UAE Funding, El Fasher Massacre and the Quest for Justice: Uncovering a Covert Supply Chain

Watch the Episode

Video originally published on November 21, 2025.

Three weeks after the rapid seizure of El Fasher, one of Sudan's largest cities, a wave of killing has surged to a scale that rivals the two‑year death toll of the Gaza conflict. The carnage is not an isolated tragedy; it is being fed by a covert supply chain that links the United Arab Emirates to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Understanding how the fall of a single city spiraled into a genocide, the magnitude of the loss, and the geopolitical calculus that sustains it is essential for any effort to halt the bloodshed and hold perpetrators accountable.

Key Takeaways

El Fasher fell to the RSF in late October 2023, approximately three weeks before November 21, triggering a week‑long massacre that Yale researcher Nathaniel Raymond assessed could have killed more people than Gaza's two‑year death toll of over 67,000.
The United Arab Emirates is the primary external patron of the Rapid Support Forces, funneling weapons, financing, and logistical support through covert supply chains that use Uganda, Chad, and Somalia as transshipment points to maintain plausible deniability.
Investigative journalism from the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and Bellingcat revealed that UAE‑registered cargo planes carried arms disguised as humanitarian aid, with the Times documenting nightly flights to Chad's Amdjarass Airport since June 2023.
A UN panel of experts and Amnesty International confirmed that RSF forces use Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155 mm AH‑4 howitzers—equipment traced back to UAE‑facilitated shipments via Saudi Arabia—marking the first documented combat use of GB50A bombs worldwide.
UAE interests in Sudan extend beyond arms to include gold mining (70 % of exports worth $13 billion annually), agricultural landholdings exceeding 500 km² with plans to expand by 1,600 km², and control of Red Sea ports handling a third of global container traffic.
The UAE views RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) as a custodian of its interests and perceives the Sudanese Armed Forces' Islamist connections—reinforced when Islamist forces helped SAF retake Khartoum—as a threat to its regional anti‑Islamist posture.

The Fall of El Fasher: Timeline and Immediate Aftermath

On the morning of late October 2023, RSF units launched a coordinated assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. The city fell under RSF control approximately three weeks before November 21, a development confirmed by Sudanese officials and echoed in international reporting. Within a week of the capture, the city erupted into a massacre of unprecedented intensity. Nathaniel Raymond of Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab made a stark assessment: more people could have died in that single week in El Fasher than died in the previous two years in Gaza. The immediate aftermath saw the RSF consolidating its grip through systematic violence, targeting civilians, and employing heavy weaponry that had previously been unseen in Sudan. The rapid escalation transformed a military victory into a campaign of extermination, prompting Sudan's Chargé d'Affaires in Kenya, Dr. Mohamed Osman Akasha, to declare that "this is not a conflict. It is for extermination." The speed and ferocity of the violence have left the city in ruins and created a humanitarian emergency that threatens to spill beyond Darfur's borders.

Scale of the Atrocity: Mortality Figures Compared to Global Conflicts

The claim that more people could have died in a single week in El Fasher than in two years of fighting in Gaza provides a stark metric for the scale of the tragedy. The Palestinian Health Authority estimates that by October 2025 more than 67,000 people had perished in Gaza, a figure the United Nations human‑rights office believes is an undercount. If the RSF's actions in El Fasher have indeed produced a death toll that surpasses that number in just seven days, the massacre ranks among the deadliest single‑city events of the 21st century. Beyond raw numbers, the nature of the killings—systematic, indiscriminate, and directed at civilian populations—mirrors the hallmarks of genocide. The rapidity with which the death toll escalated, combined with reports of mass graves and the use of advanced weaponry, underscores a level of brutality that eclipses many contemporary conflicts and demands urgent international attention. By the time three weeks had passed since the city's fall, the death toll had undoubtedly climbed far higher, cementing El Fasher's place as one of the most catastrophic humanitarian disasters of the modern era.

UAE's Covert Involvement: Funding Channels and Strategic Motives

Multiple independent investigations converge on a single conclusion: the United Arab Emirates is the principal external patron of the RSF. The Wall Street Journal's August 10 2023 exposé revealed a UAE‑registered cargo plane, ostensibly delivering humanitarian aid, that was intercepted in Uganda and found to be carrying weapons. Ugandan officials reported that the aircraft was subsequently allowed to continue to eastern Chad under orders to cease inspection of Emirati flights. A month later, The New York Times detailed a covert operation in which UAE cargo planes landed daily at a remote Chadian airfield since June, delivering drones, weapons, and medical evacuation services for injured RSF fighters. Satellite imagery and diplomatic sources corroborated the existence of a dedicated military hospital at the site. The Times investigation identified a pattern of nightly cargo flights from the UAE to Chad's Amdjarass Airport, followed by overland convoys that delivered ammunition and medical supplies directly to RSF positions in Darfur. Subsequent reporting by Kenya's Daily Nation, the UK‑based Middle East Eye, and the investigative outlet Bellingcat expanded the picture, documenting a network of transshipment points that shield the UAE from direct attribution. Middle East Eye's October investigation linked the UAE's logistics hub in the Somali port of Bossaso to the RSF, describing the flow of hundreds of thousands of containers—some marked hazardous—through the port and the presence of Colombian mercenaries who operate a blood‑stained aircraft landing zone for wounded soldiers. Abdullahi, a senior maritime commander at Bossaso Airport, recalled one occasion when a plane carrying injured soldiers landed and the aircraft door was visibly stained with blood. A UN panel of experts in 2023 confirmed that RSF forces receive weapons and ammunition several times per week via shipments that arrive at Amdjarass Airport in Chad before being trucked to Darfur. Amnesty International added a technical dimension, identifying Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155 mm AH‑4 howitzers in RSF attacks—weaponry that had never before been documented in active combat. The bombs, sold by Saudi Arabia after being manufactured in China, illustrate the layered supply chain that ultimately routes through the UAE. Strategically, the UAE's investment in Sudan is driven by a confluence of resources and ideological considerations. Gold now accounts for roughly 70 % of Sudan's exports, with production rising from 41.8 tonnes in 2022 to 64 tonnes in 2024, generating over $13 billion—90 % of which, according to the Guardian, is funneled to the Emirates. Agricultural interests are equally significant; Emirati firms International Holding Company and Jenaan Investment cultivate more than 500 km² in northern Sudan, with plans to expand by another 1,600 km²—an area larger than the city of Abu Dhabi itself. Control of Sudan's 700 km Red Sea coastline offers the UAE a strategic foothold over a maritime chokepoint that handles a third of global container traffic. Ideologically, the UAE views RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) as a custodian of Emirati interests, especially after RSF involvement in the Yemeni civil war. The Sudanese Armed Forces' longstanding links to political Islam, dating back to Omar al‑Bashir's presidency and reinforced when Islamist forces helped the SAF retake Khartoum, represent a threat to the UAE's regional anti‑Islamist posture. For Abu Dhabi, which has positioned itself as a bulwark against Islamist movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa, these connections meant that the SAF couldn't be trusted. By supporting the RSF, the UAE could potentially install a government opposed to political Islam. Finally, the regional rivalry with Saudi Arabia, which backs the SAF, has transformed the war into a proxy conflict as both vie to be the dominant power in the region, reflecting a broader shift in global power dynamics where middle powers like the UAE are carving out their own spheres of influence.

Humanitarian Research and Eyewitness Testimony: Documenting the Atrocities

Nathaniel Raymond, Executive Director of Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab, provided a critical assessment of the El Fasher massacre approximately one week after the city's fall. His stark statement—that more people could have died in that single week than in Gaza's two‑year conflict—has become a benchmark for the international community's understanding of the crisis. Raymond's work, while not involving physical travel to Darfur, drew on satellite imagery, survivor interviews, and forensic evidence collected by his team and partner organizations to document the atrocities. The research lab's analysis of video footage from RSF attacks revealed the distinctive signatures of the Chinese GB50A bombs, linking the weaponry to the supply chain traced by Amnesty International. Eyewitness accounts gathered through remote documentation paint a harrowing picture: civilians describing forced disappearances, villages razed by aerial bombardment, and hospitals overwhelmed with the wounded. One survivor recounted how a blood‑stained aircraft door was visible as a plane landed at Bossaso, confirming the Middle East Eye report of a UAE‑facilitated medical evacuation hub. These testimonies, corroborated by independent investigations from the New York Times, Bellingcat, and UN experts, reinforce the conclusion that the RSF's capacity for mass violence is directly enabled by external funding and logistical support. The convergence of satellite data, weapons analysis, and survivor accounts provides a comprehensive evidentiary base that documents not only the scale of the killing but also the international supply chains that make it possible.

International Legal Implications and Paths to Peace

The systematic targeting of civilians in El Fasher meets the legal definition of genocide, which requires proof of intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. The scale of killings, the use of specialized weaponry, and the documented coordination of supply lines from the UAE provide a compelling evidentiary base for potential prosecution before the International Criminal Court or a specially mandated tribunal. Efforts to halt the bloodshed hinge on cutting off the external lifelines that sustain the RSF. Sudanese officials, including Dr. Akasha, have made clear that any cease‑fire requires the dismantling of the RSF, the surrender of its weapons, and accountability for its leader. During a press conference in Nairobi, Akasha told the BBC that the SAF would agree to stop fighting only if these conditions were met, stating: "I have no information about a proposal for a truce. The only thing that I know is the government of Sudan, the people of Sudan are very determined to defeat this militia." However, the RSF's recent victory in El Fasher suggests it will not relinquish its arms without significant pressure. Diplomatic signals from Abu Dhabi indicate a possible shift. In a rare statement in Bahrain, UAE senior envoy Anwar Gargash admitted that supporting the coup that toppled Sudan's civilian government was a "mistake" and called for collective action to rectify it. Quoting him directly: "We all made a mistake when the two generals who are fighting the civil war today overthrew the civilian government. That was, looking back, a critical mistake. We should have put our foot down collectively. We did not call it a coup." According to Patrick Wintour, the Guardian's diplomatic editor, this represents a striking reversal given how much the UAE has invested to support the RSF. If this admission translates into a withdrawal of material support, the RSF's operational capacity could be crippled, creating a window for negotiations. Former U.S. envoy staffer Cameron Hudson told the Washington Post that "the war would be over if not for the UAE. The only thing that is keeping [the RSF] in this war is the overwhelming amount of military support that they're receiving from the UAE." The convergence of public outcry, diplomatic admissions, and the strategic calculus of rival regional powers—most notably Saudi Arabia's backing of the Sudanese Armed Forces—could generate the pressure needed to force the UAE to reconsider its involvement. A coordinated international response would need to combine sanctions targeting Emirati entities involved in the arms supply chain, diplomatic isolation that raises the reputational cost of continued support, and incentives for disengagement such as economic partnerships or security guarantees. Sanctions could include asset freezes on companies like International Holding Company and Jenaan Investment, travel bans on officials overseeing the covert operation, and restrictions on gold imports from Sudan. Diplomatic isolation might involve suspending the UAE from regional forums or conditioning Western arms sales on verifiable withdrawal from Sudan. Incentives could offer the UAE alternative agricultural partnerships or Red Sea port access through legitimate channels that don't require backing a genocidal militia. Such a multifaceted approach, drawing on the frameworks proposed by Cameron Hudson and other Sudan experts, may represent the most viable path toward a sustainable peace that addresses both the immediate humanitarian crisis and the underlying geopolitical drivers of the conflict.

Related Coverage

FAQ

How many people died in the El Fasher massacre, and how does that compare to Gaza's death toll?

Nathaniel Raymond of Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab assessed that more people could have died in a single week in El Fasher than in Gaza's two‑year conflict, which the Palestinian Health Authority estimates at over 67,000 by October 2025, making it one of the deadliest single‑city events of the 21st century.

What concrete evidence links the UAE to the Rapid Support Forces?

Multiple sources—Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Bellingcat, a UN panel, and Amnesty International—document UAE‑registered cargo planes carrying weapons intercepted in Uganda, nightly shipments to Chad's Amdjarass Airport since June 2023, and the use of Chinese GB50A bombs and 155 mm howitzers supplied through UAE‑facilitated channels.

Why is the UAE supporting the RSF instead of the Sudanese Armed Forces?

The UAE's support is driven by economic interests including gold mining worth $13 billion annually, agricultural land exceeding 500 km², and Red Sea port control; ideological opposition to the SAF's Islamist connections dating to Omar al‑Bashir's era; and regional rivalry with Saudi‑backed SAF as both vie for dominance.

What weapons are the RSF using, and how were they obtained?

RSF forces employ Chinese GB50A guided bombs—documented in combat for the first time worldwide—and 155 mm AH‑4 howitzers, as well as drones and other armaments traced back to UAE‑facilitated shipments from China via Saudi Arabia, confirming the UAE's role as a logistical conduit through Chad and Somalia.

Could the UAE's withdrawal from the conflict lead to peace in Sudan?

Former U.S. envoy staffer Cameron Hudson stated that "the war would be over if not for the UAE," suggesting that if the UAE cuts off financial, logistical, and armament support, the RSF would face a severe resource shortfall potentially forcing negotiations, though this depends on coordinated diplomatic pressure and incentives.

What role does the Red Sea play in the UAE's strategy in Sudan?

The UAE seeks to control Sudan's 700 km Red Sea shoreline, a critical maritime chokepoint through which a third of global container traffic passes en route to the Suez Canal, thereby securing economic influence and strategic advantage as part of its positioning as a global logistics and trade hub.

What specific measures could force the UAE to withdraw support from the RSF?

A coordinated international response could combine sanctions targeting Emirati entities like International Holding Company, asset freezes and travel bans on officials overseeing the covert operation, restrictions on gold imports from Sudan, diplomatic isolation from regional forums, and incentives such as alternative agricultural partnerships or legitimate Red Sea port access that don't require backing a genocidal militia.

Sources

About the Author

Wilfred M. Waimiri

Wilfred M. Waimiri creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

About the Team →