India’s Water Gambit: How the Indus Treaty Could Starve Pakistan

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Video originally published on May 8, 2025.

A terror attack on tourists in Kashmir has reignited the India‑Pakistan rivalry, sending both capitals into a rapid cycle of retaliation and military posturing. While missiles and artillery dominate headlines, the most consequential weapon in this renewed standoff may be the water that flows from the Himalayas into the Indus basin. With the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty suspended, India now possesses a lever that could reshape Pakistan’s agriculture, economy, and even its very survival.

Key Takeaways

India’s unilateral suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty after the Kashmir terror attack gives it a strategic water lever against Pakistan.
The Indus River supplies about 80% of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture, making water flow a critical economic and food security lifeline.
India currently cannot fully cut off the Indus flow, but can manipulate releases and build reservoirs to gradually reduce downstream water.
Pakistan’s diplomatic options—World Bank, ICJ, UN Security Council—are limited and unlikely to compel India to restore treaty terms.
If India expands dams and diversion projects, it could create a multi‑generational water war, threatening Pakistan’s agriculture and urban supply.
The treaty’s historical success hinged on India’s limited water use; suspending it removes that constraint and opens the door to large‑scale water weaponization.

Escalating Tensions After the Kashmir Terror Attack

In the wake of a horrific terror assault on tourists in the disputed Kashmir region, New Delhi has publicly blamed Pakistan and vowed revenge, while Islamabad has denied responsibility and pledged to defend itself with "all its might." Within days, Indian forces launched retaliatory strikes against three Pakistani targets, and Pakistan responded with shelling along the Line of Control and alleged shoot‑downs of Indian aircraft. Heavy weapons are moving, troops are massing, and the international community finds itself largely powerless to intervene as the two nuclear‑armed neighbors edge closer to open conflict. After a horrific terror attack against tourists in the disputed region of Kashmir, India’s leaders have vowed revenge on Pakistan, insisting that it was India’s long-time adversary that was truly behind the assault. All six of the rivers pass through Indian territory, most of them through the India-controlled portion of the disputed Kashmir region, before they flow into Pakistan, slowly unifying with each other until they all converge in central Pakistan.

The Indus Waters Treaty: Historical Framework and Strategic Leverage

Signed in 1960 by Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan, the Indus Waters Treaty was designed to regulate the flow of the Indus River and its six tributaries as they descend from the Himalayas. All six rivers originate in Indian territory, most of them traversing the India‑controlled part of Kashmir before converging in central Pakistan. The treaty allocated control of three western tributaries and the main Indus to Pakistan, while granting India rights over the three eastern tributaries. Under the agreement, Pakistan receives roughly seventy percent of the water, India thirty percent, and India is barred from constructing large dams or catchment zones that could significantly alter downstream flows. For decades the treaty survived three wars and numerous terror incidents without violation, earning a reputation as one of the world’s most successful water‑sharing accords.

India’s Potential Water‑Based Strategies Against Pakistan

After the Kashmir attack, New Delhi unilaterally suspended the treaty, stating that it would remain so until Pakistan "credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross‑border terrorism." Although India cannot yet cut off the Indus entirely—no large reservoirs or diversion projects are currently in place—the country has begun to demonstrate its leverage. In late April, a sudden surge in the Jhelum was attributed to snowmelt, but the episode raised concerns that India could withhold and then release water at will. More concretely, on May 3‑4 India flushed water from two dams on the Chenab, citing routine silt removal, yet the timing was atypical and signaled a willingness to manipulate flows. India has also suspended the routine exchange of flow data that Pakistan normally receives, a move that could leave Islamabad vulnerable to unexpected floods or droughts. Simultaneously, Indian authorities are expanding reservoir capacity at two hydroelectric dams in Kashmir and planning additional dam and diversion projects that could become operational within months to years. These steps, while not yet capable of a full cutoff, lay the groundwork for a future where India could restrict, store, or even unleash massive floods downstream. Water Minister statements underscore the strategic intent: "We will ensure no drop of the Indus River’s water reaches Pakistan." If pursued over time, such a policy could evolve from short‑term flow adjustments to a long‑term diversion or dam‑building campaign that fundamentally reshapes the basin.

Pakistan’s Vulnerabilities: Agricultural Dependence and Urban Water Supply

Approximately eighty percent of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture depends on the Indus system, translating to about a quarter of the nation’s GDP. With an estimated population of 250 million, the majority of citizens rely on these waters for food security. A sustained reduction in flow could precipitate crop failures, food shortages, and, in extreme scenarios, famine. The risk is amplified during the dry season when river levels are already at their annual low; even modest water retention by India would further diminish the trickle reaching Pakistani fields. Urban centers are equally at risk. Cities such as Hyderabad (population 2.4 million) and Multan (population 2.2 million) sit along the Indus and its tributaries. An uncontrolled release of stored water could overwhelm dams, flood these metropolises, and cripple infrastructure for generations. Conversely, a prolonged scarcity would strain municipal water supplies, exacerbating public health and economic challenges.

International Legal and Diplomatic Constraints on Water Weaponization

Pakistan’s legal recourse is limited. Officials have outlined four diplomatic avenues: raising the issue with the World Bank, which originally brokered the treaty; appealing to the International Court of Justice or the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague; and bringing the dispute before the United Nations Security Council. However, enforcement of Hague rulings depends on the willingness of the parties or a supporting international body, and the Security Council is hamstrung by divergent interests among its permanent members, including Russia, the United States, China, Britain, and France. The World Bank’s leverage is also questionable; India is the Bank’s largest partner, with senior leadership of Indian origin, potentially curbing the institution’s willingness to pressure New Delhi. Thus, while the treaty provides a legal framework, its suspension removes the immediate mechanisms that once restrained unilateral action, leaving diplomatic channels largely symbolic.

Broader Regional Implications and Paths to De‑escalation

If India proceeds to expand dams and diversions, the Indus basin could become a generational instrument of coercion, effectively holding the water needs of a nation of 250 million people hostage. Such a scenario would mark the first modern "water war" and could trigger humanitarian crises on a scale not seen in recent history. Climate trends—longer droughts, scarcer rains, expanding deserts—only heighten the stakes. Nevertheless, the timeline offers a potential off‑ramp. The construction of large water‑control infrastructure will take months to years, providing a window for diplomatic engagement. A calibrated show of capability—limited releases, reservoir expansions, and the suspension of data sharing—could satisfy domestic pressure in New Delhi while preserving space for negotiation. If both sides can agree to reinstate the treaty or establish new safeguards, the risk of a protracted water‑based conflict may be averted. Ultimately, the crisis hinges on whether the parties choose to let the water issue become a permanent strategic lever or to use it as a bargaining chip toward de‑escalation. The lives of hundreds of millions, the stability of South Asia, and the credibility of international water‑sharing norms all depend on that choice.

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FAQ

Why did India suspend the Indus Waters Treaty after the Kashmir terror attack?

India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty in the immediate aftermath of the 2025 Kashmir terror attack, stating that the treaty would remain suspended until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross‑border terrorism.” This move was intended to give India a strategic water lever and signal to both domestic and international audiences that it would use water as a tool of retaliation.

How much of Pakistan’s agriculture depends on the Indus River?

Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture depends on about eighty percent of the Indus River system, which translates to roughly a quarter of the country’s GDP. With a population of 250 million, the majority of citizens rely on these waters for food security, making any sustained reduction in flow a direct threat to national stability.

What diplomatic avenues does Pakistan have to challenge India’s water actions?

Pakistan’s diplomatic options include raising the issue with the World Bank, appealing to the International Court of Justice or the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and bringing the dispute before the United Nations Security Council. However, enforcement of court rulings is limited, and the Security Council is often deadlocked by competing interests of permanent members.

Can India actually cut off water flow to Pakistan?

India currently lacks large reservoirs or diversion projects that would allow it to completely cut off the Indus flow. It can, however, reduce downstream water volumes, release stored water in controlled bursts, and build new dams or reservoirs over time to gradually diminish Pakistan’s water supply.

What would be the consequences of India building large dams in Kashmir?

If India expands dams and diversion projects in Kashmir, it could create a multi‑generational water crisis, leading to chronic drought, reduced agricultural output, urban water shortages, and potential famine across Pakistan’s 250 million population. Such a scenario would constitute the first modern water war.

Sources

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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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