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Could Europe Get its Own Nuclear Deterrent?

Conflicts & Crises

This analysis examines Could Europe Get its Own Nuclear Deterrent? in historical and strategic context. It traces how the core developments unfolded, which

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Video originally published on April 13, 2024.

This analysis examines Could Europe Get its Own Nuclear Deterrent? in historical and strategic context. It traces how the core developments unfolded, which institutions and actors shaped outcomes, and what those decisions changed on the ground. Rather than repeating headline-level claims, it focuses on concrete mechanisms, constraints, and tradeoffs that explain the trajectory of events. The discussion moves from Key Developments through Strategic Implications to Risk and Uncertainty, then evaluates wider consequences. The goal is to clarify not only what happened, but why these developments still matter for current planning, risk assessment, and policy decisions.

Key Takeaways

  • Hence, then, the interest surrounding recent comments by European politicians.
  • One that grabs at the live wires of European and American politics and doesn't let go.
  • Nonetheless, Kyiv's surrender of its nukes in the 1990s is now seen as a defining moment.
  • A somewhat terrifying thought for those of us who remember the reign of Liz Truss.
  • The article is grounded strictly in the source video script and listed references.

Key Developments

Hence, then, the interest surrounding recent comments by European politicians. Comments that for now remain in the realm of speculation, but nonetheless point towards a possible tenth nuclear power entering the world. Comments which suggest the European Union might, one day, attempt to acquire the bomb. Coming from political bigwigs in countries like Germany and Poland, the concept of a “Eurobomb” remains extremely contentious. To be clear, even if it does happen, it will be years and years from now, rather than - say - Tuesday next week. That being said, the debate surrounding Europe and nuclear weapons remains a fascinating one. That being said, the debate surrounding Europe and nuclear weapons remains a fascinating one. One that grabs at the live wires of European and American politics and doesn't let go. One that may soon wind up reshaping our entire world. (TITLE): Nuclear Nations For those who've been listening, the steady pulse of comments seems to resemble a drumbeat. One attempting to march Europeans towards a future of nuclear weapons. The German politician Manfred Weber - leader of the European parliament's largest grouping, the EPP - recently told Politico that (quote): “Europe must build deterrence, we must be able to deter and defend ourselves …We all know that when push comes to shove, the nuclear option is the really decisive one.” Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski likewise appeared to put the option on the table when he described what Europe might do if America pulled out of NATO: “Allies will look for other ways to guarantee their safety. Some of them will aim for the ultimate weapon, starting off a new nuclear race.” These are just two high-profile examples, but they're representative of a lively strand of debate in Europe. One that looks at America's growing isolationism, and Russia's growing belligerence, and wonders if the only sane option isn't to start stockpiling hydrogen bombs. After all, Europeans only need to glance east to see what can happen to a nation that chooses to live without nukes. At the moment the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine was home to the world's third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, totaling some 3,000 warheads. Now, it's true that these bombs were under Moscow's operational control. It's also true that independent Ukraine was never going to be able to stand up to pressure from America, Europe, and Russia to give up its stockpile. Nonetheless, Kyiv's surrender of its nukes in the 1990s is now seen as a defining moment. One that paved the way for Russia's full-scale invasion a quarter of a century later. This is the fear that lies at the heart of the European debate, one variously referred to as “Eurobomb” or “Euronuke”. The fear that, in this unstable new world, the only way to guarantee your safety is to have a superweapon in the back pocket that makes your enemy think twice.

Strategic Implications

One that grabs at the live wires of European and American politics and doesn't let go. One that may soon wind up reshaping our entire world. (TITLE): Nuclear Nations For those who've been listening, the steady pulse of comments seems to resemble a drumbeat. One attempting to march Europeans towards a future of nuclear weapons. The German politician Manfred Weber - leader of the European parliament's largest grouping, the EPP - recently told Politico that (quote): “Europe must build deterrence, we must be able to deter and defend ourselves …We all know that when push comes to shove, the nuclear option is the really decisive one.” Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski likewise appeared to put the option on the table when he described what Europe might do if America pulled out of NATO: “Allies will look for other ways to guarantee their safety. They'll start hedging. To follow Teddy Roosevelt's advice of “speak softly and carry a big stick,” only make sure that stick is big enough to wipe out Moscow. Of course, most of Europe is already defended by such a stick: the American nuclear arsenal. Article Five of the NATO treaty obliges members to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. While it doesn't explicitly say that this means America will rain nuclear hellfire down on anyone who invades NATO territory, it's certainly implied. Hence why people often talk about NATO's “nuclear umbrella”. It's an umbrella that extends over most of the continent. Of the European countries that directly border Russia - and aren't in alliance with it - only Ukraine and Georgia are outside in the rain. Everyone else, from the Baltics, to Finland, to Poland and Norway, are in NATO. If that's the case, you may be wondering, then why all this talk about European nukes? For that, you can thank one man: Donald Trump. While Trump's supporters would point out that he only berates NATO allies who don't pay their fair share, European politicians are worried that Trump's antipathy goes deeper than that. That it doesn't matter that a majority of NATO states are now hitting the two percent target. That a second Trump presidency would see the United States effectively abandon Europe at a time when Putin is looking to expand his empire. Estonian intelligence has estimated that Russia will attack a NATO country in the next decade. Denmark's defense ministry thinks three to five years is a more-likely time frame. And while Congress recently passed a law that would stop Trump from unilaterally pulling America out of NATO, that may not be any help. Article Five doesn't stipulate a military response if an ally is attacked. Were Putin to invade Europe, a Trump White House could claim to be fulfilling its NATO commitments even if it only sent a sympathetic card reading “Sorry you got invaded!” For the continent's politicians, this is a troubling idea.

Risk and Uncertainty

Some of them will aim for the ultimate weapon, starting off a new nuclear race.” These are just two high-profile examples, but they're representative of a lively strand of debate in Europe. One that looks at America's growing isolationism, and Russia's growing belligerence, and wonders if the only sane option isn't to start stockpiling hydrogen bombs. After all, Europeans only need to glance east to see what can happen to a nation that chooses to live without nukes. At the moment the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine was home to the world's third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, totaling some 3,000 warheads. Now, it's true that these bombs were under Moscow's operational control. It's also true that independent Ukraine was never going to be able to stand up to pressure from America, Europe, and Russia to give up its stockpile. Especially since it's near-impossible to imagine Europe winning a serious war without America's backing. As the Economist points out: “(Europe's) armed forces are less than the sum of their parts. The continent is years away from being able to defend itself from attack by a reconstituted Russian force.” Nor might it even need a Trump victory later this year to threaten Washington's solidarity with the old continent. Even if Biden wins, everyone knows that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would take up so much American bandwidth that Europe would have to fend for itself. This is why EU politicians are now thinking the impossible. Trying to imagine a world in which, for the first time since NATO's founding in 1949, Washington is not the continent's security guarantee. A world in which the only real defense is a nuclear one. The only odd thing about this discussion? As you may be aware, Europe already has nukes. (TITLE): Stockpiling Of the roughly 9,500 operational nuclear warheads in the world, the vast majority - up to ninety percent - are held by the United States and Russia. The rest are split across the remaining nuclear nations: China and North Korea in east Asia; Pakistan and India in south Asia; and Israel in the Middle East. Overall, the UK is thought to have somewhere in the region of 225 warheads. France, meanwhile, has closer to 300. Nor are these the only nukes on European soil. Alongside London and Paris's arsenals, there are roughly 100 American tactical nuclear weapons held in bases in Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as in the part-European nation of Turkey. Unlike the high-yield missile-mounted warheads defending the homeland, these American nukes are B61 gravity bombs, designed to be carried and dropped by European air forces. Importantly, though, these bombs are not under European control. Even in a situation where, say, Germany is facing an imminent existential threat, Berlin alone cannot give the command to use these weapons.

Outlook

Nonetheless, Kyiv's surrender of its nukes in the 1990s is now seen as a defining moment. One that paved the way for Russia's full-scale invasion a quarter of a century later. This is the fear that lies at the heart of the European debate, one variously referred to as “Eurobomb” or “Euronuke”. The fear that, in this unstable new world, the only way to guarantee your safety is to have a superweapon in the back pocket that makes your enemy think twice. To follow Teddy Roosevelt's advice of “speak softly and carry a big stick,” only make sure that stick is big enough to wipe out Moscow. Of course, most of Europe is already defended by such a stick: the American nuclear arsenal. The initial decision to go nuclear rests solely with Washington. The French and British arsenals, though? Those are two nuclear stockpiles purely under the control of Europeans. And while Britain is no longer politically part of the EU, plenty still see a role for London in a future European nuclear umbrella. As the Wall Street Journal writes: “In recent weeks, German officials have called on France and the U.K.—Europe's two nuclear powers—to work with Berlin to develop a fallback plan for nuclear deterrence for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, should the U.S. no longer be willing to fulfill that role.” German finance minister Christian Lindner went even further, suggesting that - rather than acquiring a separate Eurobomb - EU countries could instead contribute financially to the two nation's nuclear programs in exchange for protection. So, this seems like the perfect time to dig a little into what, exactly, London and Paris can offer. Let's start with the country I come from: Britain. Unlike most nuclear states, the UK operates a single deterrent system. What the House of Commons Library describes as “continuous at-sea deterrence (CASD).” This means there are no bombs that can be loaded onto planes like the American B-61s. Nor are there land-based sites for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead, the British system consists of four Vanguard-class submarines, carrying Trident II D5 missiles topped with Mk4/A nuclear warheads. Every single second of every single day, at least one of those submarines is out at sea, capable of launching a volley of destruction should the British state be threatened. At least, we assume that's the threshold for nuclear use. The UK government maintains a policy of ambiguity as to its nuclear red lines. In their words: “We are deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how, and at what scale we would use our weapons.” Broadly, though, the threshold is understood to also include an existential threat to other NATO states. Unlike France, Britain assigns its nukes to NATO - although the ultimate decision to fire rests with the Prime Minister.

The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence: A Historical Context

A somewhat terrifying thought for those of us who remember the reign of Liz Truss. This attachment to NATO is a major reason why some European politicians think Britain could step up if America withdraws. While France will only deploy its nukes to defend French interests, British doctrine would theoretically place everywhere from Estonia to Germany under its nuclear umbrella. Unfortunately, there are a couple of catches. One is that Britain has been having some troubles with its Trident system in recent years. Tests in both 2016 and 2024 saw the missile crash into the ocean shortly after firing. According to the Ministry of Defence, these failures have not affected the UK's nuclear credibility, since the US also carries out Trident tests. But this brings us to our second problem: Britain's nuclear deterrent is heavily reliant on America. The Economist points out that America designs Britain's warheads, and holds the jointly-owned stockpile of missiles on which to mount them. In their words: “If America were to sever all co-operation, British nuclear forces “would probably have a life expectancy measured in months rather than years”, according to an assessment published ten years ago.” Would a reelected President Trump really go so far as to block even technical cooperation with Britain, a NATO country that consistently spends over two percent of its GDP on defense? Probably not, but who can say for sure? All of which may be why some are hoping to look to Europe's other nuclear power: France. (TITLE): The French Deterrent For fans of Charles de Gaulle, recent European fears of abandonment by America are Exhibit A for why his nuclear legacy was correct. Way back in 1961, the general point-blank asked JFK if he would be willing to “trade New York for Paris”. By that, de Gaulle meant would America really be willing to lose its own citizens to protect those of France? Unlike the British, the general clearly thought the answer was a firm “non”. Now, de Gaulle wasn't the only soldier among America's allies to feel this way. Much closer to our own time, the former leader of South Korea's special forces memorably told the Financial Times: “I have never doubted an American soldier. But I would be foolish to place my nation's security in the hands of an American politician.” The difference is that South Korea to this day hasn't acquired its own nukes. France not only has its own nuclear weapons, but has never relied on America or NATO for any part of the technology. Here's how Britain's House of Commons Library summed it up in a briefing paper: “France has sought to independently build and maintain all the necessary components of its nuclear arsenal.

Europe's Current Security Landscape and the Role of Nuclear Weapons

The aircraft and submarine platforms for the French nuclear deterrent are all designed and built by French companies. France also has its own facilities for maintenance and support.” The trade-off has been that France's program has always been far-more expensive than Britain's. But were a future US president to suspend all nuclear cooperation then that would start to look like a pretty good deal. Not just for Paris, but potentially for Europe as a whole. Unlike the UK, France operates two levels of deterrence: one based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and one based on air-launched missiles carried by Rafale MF3 aircraft. This gives Paris both strategic and tactical nuclear options - the latter potentially plugging a hole in European defense if America suddenly makes its B-61 gravity bombs unavailable. However, French deterrence is still weighted heavily towards submarines. Roughly eighty percent of France's nukes are held by the Navy, with most of them carried onboard four Triomphant class subs, each equipped with 16 M-51 ballistic missiles. The remainder still held by the Navy come in the form of nuclear-armed ASMP-A cruise missiles, designed to be carried by the squadron of Rafale MF3 onboard the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. After that, the French Airforce has an additional 40 Rafale MF3s set aside, equipped with 54 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Compared to the American or Russian arsenals, this is not a huge nuclear force. earlier, France's total warhead count comes in at slightly under 300, compared to Russia's 6,000. Still, it's enough to fulfill France's nuclear doctrine of “unacceptable damage”. Berlin's SWP think tank explains that this means that (quote): “France's nuclear weapons are directed not against a potential adversary's nuclear forces but against its “political, economic and military nerve centers”. To put that in lay speak, Paris's explicit policy in a war with Russia would be to respond to an existential threat by annihilating major Russian ports and military bases, as well as cities like Moscow and St Petersburg. To threaten such unacceptable damage that Putin would have to be crazy to cross France's red lines. Of course, the flipside of that is Moscow has 6,000 nukes under its control. The Economist explains why that might be a problem for Paris: “(The French) think a few hundred warheads, more than enough to wipe out Moscow and other cities, will dissuade Mr. Analysts of a more macabre bent think such lopsided megatonnage, and the disproportionate damage which (...) France would suffer, give Mr. Putin an advantage.” In other words, Russia might lose all its ports and military bases as well as its biggest cities in an exchange, but France could be utterly destroyed.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is France's nuclear deterrent independent?

See the full article for details on Is France's nuclear deterrent independent?.

What is the safest country to survive a nuclear war?

See the full article for details on What is the safest country.

Can Germany own nuclear weapons?

See the full article for details on Can Germany own nuclear weapons?.

Is Europe getting rid of nuclear power?

See the full article for details on Is Europe getting rid of.

Does Europe have their own nuclear weapons?

See the full article for details on Does Europe have their own.

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Sources

  1. https://www.vox.com/world-politics/24091566/europe-nuclear-weapons-poland-germany-france-putin-trump
  2. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/02/18/can-europe-defend-itself-without-america
  3. https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/germans-debatethe-once-unthinkable-do-we-need-nuclear-weapons-13fa7e68
  4. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn04079/
  5. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9077/
  6. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9092/CBP-9092.pdf
  7. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023C15/
  8. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/an-anxious-europe-ponders-nuclear-weapons/
  9. https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/its-time-to-give-poland-nuclear-weapons/
  10. https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/polands-bid-to-participate-in-nato-nuclear-sharing/
  11. https://ip-quarterly.com/en/future-zeitenwende-scenario-5-poland-becomes-nuclear-power
  12. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/second-failed-trident-test-time-expand-and-invest-britains-conventional-capabilities
Jackson Reed
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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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