South Sudan Is Sliding into War: How the World's Youngest Nation Faces Collapse in 2025

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Video originally published on September 17, 2025.

Not long ago, the potential collapse of the world's youngest country would have dominated headlines and commanded urgent attention from the United Nations to the African Union. Yet in 2025, South Sudan appears to be sliding toward civil war almost by default — its warning signs visible since early 2024, widely acknowledged by ruling elites and international actors alike, and yet met with a paralysis that borders on collective resignation. The machinations in the capital Juba are driving a deep ethnic split among elites. Outside powers are interfering. A galloping economic crisis, exacerbated by refugee inflows and weapons flooding across the border from war-torn Sudan, is stripping the state of its last reserves of stability. All the ingredients for societal collapse are in place, and unless the wider world intervenes, a return to the civil war that killed some 400,000 South Sudanese last decade may already be inevitable.

Key Takeaways

South Sudan's political elite nearly unanimously assesses that the country faces existential peril, with many speaking of possible state disintegration.

President Salva Kiir's wave of purges culminated in September 2025 with the arrest and treason charges against Vice President Riek Machar, shattering the fragile 2018 peace framework that forced Dinka and Nuer leaders to govern together.

The main armed opposition (SPLM-IO) declared the government illegitimate on September 15, 2025, called for regime change, and ordered supporters to report to military bases for conscription.

Nuer militias including the White Army are mobilizing in Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Unity states, while the government has allegedly forcibly conscripted teenagers off Juba's streets.

South Sudan experienced perhaps its worst economic crisis since independence in 2024-2025, with inflation hitting 120 percent, currency collapse, and the state stopping payment to soldiers and civil servants.

The civil war in neighboring Sudan ruptured critical oil pipelines that account for roughly 85 percent of South Sudan's government revenues, while nearly one million refugees crossed the border in 2024 alone.

Prelude to Bloodshed: The Warnings No One Is Heeding

The International Crisis Group issued one of the starkest warnings at the start of September 2025: "South Sudanese elites are nearly unanimous in their assessment that the young country may be facing a moment of existential peril. Many speak of the possible disintegration of the state." South Sudanese scholar Geu Madit Koryom, writing in African Arguments, echoed the alarm, declaring that "South Sudan is enmeshed in a structural political crisis with no clear exit." These assessments carry the weight of observers watching the dying days of a fragile order and recognizing that the trajectory leads nowhere good.

All of this was before September 15th, when the nation's main armed opposition declared the government "illegitimate," vowed to pursue "regime change," and ordered its supporters to report to military bases for conscription. Yet most people outside the region have heard nothing about South Sudan's impending collapse — not because journalists and experts aren't raising the alarm, but because the world is so saturated with active conflicts that events in Juba get crowded out.

This is particularly tragic because South Sudan represents one of the few crises on Earth that the international community could conceivably still stop. Founded in 2011 after splitting from Sudan following a long war of independence, South Sudan is home to roughly 12 million people spread across sixty tribes and ethnic groups. Two ethnicities dominate the political landscape: the Dinka and the Nuer. Together comprising about fifty percent of the population, the larger Dinka and smaller Nuer were also the two main factions in the civil war that erupted shortly after independence — a war defined by ethnic massacres on the streets of Juba and eyewatering atrocities committed by all sides.

The Fragile Peace: How the 2018 Accord Papered Over Deep Divisions

When peace was signed in 2018, the framework forced the leaders of both warring sides to govern together. Salva Kiir of the Dinka group became president, while Riek Machar from the Nuer faction was installed as his most important vice president in a country with a surplus of them. The idea was that the two would rule together until a path could be cleared for elections. While Kiir kept delaying those elections — currently due in 2026, having been postponed twice — Machar appears to have been content to bide his time, operating under the assumption that he would take over once Kiir died.

This arrangement was far from ideal for ordinary South Sudanese. Between 2020 and 2025, Kiir and Machar seem to have treated "governing" as synonymous with "looting," stripping the nation of its resources and redirecting money to elites. Kiir's private medical unit reportedly received more funding than the rest of the country's healthcare system combined. A recent UN report described the situation bluntly: "The country has been captured by a predatory elite that has institutionalised the systematic looting of the nation's wealth for private gain."

Ethnic fighting and bloodshed continued in the countryside throughout this period. Still, the years of looting saw less killing than the years of open war. It is precisely this precarious equilibrium that Kiir's recent maneuvers have now destroyed.

Backstory: The Roots of South Sudan's Cycle of Violence

Understanding the current crisis requires grappling with the fact that South Sudan's leaders have been involved in conflict for most of their lives. Both Kiir and Machar were members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which formed in 1983 to fight against Khartoum in the Second Sudanese Civil War. That conflict, lasting until 2005, gave birth to South Sudan as an independent nation — one of the key aspects of the peace deal was the right for Juba to hold a referendum on splitting from its old overlord, which it did in 2011.

But Kiir and Machar did not always fight on the same side. Between 1991 and 2002, Machar led a splinter faction based in his ethnic Nuer stronghold of Upper Nile State, a faction that accepted money and arms from Khartoum to fight against its former SPLM allies. Meanwhile, Kiir was a powerful figure in the SPLM but was overshadowed by its founder, John Garang. It was only when Garang died in a helicopter crash in 2005 that Kiir was elevated to leadership — a fact that meant Machar and other SPLM elites viewed him as a temporary replacement who could be shunted aside when the time was ripe. This perception, more than anything, helped trigger South Sudan's civil war.

Independent South Sudan initially had so much oil wealth that it technically counted as a middle-income country — a startling fact for anyone who knows it today as one of the poorest nations on Earth. A major reason that oil wealth was never shared was the elite power struggle that broke out in Juba. Worried that other SPLM members were vying to replace him, Kiir sacked multiple government ministers in 2013, including Riek Machar. Furious, Machar created his own group, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).

As Crisis Group describes: "After violence erupted in Juba, South Sudan's army and ruling party shattered into several competing factions, largely along ethnic lines, kicking off catastrophic fighting." The ethnic dimension made the civil war exceptionally bitter. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) explains the mechanism: "Political rivals, traditional leaders, and businesspeople weaponize identities through hate speech and patronage networks, mobilizing or partnering with armed youth, government soldiers, and mercenaries."

The war was also about territory. Machar's Nuer group is concentrated in the states of Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei — and Unity and Upper Nile happen to be where the largest of South Sudan's oil reserves are found. Control of the Greater Upper Nile region became a central strategic objective. The involvement of outside powers added further accelerant: Uganda leapt in to keep Kiir's forces afloat, while the Sudanese government in Khartoum backed Machar. The resulting civil war killed 400,000 people, displaced millions, and was defined by endless cycles of ethnic massacres. It ended only in 2018 when Uganda and Sudan helped broker a peace accord.

The Plot Thickens: Kiir's Purges and Machar's Treason Charges

Starting in late 2024, President Kiir did something almost unbelievably reckless in such a fragile country: he instigated a wave of purges that removed senior SPLM-IO members from government, threatening to tear up the 2018 peace deal. This wave culminated in September 2025 with the arrest and charging of Vice President Riek Machar with treason.

To be clear, the charges against Machar are not without basis. Even aside from the atrocities his forces committed during the civil war, Machar has a documented history of deploying armed groups to advance his interests. When the Nuer White Army overran an army base and captured the strategic town of Nasir in Upper Nile State earlier in 2025, Machar's fingerprints were reportedly all over the operation. A cynical but plausible reading is that the White Army's takeover of Nasir was ordered by Machar to help secure the oil-rich region ahead of a potential renewed civil war.

But just because Machar may well be guilty of treason and war crimes does not make his indictment any less explosive — especially when combined with the broader pattern of anti-Nuer and anti-SPLM-IO actions Kiir has been taking. Alongside charging seven other high-level Machar allies, Kiir has removed Machar's faction from all their government posts. On September 1st, the president dismissed the governor of Western Bahr el Ghazal state, replacing him with a member of a splinter SPLM-IO faction loyal to Juba. As Radio Tamazuj explains: "The [2018 peace] agreement granted Machar's SPLM-IO the authority to nominate governors for Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. Kiir had already removed the governors of Upper Nile and Western Equatoria states earlier this year. With [the governor's] dismissal, Machar's faction no longer holds any gubernatorial posts."

These political machinations are already having consequences on the ground. Crisis Group reports that "troops are mobilising in Nuer areas, including Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states." The SPLM-IO's September 15th declaration that the government is "illegitimate" was accompanied by a call for all supporters to report to bases for conscription and prepare for "regime change."

It is not only Machar's faction that is arming and recruiting. In June, the Guardian reported on teenagers who had been disappeared off the streets of Juba during a so-called anti-gang crackdown. According to the report, "parents were reported to be unable to locate their children at detention facilities, as allegations surfaced of forced conscription into the South Sudan People's Defence Forces" — the official army of South Sudan. Signs are everywhere that the major factions are preparing for conflict.

Why Now: Kiir's Health, Bol Mel's Rise, and Elite Fractures

A central question hangs over the crisis: why is South Sudan imploding in 2025 rather than two years ago or five years from now? One obvious answer is that Kiir may not be around much longer. The 73-year-old president is in such poor health that when he disappeared from public view for a few days earlier this year, rumors flew that he had died.

Aged and ailing, Kiir appears to have started panicking about his legacy. Rather than clearing the way for Machar as the peace deal implicitly envisioned, he has gone on a spree of purges designed to make way for his protégé, the businessman Benjamin Bol Mel. The problem is that Bol Mel is Dinka, like Kiir himself. For the Nuer watching the high drama in the capital, it is not just that their man Machar is being purged — it is that they may be watching their rivals secure permanent dominance.

As Geu Madit Koryom writes in African Arguments: "The rapid promotion and political elevation of Benjamin Bol Mel, widely rumoured to be the President's preferred successor, has sent strong signals that the government is preparing for a non-electoral, unilateral transition of power. Such actions deepen mistrust, particularly within SPLM-IO ranks."

The discontent is not confined to Machar's party. There are rumbles of a split among Kiir's own loyalists, with even the president's family reportedly divided over Bol Mel's rise. Meanwhile, Machar's SPLM-IO has itself fractured into two factions: one loyal to the arrested vice president and one that has pledged to work with Kiir. These elite fractures are multiplying the fault lines along which the country could shatter.

Economic Collapse: The Crisis That Stripped the State Bare

If South Sudan has been politically fragile since independence, the last two years have also seen it pass into a state of economic fragility so precarious that it is remarkable things have held together at all. In January 2025, the Economist declared that South Sudan was "experiencing perhaps its worst economic crisis since independence."

The headline figures are staggering. In 2024, inflation hit 120 percent. The local currency has collapsed against the dollar. Staples have become so expensive that street gangs in Juba have seen a recruitment boom among teenagers with no other prospects. At the same time, the state has so little money that it has stopped paying its civil servants and soldiers.

African Arguments describes the grim reality of how the security forces now sustain themselves: "Fighters are paid not with salaries, but with access to checkpoints, trade routes, and looted goods. As state revenues dry up, violent control over resource flows replaces institutional taxation." In practice, the government has resorted to paying its fighters not with cash but with permission to set up roadblocks — effectively offering the promise of shakedowns in lieu of payment. It is an absurd way to run an army, even in a country as corrupt as South Sudan.

The Sudan Factor: Oil Pipelines, Refugees, and Weapons Flows

The economic collapse is inseparable from a gigantic external factor: the civil war in Sudan. As South Sudan's northern neighbor and former overlord, what happens in Sudan has an outsized impact on Juba. South Sudan exports its oil overland through pipelines that run across Sudanese territory, and these exports make up roughly 85 percent of government revenues. When one of the two main pipelines ruptured in 2024 along the frontlines between Sudan's warring parties — the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — it was too dangerous to repair for over a year. While oil is now moving again, the lost revenue has not magically reappeared, and drone attacks by the RSF on oil terminals near the border threaten to shut down Juba's exports once more.

The Sudan conflict is also dragging South Sudan's elites into taking sides. After trying to remain neutral throughout 2023 and 2024, the Sudan War Monitor claims that Kiir's government began trading with the RSF, providing fuel in exchange for weapons. This may explain why the RSF crossed the border into Upper Nile State in March 2025, where they fought a two-day battle with armed members of Machar's SPLM-IO.

Even without this gravitational pull, the sheer intensity of fighting in Sudan would be enough to destabilize South Sudan. Across the whole of 2024, nearly one million refugees fled across the border. South Sudan is one of the poorest countries on the planet with a population of just 12 million — the pressure of absorbing so many displaced people during a time of economic crisis and political fragility is immense.

Refugees are not the only source of pressure. Bandit groups and criminal gangs are using the chaos in Sudan to establish cross-border networks. A July 2025 United Nations report described how the RSF appeared to be funneling sophisticated weaponry such as BRG55 infantry assault rifles into South Sudan in exchange for fuel and food to continue their own war against the SAF. The flood of weapons into an already militarized society is a dangerous accelerant.

Uganda and the Hunt for Outside Backers

The RSF is not the only outside actor deepening the crisis. Uganda has been supplying troops to prop up Kiir's regime since at least spring 2025, with Ugandan forces rumored to have conducted airstrikes on Nasir when it was under control of the White Army. African Arguments explains Uganda's strategic interests: "South Sudan serves as a critical market for Ugandan goods, a transit corridor for regional trade, and a buffer against rebel movements along its northern frontier."

According to Crisis Group, Machar's faction and others are also hunting for outside backers, although they do not appear to have secured any yet. However, the trajectory is ominous. Should the RSF become more deeply involved with Kiir's government, it is likely that the SAF will start backing Machar with arms and gold — replicating the proxy dynamics that fueled the previous civil war.

Social Media, Hate Speech, and the Specter of Ethnic Massacres

Against this backdrop of political purges, economic collapse, and external interference, there has been an intense uptick in charged ethno-nationalist content on social media. This content exists purely to stoke hatreds between the Dinka and Nuer ahead of renewed fighting — echoing the hate speech and identity weaponization that preceded the worst atrocities of the previous civil war, including door-to-door massacres on the streets of Juba and the rape and mutilation of women based on their ethnic background.

The ACLED framework for understanding South Sudan's violence — in which political rivals, traditional leaders, and businesspeople weaponize identities through hate speech and patronage networks — is playing out in real time on digital platforms, reaching audiences far beyond the capital and priming communities for the kind of ethnic violence that defined the 2013–2018 conflict.

A Crisis the World Could Still Stop — But Probably Won't

To sum up the situation: South Sudan in 2025 is in the most dangerous position it has been in since the end of the civil war. Its elite is riven by internal divisions. Its army is underpaid and starving. Ethnic militias are arming. The SPLM-IO is threatening regime change. The warring parties in Sudan are pouring fuel onto the fire. And the international community — distracted by conflicts elsewhere — is standing by.

What makes this particularly agonizing is that South Sudan is one of the few active crises where international intervention could conceivably make a difference. The country's small population, its dependence on external oil transit routes, and the leverage held by regional actors like Uganda all mean that concerted diplomatic pressure could, in theory, pull the country back from the brink.

But no such pressure appears to be forthcoming. Instead, the world seems to be watching South Sudan's slide toward catastrophe with the helpless detachment of an audience watching a television drama barrel toward its inevitable, bloodsoaked finale. If the trajectory is not altered, 2025 may go down as a year in South Sudanese history even worse than 2013 — the year the country finally collapsed.

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FAQ

Why is South Sudan sliding toward civil war in 2025?

President Salva Kiir has launched a wave of purges removing Nuer leaders from government, culminating in treason charges against Vice President Riek Machar. Combined with economic collapse, the Sudan conflict disrupting oil revenues, and Kiir's apparent plan to install a Dinka successor rather than allow the Nuer's Machar to take power, the fragile 2018 peace deal has collapsed. Ethnic militias are now mobilizing and the opposition has called for regime change.

What was the 2018 peace agreement and why is it falling apart?

The 2018 peace accord ended a civil war that killed 400,000 people by forcing President Salva Kiir (Dinka) and Vice President Riek Machar (Nuer) to govern together until elections could be held. The framework granted Machar's SPLM-IO faction key government posts and governorships. Kiir has now systematically removed all SPLM-IO members from these positions and charged Machar with treason, effectively tearing up the agreement.

Who are the main ethnic groups involved in the conflict?

The two dominant groups are the Dinka (larger) and Nuer (smaller), who together comprise about 50 percent of South Sudan's 12 million people. President Kiir is Dinka while Vice President Machar is Nuer. The previous 2013-2018 civil war was largely fought along these ethnic lines, with political elites weaponizing ethnic identities through hate speech and patronage networks to mobilize armed groups.

How is the Sudan civil war affecting South Sudan?

South Sudan exports oil through pipelines crossing Sudan, which account for roughly 85 percent of government revenues. One main pipeline ruptured in 2024 along Sudan's frontlines and was too dangerous to repair for over a year. Nearly one million Sudanese refugees fled into South Sudan in 2024. The RSF is reportedly trading sophisticated weapons to South Sudan for fuel, while both Sudanese factions threaten to back opposing sides in any renewed South Sudanese civil war.

What role is Uganda playing in the crisis?

Uganda has been supplying troops to prop up Kiir's regime since at least spring 2025, with Ugandan forces rumored to have conducted airstrikes on the town of Nasir when it was controlled by the Nuer White Army. South Sudan serves as a critical market for Ugandan goods, a transit corridor for regional trade, and a buffer against rebel movements along Uganda's northern frontier.

Why did President Kiir charge Vice President Machar with treason?

The charges stem from Machar's alleged role in ordering the Nuer White Army to overrun an army base and capture the strategic oil-rich town of Nasir in Upper Nile State. While the charges may have basis—Machar has a documented history of deploying armed groups—they are also part of Kiir's broader purge of Nuer leaders as the 73-year-old president in poor health appears to be clearing the way for his Dinka protégé Benjamin Bol Mel.

How bad is South Sudan's economic crisis?

In 2024, inflation hit 120 percent and the local currency collapsed against the dollar. The state has stopped paying civil servants and soldiers, instead giving fighters permission to set up roadblocks and shake down citizens for payment. Street gangs in Juba have seen recruitment booms among teenagers with no prospects. The Economist declared it perhaps South Sudan's worst economic crisis since independence.

What happened during South Sudan's previous civil war?

The 2013-2018 civil war erupted after President Kiir sacked multiple ministers including Machar, who then formed the SPLM-IO opposition. The conflict killed 400,000 people, displaced millions, and was defined by ethnic massacres including door-to-door killings in Juba and systematic rape and mutilation of women based on ethnicity. Uganda backed Kiir while Sudan's Khartoum government backed Machar, turning it into a proxy war over the oil-rich Greater Upper Nile region.

Sources

About the Author

Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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