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Video originally published on May 10, 2025.
In early 2025 the March 23rd movement (M23) unleashed a rapid, coordinated offensive that seized the eastern Congolese capitals of Goma and Bukavu within weeks. The speed of the advance, the strategic targeting of key junctions, and the ensuing collapse of state services thrust two million civilians into chaos and reignited a conflict whose roots stretch back decades. The world’s brief focus on the firestorm in the Congo now demands a deeper look at the military tactics, the human toll, and the geopolitical forces that sustain the war.
Key Takeaways
- M23 seized Goma and Bukavu in early 2025, collapsing state infrastructure and displacing roughly two million civilians.
- The offensive accelerated after M23 captured the junction town of Sake on January 23, 2025, tightening the noose around Goma within days.
- UN investigators and Congo’s foreign minister have repeatedly documented Rwanda’s training, equipment, and logistical support for M23.
- The fall of Goma severed critical mineral export routes, threatening global supply chains for coltan, cobalt, and gold.
- International reactions have largely been rhetoric; UN peacekeepers withdrew, and sanctions against Rwanda and M23 figures have been imposed but with limited effect.
- The conflict’s roots trace back to Laurent Nkunda’s legacy, the CNDP, and the broader pattern of Rwandan-backed rebel movements in eastern DRC.
M23’s Lightning Capture of Goma and Bukavu
The offensive began in October 2024, but it accelerated dramatically in January 2025. On January 23, M23 rebels seized Sake, a critical junction town only 19 km west of Goma, tightening the noose around the provincial capital. Within two days, Congolese forces were overwhelmed on the outskirts of Goma, and by January 27 the rebels had breached the city centre. The airport, Goma’s last link to the outside world, fell on January 28 after more than 1,200 soldiers surrendered. By January 29 the rebels had restored electricity to parts of the city, installed their own administrators, and declared victory. The same pattern unfolded in South Kivu. While the script does not detail the exact timeline for Bukavu, it confirms that M23 captured both provincial capitals, bringing nearly two million people under rebel control. The seizure of these logistical hubs—gateways for mineral exports and humanitarian aid—reconfigured the geography of the conflict, turning former government strongholds into rebel‑run territories almost overnight.
Humanitarian Catastrophe: Displacement and Gendered Violence
The rapid collapse of state infrastructure left civilians scrambling for safety. Images of women clutching motorcycles, mothers bearing mattresses and children, and military vehicles sharing roads with fleeing families illustrate the scale of the exodus. Refugee camps surrounding Goma, once a sanctuary, became death traps as rebels advanced within a mile of the Rwandan border. Food supplies dwindled, power and water were cut, and communication lines went dark. The humanitarian fallout was compounded by targeted gendered violence. After the breach of Muzenze prison, over 4,000 inmates escaped and reports emerged of atrocities against female prisoners. In the village of Kishishe, M23 forces executed men, then subjected women and children to systematic sexual violence. Minister of Industry Julien Kahongya reported more than 300 deaths in that massacre alone. Hospitals, already overwhelmed, set up triage tents in courtyards, while looting of food warehouses deepened the crisis for the displaced. Demoralized, angry and panicking, the soldiers launched a systemic campaign of violence against civilians, including a three-day-long campaign of sexual assault against the town’s women.
Historical Roots: From Laurent Nkunda’s Legacy to the Rise of M23
M23 cannot be understood without tracing its lineage to earlier rebel movements. After the 2006 elections, the RCD—a Rwandan‑backed paramilitary—saw its political relevance evaporate, leaving Tutsi‑aligned communities vulnerable. Laurent Nkunda, a former RCD commander, defected from the national army and formed the CNDP, inheriting RCD’s structure and grievances. In 2009, Nkunda was ousted by General Bosco Ntaganda, who later appeared publicly alongside Rwanda’s defense minister and entered the Congolese army. The integration deal of March 23 2009, meant to absorb CNDP fighters, instead sowed the seeds of M23. Ntaganda manipulated the process, securing mineral‑rich postings for loyalists and creating a power base that the government could not dismantle. When the government attempted to redeploy ex‑CNDP officers away from their strongholds, Rwanda stepped in to protect its interests, leading to the formal unveiling of M23 in May 2012. The group’s first offensive captured Bunagana and Rutshuru, setting the stage for the 2025 seizure of Goma and Bukavu. He apparently once asked his soldiers, “Why do you need a salary when you have weapons?” With Mobutu’s eyes fixed firmly on his ever-expanding bank account, rebel forces, including those led by future president Laurent-Désiré Kabila, were planting roots in Eastern DRC.
Rwanda’s Alleged Backing and Regional Power Play
Accusations of Rwandan support for M23 are woven throughout the narrative. Congo’s foreign minister Christophe Lutundula directly blamed Rwanda for the attack on the Rumangabo military base, describing it as an “unhesitant” assault. UN investigators later estimated that Rwanda supplied training, equipment, and manpower for key operations, including the assault on Rumangabo and the broader push toward Goma. The Congo Research Group reported that Rwanda sent reinforcements for strategic towns, while Uganda’s role was more passive—allowing wounded M23 fighters to cross into its territory for treatment and recruitment. These cross‑border dynamics intensified after the DRC signed a joint operational unit with Rwanda to combat “jihadists, terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling.” The unit’s presence in Goma sparked protests that left four dead, underscoring how Rwandan police activity is perceived as an infringement on Congolese sovereignty. The pattern of Rwandan‑backed militias, from the RCD to M23, illustrates a broader regional contest for influence over the mineral‑rich eastern Congo.
International Response: Rhetoric versus Reality
The international community’s reaction has been a mix of urgent statements and limited action. The UN quickly evacuated personnel from Goma as the city fell, and UN peacekeepers were forced to withdraw from the capital’s airport. A UN Security Council report later highlighted Rwanda’s involvement, yet concrete sanctions remained elusive. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta called for a new peacekeeping force after M23 captured Bunagana, but no robust multinational deployment materialized. Diplomatic efforts in Nairobi brought together leaders from Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC, proposing a “carrot‑and‑stick” approach: negotiations with M23 alongside a regional military offensive. The DRC government, however, feared legitimizing M23 and renamed the talks “consultations,” inviting dozens of other armed groups to dilute M23’s prominence. The result was a fragmented diplomatic front that failed to halt the rebels’ advance, illustrating the gap between high‑level rhetoric and on‑the‑ground effectiveness. The UN quickly evacuated, and by January 27, the rebel fighters had breached the city center of Goma.
Future Paths: Risks of Prolonged Conflict and Options for Stabilization
If the current dynamics persist, the eastern Congo faces a protracted humanitarian disaster. Continued M23 advances could further disrupt mineral supply chains, exacerbate displacement, and deepen gender‑based violence. The script notes that M23’s resurgence is tied to renewed support from Rwanda and Uganda, suggesting that without a decisive regional diplomatic break, the rebels may “unleash Hell” again. Stabilization would require coordinated military pressure, credible peacekeeping mandates, and a political settlement that addresses the historic grievances of Tutsi‑aligned communities while curbing external meddling. The earlier Nairobi talks demonstrated that inclusive negotiations—bringing in other armed groups and addressing resource exploitation—are essential, but they must be backed by enforceable guarantees. Until such measures are implemented, the risk of further city captures, refugee flows, and regional escalation remains high. The violence continued unabated, and M23 continued their steady march through Eastern Congo. In an interview with Reuters, Jason claimed that Rwanda and M23 needed to be seen as engaging in the present peace process but were actually seeking to expand their control in Eastern Congo to gain leverage in future negotiations.
Regional Forces, Mercenaries, and the Congo River Alliance
In early 2024 the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) was deployed to freeze the front lines, but its mandate—limited to providing security for negotiations—clashed with Kinshasa’s view that a peace‑keeping force should confront M23. This misalignment led DRC to refuse a renewal of the EACRF mandate at the end of 2023. Seeking alternatives, President Tshisekedi turned to private military contractors, notably the Agemira company, to train Congolese fighters, and to the Southern African Development Community, which launched the SAMIDRC mission on 15 December 2023. On 4 February 2024 M23 announced its rebranding under the Congo River Alliance, swiftly capturing Shasha and, within days, seizing all routes out of Goma and advancing toward the UN‑protected town of Sake. The alliance’s expansion was accompanied by a disturbing UN report that Rwandan combatants now outnumbered M23 rebels and that children as young as twelve were being recruited into training camps supervised by both M23 and Rwandan soldiers. President Kagame’s televised warning to France 24 that Rwanda was prepared to go to war with the DRC further heightened the stakes, underscoring how the Congo River Alliance has become a conduit for regional actors to project power while exploiting local grievances.
Escalating Sanctions and Diplomatic Stalemate: From Nairobi to Qatar
The international outcry intensified after Nobel laureate Denis Mukwege urged a global mobilization against Rwanda’s aggression and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on Kigali to cease its support for M23. In response, Washington imposed targeted sanctions on key Rwandan and M23 figures, the United Kingdom paused critical economic assistance to Rwanda, Germany froze aid, Belgium issued a formal rebuke, and the European Union moved to ban mineral imports linked to Rwandan interests. Despite these pressures, diplomatic initiatives repeatedly faltered. Nairobi’s early peace talks gave way to Angolan mediation, which organized a ministerial meeting in March 2024 and planned a December 15 summit that was abruptly cancelled when Rwanda demanded direct negotiations with M23—an offer Kinshasa deemed unacceptable. Subsequent attempts by Qatar to broker a meeting between Tshisekedi and Kagame produced only a joint statement calling for an “immediate and unconditional” ceasefire, while a panel of former African heads of state, including Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s Thabo Motswaledi, failed to generate substantive progress. The cumulative effect of sanctions, failed summits, and competing regional agendas has left the conflict in a diplomatic deadlock, with humanitarian conditions deteriorating as political solutions remain out of reach.
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FAQ
What triggered M23’s rapid offensive in January 2025?
M23’s offensive was triggered by a strategic seizure of the junction town of Sake on January 23, 2025, which cut off supply routes to Goma and allowed the rebels to rapidly advance toward the provincial capital, exploiting weaknesses in Congolese forces and accelerating the collapse of state control.
How has Rwanda been implicated in supporting M23?
Rwanda has been implicated in supporting M23 through documented training camps, the supply of weapons and logistics, and direct financial aid, as confirmed by UN investigators and cited by Congo’s foreign minister Christophe Lutundula, who described Rwanda’s involvement as an “unhesitant” assault on the Rumangabo military base.
What impact did the fall of Goma have on the DRC’s mineral exports?
The fall of Goma disrupted the main rail and road corridors that transport coltan, cobalt, and gold from the eastern mines to international markets, causing a sharp decline in export volumes and raising concerns among global buyers about supply chain security and the potential for increased smuggling.
Why has the international community’s response been limited despite the crisis?
The international community’s response has been limited because of competing geopolitical interests, reluctance to deploy additional UN peacekeepers, and the difficulty of enforcing sanctions against Rwanda and M23 leaders, resulting in largely symbolic statements rather than decisive military or economic action.
What are the main humanitarian consequences for civilians in eastern DRC?
Civilians in eastern DRC face mass displacement, gendered violence, and the collapse of basic services, with refugee camps around Goma overcrowded, lacking food and medical supplies, and becoming sites of insecurity as armed groups vie for control of resources.
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Jackson Reed
Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.
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