Ethiopia and Eritrea Are Preparing for War: Tigray Faces Another Catastrophic Conflict

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Video originally published on August 7, 2025.

Three years after a ceasefire ended one of the deadliest conflicts since the Second Congo War, the Horn of Africa stands on the precipice of renewed catastrophe. Ethiopia and Eritrea, former allies in the brutal Tigray War that claimed an estimated 600,000 lives between 2020 and 2022, are now moving military equipment toward their borders while publicly denying any such preparations. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's urgent July 3rd appeal to religious leaders to prevent Tigray from "entering conflict" has done little to calm fears that the shattered region may once again become a battleground. The bitter irony is that this time, the two nations that jointly invaded Tigray may turn their weapons on each other, with the devastated region caught in the crossfire of a war driven by Ethiopia's obsession with regaining Red Sea access and Eritrea's sense of betrayal over the 2022 Pretoria Agreement that excluded it from peace negotiations.

Key Takeaways

Ethiopian and Eritrean forces are repositioning military equipment near their borders despite official denials, raising alarm among regional experts.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's July 3rd speech explicitly warned religious leaders to prevent Tigray from entering renewed conflict.

The 2020-2022 Tigray War resulted in approximately 600,000 deaths through combat, starvation blockades, and atrocities committed by all sides.

Ethiopia's push to regain Red Sea access, lost when Eritrea gained independence in 1993, has become a central driver of regional tensions.

The 2022 Pretoria Agreement that ended the Tigray War excluded both Eritrea and Amhara leadership, sowing seeds for current instability.

Tigray's political landscape has fractured, with the TPLF splitting into two heavily-armed factions after a March 2025 coup.

The Forgotten Apocalypse: Understanding the Tigray War's Devastating Legacy

The Tigray War that raged from November 2020 to late 2022 stands as one of the most catastrophic conflicts of the 21st century, yet it passed largely unnoticed by global media. As Ethiopian federal forces marched through northern Tigray, they implemented a deliberate starvation policy, setting farms and crops ablaze to force the region into submission. The resulting famine, never officially declared, is believed to have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. The atrocities extended far beyond government forces. When Tigrayan forces invaded the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions, they conducted their own massacres. Eritrean soldiers rampaged through cities, engaging in systematic looting and mass sexual violence. By the time the ceasefire was declared in late 2022, the death toll had reached an estimated 600,000 people. If confirmed, this figure would make the Tigray War the deadliest conflict humanity had witnessed since the Second Congo War ended in 2003.

The war's invisibility on the global stage resulted from unfortunate timing and geographical distance. Kicking off during the COVID-19 pandemic and concluding the same year Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict was simply too distant and too complicated to capture sustained international attention. This same lack of awareness may explain why alarm bells aren't ringing louder now as the region slides back toward the abyss. The pieces for renewed conflict are unmistakably in place: Tigray remains divided and heavily militarized, with up to 200,000 soldiers never disarmed after the Pretoria Agreement. Both Ethiopian federal forces and the Eritrean Defence Forces are repositioning equipment near their borders while loudly proclaiming they're doing nothing of the sort. As one anonymous Tigrayan author wrote in the New Humanitarian, "Everyone is reminded of 2020, in the months before the last war broke out, and everyone is afraid that another war is looming."

The Red Sea Obsession: Ethiopia's Quest for Coastal Access

At the heart of current tensions lies Ethiopia's determination to regain access to the Red Sea, lost when Eritrea gained independence in 1993 following a long and bitter war. That independence transformed Ethiopia into the world's most-populous landlocked country, a status that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has vowed to reverse. This ambition briefly threatened to spark war between Ethiopia and Somalia when Addis Ababa signed a memorandum with the breakaway republic of Somaliland, offering recognition in exchange for port access. The federal government in Somalia reacted with outrage, and following Turkish mediation, Abiy eventually backed down—though he never abandoned his coastal aspirations.

With the Somaliland route closed, Ethiopia faces essentially two options for reaching the coast: Djibouti, where it already leases a port, and Eritrea. Analysts fear that Abiy may have identified the Eritrean port of Assab as the perfect target. The port sits a mere 60 kilometers from the Ethiopian border in a remote region where Eritrean state power is limited. There's even a vague historical justification for Ethiopian claims. One condition of Eritrean independence was that Addis Ababa would retain access to Assab. However, this arrangement was rescinded when the two states went to war over their borders in 1998. Although the fighting lasted only until 2000, Ethiopia refused to accept the decisions of a post-war boundary commission, prompting Eritrea to refuse restoration of port access. This stalemate persisted until 2018, when the newly-ascendant Abiy Ahmed struck a deal with Eritrea's longtime dictator, Isaias Afwerki, to thaw relations. The agreement was supposed to implement the boundary commission findings and grant Ethiopia port access—a breakthrough considered so significant that it earned Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize. The supreme irony is that just two years later, having settled their differences, Addis Ababa and Asmara joined forces to invade Tigray, launching one of the most apocalyptic wars fought in decades.

The TPLF's Rise and Fall: Historical Context for Current Tensions

Understanding why Ethiopia and Eritrea were so eager to invade Tigray requires examining the Tigray People's Liberation Front's role in Ethiopian politics. The TPLF dominated the Ethiopian government following the fall of the dictatorship in 1991, which means they were in charge during the border crisis and war with Eritrea in 1998-2000. While they governed in coalition with other ethnic groups, they were perceived as oppressive toward minorities like the Amhara and Oromo. When Abiy Ahmed came to power on the back of widespread protests in 2018, he quickly moved to sideline the TPLF. The heavily-armed TPLF retreated to its home region and refused to recognize federal authority. In November 2020, this political standoff erupted into active warfare.

The war saw Abiy and Isaias Afwerki team up with Amhara militias to crush the TPLF. All sides committed atrocities, including the Tigrayans. However, it was Ethiopia's federal forces that implemented the starvation blockade, and Eritrean soldiers who committed the majority of mass sexual violence. The seeds for today's tensions weren't sown during the war itself, but during the peace process. In November 2022, Abiy's government signed the Pretoria Agreement with Tigrayan leadership, ending the fighting. Critically, Eritrea—despite its soldiers occupying chunks of Tigray—was excluded from the talks, along with Amhara leadership. From this single decision, all the chaos of the next three years would flow.

The Pretoria Agreement's Fatal Flaw: Excluding Key Stakeholders

The most immediate impact of excluding Amhara leadership from the Pretoria Agreement was that the Amhara region erupted into rebellion. Technically, the trigger was Abiy's spring 2023 demand that their militia disarm, but a huge contributing factor was fear that Abiy would return chunks of land annexed during the fighting to the Tigrayans—land the Amhara consider to have been stolen from them by Tigrayans decades earlier. That rebellion started in mid-2023 and continues to this day, stretching federal military resources thin. The bigger issue was that Isaias Afwerki felt betrayed by Abiy, and Abiy knew it. As Ethiopia Insight puts it, "Following Pretoria, Ethiopia and Eritrea began hedging against each other."

On Eritrea's side, hedging meant funding rebellious groups in Ethiopia such as the Amhara, while also purchasing military equipment in preparation for potential war. For Ethiopia, it meant arming Eritrean opposition forces. Both sides attempted to meddle in Tigray's internal politics, a task made easier by the ceasefire's shattering effect on regional unity. The Pretoria Agreement allowed the TPLF to form its own interim regional government, but gave Addis Ababa veto power over its leadership. Initially, the TPLF wanted its chairman, Debretsion Gebremichael, as head of the regional government. When this was refused, they settled on the younger Getachew Reda. Perhaps in a parallel universe where the guarantors of the peace deal—the African Union and United States—ensured compliance with its major points, this arrangement might have worked. Perhaps there's a universe where the Ethiopian government invested heavily in reconstructing Tigray, where Eritrea unilaterally withdrew its troops, where the territorial dispute between Amharans and Tigrayans magically vanished, and where Abiy and Isaias chose reconciliation over continued antagonism. But in reality, the failures of the peace deal led parts of the TPLF to turn on Getachew.

Tigray's Internal Fracture: The Split That Could Reignite War

In August 2024, Getachew Reda was expelled from the TPLF, before being overthrown in a coup this March by Debretsion. At that point, it became clear that not everyone in Tigray was as anti-Getachew as the coup plotters imagined. With Getachew fleeing to Addis Ababa, the TPLF split in two. On one hand stands the old guard of the party, clustered around Debretsion in the regional capital of Mekelle. On the other, a new offshoot that branded itself the Tigray Peace Forces, based today in neighboring Afar region with the primary goal of overthrowing the TPLF. Critically, both factions are heavily armed. Up to 200,000 Tigrayan soldiers were never disarmed after Pretoria, and many have now taken sides in the dispute.

Ethiopia and Eritrea are both inserting themselves into this internal conflict. In Addis Ababa, the federal government appears to be using Getachew's new party as a means to support the breakaway faction. But the more shocking development is that the TPLF seems to be reacting by forming an alliance with Eritrea—the very nation whose forces looted Tigray and mass-raped its women. The New Humanitarian reports that "Pro-government propagandists in Tigray and Eritrea have taken to calling (their growing alliance) Tsimdo, a Tigrinya word for the yoke that ties two oxen to the same plough." Foreign Affairs speculates that this newfound cross-border unity might be driven by shady business deals, with accusations that TPLF leadership have abandoned their principles in favor of profits from gold smuggling and human trafficking. However, the old adage "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" also applies. For some in the TPLF, there's no greater enemy than Abiy Ahmed—the Nobel Peace Prize winner who invaded their homeland and starved their people into submission.

The UAE Factor: External Powers and Red Sea Ambitions

Abiy's recent obsession with gaining coastal access may be born from historical grievances, but as Ethiopia Insight notes, it also aligns remarkably well with the goals of his main backer, the United Arab Emirates. The UAE is engaged in something of an arms race with regional rivals like Iran over Red Sea access, which they view as key to becoming dominant powers in the region. It's a race the UAE is currently winning, having already annexed the Yemeni islands of Socotra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden. But it's also one that has seen Abu Dhabi take bewildering gambles—like providing arms and funding to the genocidal Rapid Support Forces in Sudan's ongoing civil war.

With the RSF no longer threatening the Sudanese coast and with Eritrea aligned with their rival, the Sudanese Armed Forces, Abiy's push for a port may represent the UAE's next best option. While it's impossible to know what's happening in the military planning rooms of the UAE, the fact that the two are in alliance points to a worrying possibility: that any war might pull in a host of outside actors. Just as regional powers are fueling Sudan's self-destruction, arms and funding from external sources might make a conflagration between Addis Ababa and Asmara burn all the brighter. As the Critical Threats Project observed, "The UN lifted the arms embargo on Eritrea in 2018, and Afwerki has strengthened defense ties with Russia since. Ethiopia has also built defense partnerships with Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. These same countries are fueling the conflict in neighboring Sudan and could do the same in Ethiopia. China has ties with both countries."

Why War Remains Unlikely—But Not Impossible

Despite the ominous signs, most analysts still believe a war won't happen, primarily because there are so many ways it could go catastrophically wrong for either side. Ethiopia is currently fighting multiple insurgencies, including one in Amhara region that has seen the government lose control of the countryside. Eritrea, meanwhile, is suspected to have suffered massive casualties during the previous round of fighting in Tigray. The TPLF is in no better shape. While it still has hundreds of thousands of men under arms, the party lost the Tigray War and now presides over a shattered region nowhere close to recovery. The party itself is divided, losing the trust of local people, and appears to be hoping that an alliance with one of the nations that attacked it will somehow lead to a positive outcome. As the Africa is a Country blog writes, "Leaders in Asmara, Addis Ababa, or Mekelle are not keen to launch another war. They all have thinly stretched resources."

However, the bad news is that there's always potential for miscalculation. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have moved heavy equipment near their borders, and the constant ramping up of nationalist rhetoric can make deescalation near impossible if something does happen. The precedent of Thailand and Cambodia, where a minor border skirmish turned into a short, sharp war that left over 100 people dead, serves as a cautionary tale. While the most likely scenario is a conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea that pulls in Tigray, there's also the possibility for the reverse to occur. Right now, significant tension is simmering in Afar region bordering Tigray. Not only did the TPLF annex three kebeles there during the war, but the region is also hosting the Tigray Peace Forces—the armed group that split from and wants to bring down the TPLF. On July 1st, the two groups briefly skirmished along the regional borders. While the fighting came to nothing, it was an ominous sign that the split in Tigrayan politics is already turning violent and that another war could erupt in this broken land at any time.

The Horn of Africa's Endless Cycle of Conflict

The chance of conflict, then, is not zero. And even if it turns out to be limited and confined to Tigray or skirmishes along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, this would hardly be cause for celebration. In their deep dive on the tensions, Ethiopia Insight concluded with a depressing observation: "The Horn of Africa is a mosaic of failed states, contested sovereignties, and endless war. Eritrea and South Sudan emerged through secession. Somaliland remains unrecognized. Sudan burns. Somalia stagnates. Ethiopia, far from stabilizing post-Pretoria, faces new ruptures as intra-elite conflict, regional rivalries, and competing sovereignties intensify."

For whatever reason, the fate of east Africa in the first half of this decade has been to become the battleground for the world's rising and falling powers—a place where states like the UAE, Iran, Russia, and Turkey flex their muscles and settle their differences through distant bouts of bloodshed. Changing this fate depends on heroic levels of self-restraint from regional leaders like Abiy, Isaias, and the fractured leadership in Tigray. Whether or not they possess that restraint is something the world can only wait and see. What is certain is that the people of Tigray, having already endured one of the deadliest conflicts of the 21st century, now face the prospect of their shattered region becoming a battleground once again—whether as the site of renewed civil war or as collateral damage in a larger conflict between their former oppressors.

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FAQ

How many people died in the Tigray War?

The Tigray War that lasted from November 2020 to late 2022 resulted in an estimated 600,000 deaths through combat, starvation blockades, and atrocities. If confirmed, this would make it the deadliest conflict since the Second Congo War ended in 2003.

Why did Ethiopia and Eritrea invade Tigray together in 2020?

The TPLF dominated Ethiopian government from 1991 and was perceived as oppressive toward minorities. When Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he sidelined the TPLF, which retreated to Tigray and refused to recognize federal authority. In November 2020, this political standoff erupted into war, with Ethiopia and Eritrea teaming up with Amhara militias to crush the TPLF.

What was the Pretoria Agreement?

The Pretoria Agreement was signed in November 2022 between Abiy's government and Tigrayan leadership to end the Tigray War. Critically, it excluded both Eritrea (despite its soldiers occupying parts of Tigray) and Amhara leadership from negotiations, which sowed seeds for current instability.

Why does Ethiopia want Red Sea access?

When Eritrea gained independence in 1993, Ethiopia lost its coastline and became the world's most-populous landlocked country. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has vowed to regain sea access, with the Eritrean port of Assab being a potential target as it sits only 60 kilometers from the Ethiopian border.

What caused the TPLF to split?

The Pretoria Agreement allowed the TPLF to form an interim regional government but gave Addis Ababa veto power over leadership. After Getachew Reda was installed instead of chairman Debretsion Gebremichael, failures of the peace deal led to internal tensions. Getachew was expelled in August 2024 and overthrown in a March 2025 coup, causing the TPLF to split into two heavily-armed factions.

Why is the TPLF now allied with Eritrea?

Despite Eritrean forces committing mass atrocities against Tigrayans during the war, the TPLF appears to have formed an alliance with Eritrea, possibly driven by shady business deals involving gold smuggling and human trafficking, or following the principle that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'—with Abiy Ahmed being their common enemy.

What role does the UAE play in these tensions?

The UAE is Abiy's main backer and is engaged in an arms race with regional rivals like Iran over Red Sea access. Abiy's push for coastal access aligns with UAE goals, and the UAE has already annexed Yemen's Socotra islands and funded the RSF in Sudan's civil war, raising concerns about external involvement in any Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict.

Why is the Amhara region in rebellion?

The Amhara region erupted into rebellion in mid-2023, triggered by Abiy's demand that their militia disarm and fear that he would return land annexed during the Tigray War back to Tigrayans—land the Amhara consider stolen from them decades earlier. This rebellion continues today.

Sources

About the Author

Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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