Blueprints for the Next Indo‑Pakistani War

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Video originally published on January 26, 2026.

Since 1947 India and Pakistan have fought four wars, countless border skirmishes, and a series of proxy attacks over Kashmir. The most recent clash in May 2025 ended quickly, but both sides retain large conventional forces, nuclear arsenals, and divergent doctrines. This article evaluates the current force structures, budgets, and industrial bases, then outlines two plausible conventional scenarios—a limited “Short War” and a rapid “Cold Start” incursion—while accounting for nuclear deterrence and third‑party influences.

Key Takeaways

India fields roughly double the active‑duty personnel of Pakistan (1.4 million vs 660 000) and enjoys larger numbers of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery.

Pakistan holds a decisive edge in self‑propelled artillery (552 vs 100) and operates a larger fleet of surveillance, reconnaissance and early‑warning aircraft (22 vs 7).

Naval power is heavily skewed toward India, which fields two aircraft carriers, 29 surface vessels and 18 submarines (including two nuclear‑powered), compared with Pakistan’s 11 frigates and five conventional submarines.

Defence spending is dramatically unequal: India’s 2024 budget of $83.6 billion dwarfs Pakistan’s roughly $8 billion, giving India a ten‑fold financial advantage.

India’s indigenous defence industry can sustain prolonged conventional operations, whereas Pakistan relies heavily on imported components and foreign suppliers.

Both militaries conduct regular joint‑ness exercises (e.g., India’s Trishul, Pakistan’s Azm‑e‑Nau) that demonstrate readiness for rapid, limited incursions.

Military Balance Overview

By 2025 India fields over 1.4 million active personnel (≈1.2 million in the army) versus Pakistan’s 660 000 (≈560 000 army)【1】. Ground‑combat platforms total ~7 100 tracked/wheeled systems for India and ~6 600 for Pakistan; India leads in main‑battle tanks by >1 200 units, while Pakistan possesses a decisive advantage in self‑propelled artillery (552 vs 100)【1】. In towed and rocket artillery India enjoys roughly a 2:1 edge【1】. The Indian Air Force operates 663 fighters (Su‑30MKI, Rafale, Tejas‑Mk2) and plans to field the indigenous AMCA stealth fighter by 2027, whereas Pakistan fields 417 fighters (F‑16, JF‑17, CJ‑10)【2】. Pakistan fields more surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft (22 vs 7)【2】. UAV inventories are contested: open‑source estimates place Pakistan above 1 000 UAVs, while India’s fleet ranges from <200 to ~2 000 depending on the source【3】. India’s air‑defence network exceeds 3 200 gun and missile batteries, nearly double Pakistan’s【2】. Naval forces are heavily skewed toward India (2 carriers, 29 surface combatants, 18 submarines—including 2 nuclear‑powered) versus Pakistan’s 11 frigates and 5 conventional submarines【2】. Both nations maintain comparable nuclear stockpiles (India 172, Pakistan 170 warheads)【11】.

Financial and Industrial Capacity

India’s 2024 defence budget reached $83.6 billion, roughly ten times Pakistan’s $8 billion and comparable to France’s spend【4】. India allocates ~2 % of GDP to defence; Pakistan spends ~4 % of a much smaller GDP【4】. India’s imports are diversified—Russia (36 % in recent years), France, Israel, the US, and the UK—while Pakistan relies heavily on China and the US【4】. Domestic production in India hit $17 billion in FY 2023‑24, a 170 % increase over the previous decade, covering missiles, air‑defence, armoured vehicles, drones, and naval vessels【5】. Pakistan’s defence industry is state‑centric, producing small arms, armoured vehicles, drones, and licensed Chinese fighters, but remains dependent on imported components【5】. Consequently, a supply disruption would impair Pakistan more severely than India.

Short War Scenario

A terrorist attack on Indian soil, attributed to Pakistan‑backed militants, triggers a limited Indian “surgical strike” using missiles, fighter aircraft, and drones. Pakistan’s air force, which downed up to five Indian fighters and one UAV in May 2025, could contest air superiority by exploiting its larger surveillance fleet【2】. If the engagement occurs after the AMCA enters service, India may regain a qualitative edge; otherwise, UAV numbers will be decisive. Ground combat would be confined to artillery exchanges and brief cross‑border fire along the Line of Control. Within days, diplomatic pressure from the US, UK, France, Russia, and China—particularly concerning the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor—would force a cease‑fire and a return to pre‑conflict positions【10】.

Cold Start Scenario

India’s “Cold Start” doctrine envisions mobilising eight division‑sized battle groups (80 000‑120 000 troops) within 3‑4 days for shallow incursions that capture limited, uninhabited border terrain【5】. The aim is political leverage without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. The 2025 “Ram Prahar” exercise simulated exactly this: 20 000 troops, tanks, amphibious vehicles, fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and drones conducted night‑time parachute drops across the Punjab border【7】. Pakistan would respond with its New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF), which emphasises accelerated mobilisation, joint air‑ground coordination, and cruise‑missile strikes to blunt the Indian thrust while accepting limited territorial loss【6】. Success hinges on rapid air‑superiority (India’s larger fighter fleet vs Pakistan’s surveillance advantage) and UAV dominance (Pakistan’s >1 000 UAVs vs India’s uncertain fleet)【3】. International actors—especially China, which safeguards the CPEC—would likely pressure both sides toward a swift diplomatic settlement【10】.

Nuclear Doctrine and Deterrence

Both states adhere to a “minimum credible deterrence” posture, but India maintains a No‑First‑Use (NFU) policy【13】, whereas Pakistan follows Full‑Spectrum Deterrence, permitting first use of low‑yield tactical nukes if its territorial integrity is threatened【12】. This asymmetry creates a narrow escalation ladder: a conventional Indian incursion that threatens Pakistani territory could provoke a tactical nuclear response, which in turn might trigger India’s retaliatory use of strategic warheads despite its NFU stance. Consequently, crisis‑management hotlines and third‑party diplomatic channels are essential to prevent inadvertent nuclear exchange.

Cold Start Operational Details and Recent Exercises

Cold Start is deliberately limited to shallow gains—akin to seizing the first tiles of an entrance hall—to secure political bargaining power while staying below the nuclear threshold【5】. The “Ram Prahar” drill demonstrated rapid deployment, night‑time airborne insertions, and coordinated use of drones to suppress enemy air‑defence【7】. The doctrine’s viability depends on three factors: (1) achieving at least air parity, (2) neutralising Pakistan’s self‑propelled artillery advantage, and (3) overwhelming Pakistan’s larger UAV fleet with Indian swarms. Failure in any pillar would force a rapid halt and diplomatic de‑escalation.

Pakistan’s New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF)

Developed between 2009‑2013, NCWF focuses on (a) accelerated mobilisation—Pakistani sources claim reaction times measured in hours【6】, (b) tight air‑ground integration using its superior surveillance fleet, and (c) cruise‑missile batteries to strike deep Indian logistics. The doctrine accepts limited territorial concessions as a means to force a stalemate, thereby avoiding nuclear escalation【6】.

India’s Sundarji Doctrine and Joint Operations

The 1981 Sundarji Doctrine called for ten corps (≈450 000 troops): seven for “deterrence‑by‑denial” along the border and three for “deterrence‑by‑punishment” involving deep strikes supported by air superiority【5】. Although later superseded by Cold Start, elements resurfaced in the 2017 Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF‑2017), which still references “capturing sizeable portions of enemy territory” and assigns the Air Force a role in engaging surface targets “within and outside the battlespace”【8】. The 2025 “Trishul” exercise validated jointness across land, air, and sea, rehearsing a three‑pronged offensive from Rajasthan, Gujarat, and the Arabian Sea【9】.

Sundarji‑Riposte Scenario: A Full‑Scale Conventional Conflict

Combining Pakistan’s historic “Riposte” (infiltration of militants followed by a rapid armored “hook” toward Akhnoor or the Sutlej) with India’s revived Sundarji deep‑strike concept yields a conventional war that excludes nuclear weapons. Pakistan would launch simultaneous incursions while India would mobilise its three strike corps for a deep penetration aimed at Lahore and Karachi, supported by amphibious landings and naval firepower. Massive tank‑on‑tank battles, extensive UAV swarms, and contested air superiority would define the conflict. India’s ten‑fold budget advantage, larger industrial base, and higher personnel levels would enable sustained attrition, while Pakistan’s faster mobilisation and cruise‑missile capability could impose a costly stalemate. Within weeks, China—concerned about the CPEC—and the United States would pressure both sides toward a cease‑fire, likely resulting in limited territorial adjustments and a UN‑backed monitoring mission in Kashmir.

Strategic Implications and Third‑Party Influences

The escalation ladder (Short War → Cold Start → Sundarji‑Riposte) is constrained by nuclear deterrence, the economic stakes of the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the strategic interests of the United States, Russia, and the UN. China’s primary goal is to keep CPEC operational; prolonged conflict would jeopardise that, prompting Beijing to act as a de‑escalation arbiter【10】. The United States views Pakistan as a regional partner and would similarly push for rapid diplomatic resolution. Economic disparity—India’s $83.6 billion defence budget versus Pakistan’s $8 billion—means India can sustain high‑intensity operations longer, further tilting the balance in its favour.

Strategic Intent: Perpetual Low‑Intensity Conflict

Senior Indian officers have observed that Pakistan’s military seeks to maintain a perpetual war posture rather than achieve decisive territorial conquest【14】. By preserving a state of low‑intensity tension, the Pakistani armed forces reinforce their domestic political relevance and compel India to allocate substantial resources to deterrence. This dynamic suggests that future Indo‑Pakistani engagements will likely remain limited, episodic confrontations rather than full‑scale wars, with both sides preferring to manage crises through diplomatic channels and strategic signaling.

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FAQ

How do the ground‑combat platforms of India and Pakistan differ?

India fields about 7 100 tracked/wheeled combat vehicles, including a larger tank fleet (+1 200 tanks), while Pakistan fields ~6 600 such platforms but leads in self‑propelled artillery (552 vs 100).

What are the main advantages of Pakistan’s air‑surveillance assets?

Pakistan operates 22 surveillance, reconnaissance and early‑warning aircraft—more than three times India’s count—allowing earlier detection of Indian movements and better targeting for its limited fighter force.

What is the core principle of India’s Cold Start doctrine?

Cold Start calls for mobilising eight division‑sized battle groups (80 000‑120 000 troops) within 3‑4 days to seize shallow border territory, creating political leverage while staying below the nuclear escalation threshold.

How does Pakistan’s New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF) counter Cold Start?

NCWF emphasises accelerated mobilisation, tight air‑ground coordination, and the use of cruise‑missile batteries to blunt an Indian rapid thrust, while accepting limited territorial loss to force a stalemate and avoid nuclear use.

Why is the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor a factor in conflict escalation?

The CPEC is a cornerstone of China’s Belt‑and‑Road Initiative; a prolonged Indo‑Pakistani war would threaten its security and economic value, prompting China to pressure both sides toward a cease‑fire.

Do India and Pakistan have comparable nuclear arsenals?

Yes. India possesses about 172 warheads and Pakistan about 170, making their nuclear capabilities roughly equal, but their doctrines differ: India follows a No‑First‑Use policy, while Pakistan adopts Full‑Spectrum Deterrence, allowing first use of low‑yield tactical nukes.

Sources

About the Author

Arnaldo Teodorani

Arnaldo Teodorani creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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