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UAE's Overreach Unravels: How Regional Powers Turned the Tide in 2026

Geopolitics & Strategy

How Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt dismantled UAE influence in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya through coordinated action in 2026.

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Video originally published on January 31, 2026.

By early 2026 the United Arab Emirates found its sprawling network of proxies crumbling across Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Libya. Years of covert support for breakaway regions and warlords had been built on the promise of cheap loyalty, intelligence outposts and a shield for the Emirates’ export‑driven economy. A coordinated push by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and their allies has now exposed the fragility of Abu Dhabi’s playbook, reshaping the Middle Eastern balance of power and raising the specter of a wider regional destabilization.

Key Takeaways

  • For decades the UAE pursued a geo‑strategic foothold that could monitor the most volatile corners of the Middle East and North Africa.
  • The first signs of reversal appeared in Sudan, where the RSF’s offensive momentum stalled as regional actors cut off its lifelines.
  • The setbacks could not have occurred without a new level of regional coordination.
  • The rapid dismantling of Emirati proxies has produced a new strategic axis in the Middle East.
  • The article is grounded strictly in the source video script and listed references.

A Strategic Playbook of Proxy Power

For decades the UAE pursued a geo‑strategic foothold that could monitor the most volatile corners of the Middle East and North Africa. Its stated objective was to gather intelligence, station troops and keep volatile regions “peaceful enough” for the Emirates’ export‑centered economy. To achieve this, Abu Dhabi cultivated relationships with non‑state actors that other states kept at arm’s length: the breakaway region of Somaliland in Somalia, Khalifa Haftar’s rival government in Libya, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, and Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC). The tactics were consistent. The Emirates leveraged its oil wealth to fund these actors at minimal diplomatic cost, betting on their loyalty while avoiding the blow‑back that direct state‑to‑state interventions would provoke. The UAE’s support ranged from building airfields in Somaliland and southern Libya to funneling Colombian mercenaries into Sudan and providing the RSF with control over the gold trade. In Yemen, the Emirates broke from Saudi Arabia, securing de‑facto control of Aden and establishing bases on nearby islands through the STC. Parallel to these proxy ties, Abu Dhabi deepened its partnership with Israel. An intelligence‑sharing program codenamed “Crystal Ball” linked Emirati and Israeli analysts, while defense cooperation produced joint projects on unmanned naval vessels, advanced sensors and a multibillion‑dollar deal for aircraft‑mounted laser technology. This dual track—covert proxy patronage and overt security collaboration with Israel—defined the UAE’s strategic playbook up to the end of 2025.

The Collapse of Emirati‑Backed Regimes

The first signs of reversal appeared in Sudan, where the RSF’s offensive momentum stalled as regional actors cut off its lifelines. Saudi‑backed tribal units, supported by Saudi air power, launched a counteroffensive that pushed the RSF out of Darfur. Turkey and Egypt then refused Emirati use of their airspace and, in Egypt’s case, carried out an unprecedented airstrike on an RSF supply convoy on Sudanese soil. Deprived of aerial routes, the RSF turned to overland smuggling across the Chadian border, only to meet resistance from Chadian forces. In Yemen, the STC’s rapid advance against the Saudi‑backed Republic of Yemen collapsed under a Saudi‑led counterattack. The Southern Transitional Council was forced off the territory it had captured, and within weeks the movement dissolved entirely. Libya saw Haftar’s tentative plans for a new offensive dissolve as Egyptian diplomatic pressure in Cairo reminded the commander of his precarious position. The anticipated Libyan resurgence never materialized. Somalia’s fragile autonomous regions, nurtured by Emirati investment, faced a coordinated diplomatic offensive. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other states visited Somaliland and backed militias that have long opposed Emirati‑aligned authorities, leaving the region isolated and its hoped‑for recognition by Israel unrealized. Finally, the anticipated international legitimacy for Somaliland evaporated. Although Israel announced recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, the UAE and Ethiopia never followed through, and the broader Arab response—led by Turkey and Egypt—effectively isolated the breakaway state. Across these theatres, the common thread was the rapid erosion of Emirati‑backed structures once regional powers aligned their military, diplomatic and economic tools against them.

A Coordinated Regional Counteroffensive

The setbacks could not have occurred without a new level of regional coordination. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt moved from isolated protests to a joint operational front. Saudi‑backed tribal units, bolstered by Saudi air support, delivered the decisive blow to the STC in Yemen. Turkey, having joined Saudi Arabia’s collective security pact with Pakistan, began to align its military assets with Riyadh’s objectives. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia deepened its security partnership with Qatar, while Egypt sealed a new Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security accord with Riyadh. These two states also prepared a joint defense package for both Somalia and the internationally recognized Sudanese Armed Forces. Pakistan entered the fray by signing a deal to deliver fighter jets to Libya, a move intended to bring Haftar’s forces into line with the Saudi‑Turkish‑Egyptian bloc. Turkish warplanes landed in Somalia, signaling a direct threat to the Emirati‑backed Somaliland project. The emerging security architecture, though not a formal Islamic NATO, represents a de‑facto coalition of the most powerful Islamic nations, unified by a shared perception of the UAE’s proxy network as a destabilizing threat. Their coordinated actions within a single month effectively dismantled the Emirates’ regional footholds.

Domestic Strains and Governance Missteps in Abu Dhabi

Abu Dhabi’s external overreach masked internal vulnerabilities. The Emirates’ reliance on thin, proxy‑based connections left it exposed when regional sentiment shifted. By late 2025, the UAE faced two critical headwinds: its continued security cooperation with Israel at a time when Arab states increasingly viewed Israel as a rogue actor, and its own reputation as a rogue actor due to the grey‑zone tactics employed across Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. The leadership’s failure to anticipate the coordinated regional response reflected a governance blind spot. While public statements condemned Israel’s strike on Qatar and summoned Israeli diplomats, behind‑the‑scenes the Emirates continued to negotiate defense deals with Israel, develop Gaza reconstruction plans and sign a multibillion‑dollar laser‑technology agreement. This dissonance between public posturing and private collaboration eroded trust among Arab partners. Economic pressures also mounted as the cost of sustaining overseas bases, airfields and mercenary flows grew, while the anticipated returns—stable trade routes and political influence—evaporated. The combination of diplomatic isolation, rising expenditures and a misreading of regional dynamics weakened Abu Dhabi’s capacity to sustain its external ventures.

Redrawing the Middle Eastern Balance of Power

The rapid dismantling of Emirati proxies has produced a new strategic axis in the Middle East. On one side stand Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Pakistan, bound together by security pacts, joint defense deals and a shared commitment to curtail Abu Dhabi’s influence. On the opposite side align Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Morocco and, more recently, India, which signed a strategic defense pact with the Emirates and already participates in the US‑led I2U2 partnership. Each bloc has secured a nuclear‑armed partner: Pakistan backs the Saudi‑Turkish‑Egyptian coalition, while India underwrites the Israel‑UAE camp. The traditional Israel‑Iran rivalry, once the dominant regional fault line, has receded as both sides focus on the emerging confrontation between these two larger coalitions. The prospect of imminent military action in Iran underscores the shift from a bilateral rivalry to a broader, multi‑pole contest. The new alignment suggests a future where regional security decisions will be made within these competing blocs, rather than through ad‑hoc bilateral deals. The erosion of UAE‑backed proxy networks removes a destabilizing wildcard, but the emergence of two rival coalitions, each with nuclear backing, raises the stakes for any future flashpoint.

Global Reactions and the Risk of Wider Destabilization

International actors have taken note of the reshaped landscape. The United States, while maintaining close ties with Israel, appears unlikely to side against a coalition that includes Israel and the UAE, especially given the strategic partnership of India, Israel and the United States in the I2U2 framework. India’s recent strategic defense pact with the Emirates further cements the emerging anti‑Pakistani bloc. European Union officials have expressed concern over the rapid militarization of regional alliances, warning that the new security pacts could spill over into broader conflict. The United Nations has called for restraint, but the competing nuclear‑armed partners complicate diplomatic mediation. The risk of wider destabilization stems from the fact that the former proxy networks, now dismantled, have left power vacuums in Sudan, Yemen and Libya. Competing regional powers are poised to fill those gaps, potentially igniting new proxy wars. Moreover, the entrenched rivalry between the two emerging blocs, each backed by a nuclear state, raises the specter of escalation beyond the traditional Middle Eastern theater.

Related Coverage

FAQ

Why did the UAE's proxy network collapse in 2026?

The coordinated efforts of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt cut off UAE support to key forces like the RSF in Sudan and the STC in Yemen, exposing the fragility of Abu Dhabi's reliance on proxy alliances and forcing a rapid withdrawal of Emirati influence.

What role did Saudi-backed tribal units play in the counteroffensive?

Saudi-backed tribal units, equipped with Saudi air support, launched targeted operations against the RSF in Darfur and the STC in Yemen, delivering decisive blows that halted Emirati-backed momentum and reclaimed strategic territories.

How did internal governance issues in Abu Dhabi contribute to the UAE's loss of influence?

Abu Dhabi's thin, proxy-based connections left it vulnerable when regional sentiment shifted; internal missteps, such as overreliance on external security cooperation with Israel, amplified the impact of the coordinated counteroffensive.

What were the broader regional implications of the UAE's collapse?

The unraveling shifted the balance of power, granting Saudi Arabia and Turkey greater strategic footholds, while exposing the limits of proxy warfare and prompting a reassessment of the UAE's export-driven security model.

How did the UAE's cooperation with Israel affect its regional standing?

Continued security cooperation with Israel, amid rising Arab opposition post‑2025, became a liability that regional actors leveraged to justify cutting ties with Emirati proxies, accelerating the UAE's isolation.

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Jackson Reed
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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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