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Is Kenya's Haiti Intervention in Danger of Falling Apart?

Conflicts & Crises

This analysis examines Is Kenya's Haiti Intervention in Danger of Falling Apart? in historical and strategic context. It traces how the core developments u

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Video originally published on June 18, 2024.

This analysis examines Is Kenya's Haiti Intervention in Danger of Falling Apart? in historical and strategic context. It traces how the core developments unfolded, which institutions and actors shaped outcomes, and what those decisions changed on the ground. Rather than repeating headline-level claims, it focuses on concrete mechanisms, constraints, and tradeoffs that explain the trajectory of events. The discussion moves from Key Developments through Strategic Implications to Risk and Uncertainty, then evaluates wider consequences. The goal is to clarify not only what happened, but why these developments still matter for current planning, risk assessment, and policy decisions.

Key Takeaways

  • Left behind a failing state plagued by insecurity and famine.
  • Although Ariel Henry had signed off on the intervention, his resignation in March threw everything back up in the air.
  • The article is grounded strictly in the source video script and listed references.
  • Key developments are organized in sequence to clarify what changed and why it matters.
  • The closing sections focus on strategic implications and scenarios to monitor next.

Key Developments

By rights, the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti (or MSS) should've begun at the end of May. Authorized by the United Nations Security Council in October 2023, the Kenyan-led expedition had been intended to start operations before summer. To begin the dangerous work of dismantling the gangs that have brought the Caribbean nation to the brink of collapse. Indeed, as the end of spring approached, it looked like all the pieces were in place. After three months shuttered due to gang violence, the international airport at Port-au-Prince reopened on May 20th. Shortly after, American soldiers were photographed on the tarmac, guarding transport planes. Shortly after, American soldiers were photographed on the tarmac, guarding transport planes. By May 25th, 200 Kenyan police officials were reported to be in the country, preparing to lead an intervention that would be backed by forces from nations as varied as Jamaica, Chad, Bangladesh, and the Bahamas. Online, speculation grew that the fighting would begin at any moment. No pitched battles took place on the streets of the Haitian capital. No roads were seized, and no vital infrastructure was occupied. Instead, on Monday May 27th, the Kenyan detachment boarded a plane and left Haiti. Left behind a failing state plagued by insecurity and famine. Left behind hundreds of thousands trapped in Port-au-Prince as armed gangs cut off the exit roads. Not long after, President William Ruto confirmed what everyone had already guessed. The intervention would not yet be going ahead. Rather than begin their dangerous task at the end of May, the Kenyan-led force would now be waiting a minimum of three more weeks, until the second half of June. The reasons why were eminently reasonable. AP News reports that the American-built base the MSS was intended to operate out of was only 70 percent complete, and lacking “secure stores for the armory”. CNN claimed that the Kenyans were “particularly concerned by a lack of helicopters for medical evacuations.” Both of those are very good reasons to delay a deployment. Especially one that will take place in a dense urban zone against an enemy with military-grade weapons. Still, it was hard to shake the feeling that the delay was a bad omen.

Strategic Implications

By May 25th, 200 Kenyan police officials were reported to be in the country, preparing to lead an intervention that would be backed by forces from nations as varied as Jamaica, Chad, Bangladesh, and the Bahamas. Online, speculation grew that the fighting would begin at any moment. And then… nothing. No pitched battles took place on the streets of the Haitian capital. No roads were seized, and no vital infrastructure was occupied. Instead, on Monday May 27th, the Kenyan detachment boarded a plane and left Haiti. That, for all the good intentions, the upcoming intervention in Haiti may be morphing into a geopolitical nightmare. After all, this isn't the first time the deployment has been delayed. Kenyan police were originally supposed to arrive in March, only for President Ruto to hold back when a gang uprising forced Haiti's leader, Ariel Henry, to resign. Henry has since been replaced by a Transitional Presidential Council, which on May 28th appointed a new, interim prime minister: Garry Conille. But that hasn't stopped unease from spreading. Unease, that the intervention may be seen as illegitimate by too many Haitians. Unease that the military deployment so far authorized might not be strong enough to defeat Haiti's increasingly-powerful gangs. So, now seems like the ideal time to dig into what's happening with the MSS. To try and assess two things: One, how likely it is to go ahead; and Two, the likelihood that it'll actually succeed. Before we can do that, though, we need to quickly fill in some background. Both on what the MSS actually involves, and on how the situation in Haiti got so desperate in the first place. Let's start with the story of the MSS itself, since it's both easier to explain and less relentlessly depressing. Although authorized in October of 2023, the Multinational Security Support Mission was first requested a year earlier, in fall of 2022. That was when Ariel Henry and his cabinet begged the international community to send a military force into Haiti to quell the violence. At the time, the country's murder rate was extremely high, but not yet stratospheric. When we did our first in-depth video on the topic we reported how 1,377 people had been killed between June and September of 2022 alone, which at the time felt like a crazy amount.

Risk and Uncertainty

Left behind a failing state plagued by insecurity and famine. Left behind hundreds of thousands trapped in Port-au-Prince as armed gangs cut off the exit roads. Not long after, President William Ruto confirmed what everyone had already guessed. The intervention would not yet be going ahead. Rather than begin their dangerous task at the end of May, the Kenyan-led force would now be waiting a minimum of three more weeks, until the second half of June. The reasons why were eminently reasonable. Well, fast forward to 2024, and the estimated toll from the first three months of this year was a staggering 2,500. Unofficially, it's thought to be much higher. Médecins Sans Frontières did a pretty convincing study recently, showing that Haiti's murder rate could be underreported by up to 70 percent. If true, that would mean Haiti's homicide rate is likely the highest in the Americas, and up there with that of active warzones. Hence the need for the MSS. As agreed by the UN Security Council, the mission is meant to involve 2,500 police officers drawn from multiple nations, who will help support the overwhelmed Haitian National Police in their fight against the gangs. Overall, fifteen nations have pledged boots on the ground - nearly all of them either Caribbean or African. However, the two most-important countries in the coalition will be Kenya and Jamaica. Operationally, CNN reports that the MSS will be headed by “a Kenyan police commissioner and a Jamaican police lieutenant, with other top posts filled by Kenyan staff.” Nairobi will also provide the bulk of the mission, with 1,000 Kenyan police being flown out to fight. If this sounds like a pretty major challenge for regular police officers, rest assured that there's nothing “regular” about the Kenyan force. Most of them are from the border police, which - given Kenya's neighbors - means they've had experience battling terror groups like Somalia's Al Shabaab. Once in Haiti, the New Humanitarian informs us that the deployment will be split in two. According to the magazine: “Half of the contingent will work to secure critical facilities and infrastructure, including the airport, while the rest will be tasked with combating the gangs that now control over 90% of Haiti's capital.” To give them the equipment needed to achieve this, other nations are pitching in financially.

Outlook

AP News reports that the American-built base the MSS was intended to operate out of was only 70 percent complete, and lacking “secure stores for the armory”. CNN claimed that the Kenyans were “particularly concerned by a lack of helicopters for medical evacuations.” Both of those are very good reasons to delay a deployment. Especially one that will take place in a dense urban zone against an enemy with military-grade weapons. Still, it was hard to shake the feeling that the delay was a bad omen. That, for all the good intentions, the upcoming intervention in Haiti may be morphing into a geopolitical nightmare. After all, this isn't the first time the deployment has been delayed. The UN already has an MSS fund of $21 million, made up of contributions from the United States, Canada, France, and Spain. On top of that, Ottawa has pledged an additional $80.5 million, while Uncle Sam has promised to cough up $300 million overall. A key point, though, is that neither America nor Canada - nor any European partners - will put boots on the ground, beyond a possible skeleton staff for technical support. That's because Haiti - a majority Black nation - has a long history of interventions by outside powers that go spectacularly wrong. American interventions in 1915, 1994 and 2004 all led to problems, while a Brazilian-led UN stabilization mission was dogged by allegations of abuse. Then, in 2010, Nepalese peacekeepers accidentally introduced cholera, leading to an outbreak that killed thousands. As a result, the international community was eager for an intervention that would be free from any colonial overtones. Former Kenyan foreign minister, Alfred Mutua, said as much in 2023 when he declared of the MSS that “Kenya stands with persons of African descent across the world.” In reality, the reason for Nairobi's involvement - which is unpopular at home - may be more prosaic. In advance of the first Kenyan police arriving in Port-au-Prince, Joe Biden announced that Kenya would be designated a “non-NATO ally” of America, allowing it to buy more-sophisticated US weapons. The final piece to get in place for the MSS was the buy-in of Haiti's political leaders.

Kenya's Mandate: Understanding the UN-Backed Mission to Haiti

Although Ariel Henry had signed off on the intervention, his resignation in March threw everything back up in the air. Not that it stayed up there for long. When the Transitional Council was being assembled to replace Henry, both the US and the regional CARICOM grouping made supporting the MSS a condition of joining. Although the Council quickly collapsed into elite in-fighting, it did manage to appoint Prime Minister Garry Conille and sign off on the intervention. OK, so that's the story behind the Multinational Security Support Mission. The part where we sketch out why Haiti needs it in the first place. The short version is that the country has collapsed. Under the weight of elite dysfunction, the political crisis sparked by the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, and the growing power of armed gangs, Haiti's always-fragile institutions have finally stopped working. The country is now fundamentally ungovernable without outside help. Gangs control 90 percent of the capital, Port-au-Prince, including former government buildings. The embattled Haitian National Police has retreated from most areas, leading to a wave of crime that unfolds on crowded streets in broad daylight. As of March, 360,000 people inside Haiti were internally-displaced - turned into refugees in their own country. According to the UN, murders were up 53 percent on their previous record-high in 2023. As War on the Rocks wrote: “In the first two months of 2024, a Haitian was murdered, injured, or kidnapped in gang-related violence every 40 minutes.” So bad has the violence become - so random are the killings - that bodies are left to rot in the streets. And all this has a knock-on effect on other aspects of daily life. The power grid has collapsed, and fuel for generators - long the main source of electricity for most of the capital - is impossible to come by. Only twenty percent of Haiti's healthcare facilities are functional. Supply chains have been severed as gangs seize ports and key roads, leading to a situation where nearly 5 million people are going hungry, with 1.64 million on the cusp of famine. In the words of UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the country has become “a living nightmare”. In this carnival of horrors, the only people who are enjoying any kind of stability are the gangsters. Speaking of the gangs, one of the terrifying things about the last couple of years has been witnessing them grow in strength and sophistication. Originally created as paramilitary enforcers for Haiti's political and business elites, the gangs have wound up becoming more powerful than their masters. Videos on social media from just a year or so ago show members modeling themselves on the Los Angeles Crips - posing in front of expensive cars and flashing gang signs. Jump forward to 2024, though, and the videos feature khaki uniforms and military-grade weapons. According to Crisis Group, these weapons include (quote): “AR15s, AK47s, Galils,.50 caliber sniper rifles and belt-fed machine guns.” Those are serious pieces of kit, as is the Belgian-designed FN FAL rifle some gang members are toting. Justice Department officials recently told the New York Times that Haiti's gangs now have “an arsenal more powerful than any they have ever possessed before.” The source of these guns is also worrying.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why is Kenya intervening in Haiti?

See the full article for details on Why is Kenya intervening in.

Is there trouble in Kenya at the moment?

See the full article for details on Is there trouble in Kenya.

Are Kenyan police still going to Haiti?

See the full article for details on Are Kenyan police still going.

What happened to the Kenyans in Haiti?

See the full article for details on What happened to the Kenyans.

What are the major problems in Kenya?

See the full article for details on What are the major problems.

Related Coverage

Sources

  1. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/haiti-new-government-faces-gangs
  2. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/24/americas/haiti-gang-mss-kenya-explainer-intl/index.html
  3. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-haitis-gangs-ramp-up-violence-as-nation-awaits-intervention-by-foreign/
  4. https://apnews.com/article/kenya-police-haiti-4efd3d7634f6b4ddb4a3d856f670a3e7
  5. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd11kp3260xo
  6. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2024/05/21/haitis-airport-reopens-international-security-mission-prepares-arrive
  7. https://theconversation.com/haiti-first-kenyan-police-arrive-to-help-tackle-gang-violence-but-the-prospects-for-success-are-slim-230741
  8. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/21/world/americas/haiti-gangs-weapons.html
  9. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/05/21/world/americas/haiti-gangs-segonn-5.html?pgtype=Article&action=click&module=RelatedLinks
  10. https://insightcrime.org/news/haiti-crime-strategy-kenya-mission/
  11. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/21/kenya-haiti-mission
  12. https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/violence-and-hunger-persist-haitians-struggle-adapt-and-survive
  13. https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/violence-drives-haitis-children-armed-groups-half-all-members-are-now-children-unicef
Jackson Reed
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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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