Nayib Bukele: El Salvador's President for Life?

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Video originally published on August 6, 2025.

On July 31st, El Salvador's Legislative Assembly approved sweeping constitutional reforms in less than six hours, fundamentally altering the country's democratic framework. Presidential terms will now last six years instead of five, runoff elections have been abolished, and most significantly, all limits on presidential re-election have been removed. For forty-four-year-old President Nayib Bukele, already the most popular leader in Salvadoran history with approval ratings hovering around 85 percent, these changes open a path to potentially rule for decades. While Bukele himself has remained publicly quiet about his intentions to seek a third term, his actions over seven years in power tell a different story—one of methodical power consolidation, opposition suppression, and the systematic dismantling of democratic guardrails.

Key Takeaways

El Salvador's Legislative Assembly passed constitutional reforms on July 31st allowing indefinite presidential re-election, extending presidential terms from five to six years, and eliminating runoff elections, with 57 votes in favor and only 3 opposed in less than six hours.

President Nayib Bukele, currently in his seventh year in office, maintains an approval rating around 85 percent, with credible outside pollsters consistently confirming these figures.

Since taking office in 2019, Bukele has arrested over 85,000 people in a country of six million, with an estimated two percent of El Salvador's adult population currently incarcerated, many without clear evidence of criminal involvement.

Bukele has systematically consolidated power by packing the Supreme Court with loyal justices, stripping opposition funding, forcing journalists and human rights leaders into exile or imprisonment, and rewriting rules to make constitutional amendments easier.

The reforms move the next presidential election from 2029 to 2027, giving Bukele an opportunity to secure a third term before public opinion potentially shifts, while leaving the shattered opposition very little time to organize.

The Trump administration's friendly relationship with Bukele, including sending migrant detainees to Salvadoran prisons, has insulated Bukele from American criticism and removed a key external check on his power.

The Swift Constitutional Overhaul

The transformation of El Salvador's constitutional order occurred with remarkable speed and minimal resistance. On Thursday, July 31st, legislator Ana Figueroa from Bukele's New Ideas Party introduced a constitutional reform package to the Legislative Assembly. The reforms contained three fundamental changes to Salvadoran governance: presidents could now be re-elected indefinitely with no term limits, presidential terms would be extended from five to six years, and elections would be decided by a single round of voting with no runoff provisions.

The entire legislative process was compressed into less than six hours. The reform was rushed to a vote and approved nearly unanimously, with fifty-seven votes in favor and a mere three in opposition. The timing was strategic—Salvadorans were focused on the country's week-long San Salvador celebration, and the vote was framed as a procedural matter designed to save money on elections rather than a fundamental restructuring of democratic governance. The entire process took barely as much time as it takes to drive from one end of El Salvador to the other, transforming the country's political system while much of the population was distracted by festivities.

Bukele's Rise and Iron-Fisted Rule

Nayib Bukele's ascent to power and his subsequent consolidation of authority cannot be separated from the context in which he emerged. First elected in February 2019, Bukele took office during one of the most difficult periods in Salvadoran history. Gangs operated unchecked across urban areas, corruption permeated national and local government at every level, and the country's homicide rates ranked among the highest in the world. El Salvador was a nation in crisis, and Bukele positioned himself as the strongman who could restore order.

Since taking office, Bukele has been defined primarily by his aggressive crackdowns against organized crime. From 2019 through the end of 2024, his government arrested over 85,000 people in a country with a total population of just six million. This massive detention campaign has been accompanied by an equally massive expansion of prison infrastructure, most notably the construction of the Terrorism Confinement Center, known by its Spanish acronym CECOT. This facility has become notorious both domestically and internationally as a symbol of Bukele's hardline approach to criminal justice.

The scale of incarceration under Bukele is staggering. An estimated two percent of El Salvador's entire adult population is currently behind bars, distributed across CECOT and other detention centers throughout the country. According to advocacy and human rights organizations, many of these detainees have been swept up without clear evidence of their involvement in criminal activities. These individuals have essentially been disappeared into a penal system that functions as a black hole, with minimal transparency, limited due process, and little accountability for wrongful detention.

Despite these concerns from human rights groups, or perhaps because of the very tactics that alarm them, Bukele has been rewarded generously by the Salvadoran public. His approval rating currently hovers around 85 percent nationwide—a staggering level of popularity in a region where leaders typically become deeply unpopular after a few years in power. That approval rating sometimes spikes into the nineties and has yet to drop below seventy-five percent. Importantly, these figures don't appear to be the result of Putin-style poll manipulation; credible outside pollsters consistently cluster around these same statistics.

The reasons for Bukele's extraordinary popularity are tangible. Today, El Salvador's homicide rates are among the lowest in the region, a dramatic reversal from the violence that plagued the country before his presidency. The economy has grown steadily despite frequent setbacks, and Bukele has waged a very public 'war against corruption' that resonates with citizens tired of endemic graft. Meanwhile, Bukele and his allies have demonstrated a seamless command of social media and 21st-century messaging techniques, using these platforms to amplify their successes, wage all-out wars against critics, and polish a narrative that serves their political needs.

Bukele's appeal extends beyond El Salvador's borders. He is widely popular not just among Salvadorans at home, but throughout the Salvadoran diaspora across the globe. In one recent popularity poll, less than two percent of Salvadoran respondents expressed concern about how much power Bukele has concentrated in his own hands—a statistic that reveals either genuine satisfaction with his leadership or a successful suppression of dissenting voices, or both.

The Systematic Removal of Barriers to Power

Over the course of recent months, Bukele has watched as the remaining barriers to his rule have systematically fallen away, creating the conditions for the constitutional reforms that would cement his position. The international environment has shifted dramatically in his favor. The United States, long the arbiter of affairs in Latin America and especially on the Central American isthmus, is now led by a Bukele-friendly president. The Trump administration has sent hundreds of migrant detainees to the Salvadoran prison system, and Bukele has offered to build dedicated detention centers for the United States, creating a mutually beneficial relationship that insulates him from American criticism.

Domestically, Bukele's opponents in the media have been systematically marginalized. They have been framed as corrupt agitators and accused of partnership in influence operations alongside USAID. Internationally, Bukele has started to throw his weight around more actively in regional affairs, positioning himself as a model for other Latin American leaders with iron-fisted ambitions.

Bukele has proved remarkably invulnerable to controversies that might have damaged other leaders. The apparent failure of his nationwide Bitcoin program, which was promoted as a revolutionary economic initiative, has done little to dent his popularity. Reports from the investigative outlet El Faro alleged that Bukele made a secret pact with gang leaders to lower the murder rate—a claim that, if true, would undermine the entire narrative of his tough-on-crime approach. Yet these allegations gained little traction. Outcry from the nation's bishops against the decision to allow metals mining was similarly ineffective. The eviction of thousands of street vendors from downtown San Salvador, which displaced vulnerable economic actors, failed to generate sustained opposition.

If there is anything in El Salvador that can harm the popularity of Nayib Bukele, his domestic opponents have yet to discover it. With no reason to believe that Salvadorans would punish him for becoming President for Life, Bukele seized the opportunity to do exactly that.

The Methodical Consolidation of Power

While Bukele himself has claimed that he does not intend to run for a third term—citing an agreement he formed with his wife—his actions tell a very different story. For any political leader, actions speak far louder than words, and even a cursory examination of Bukele's conduct since first taking office reveals a man who has had no qualms about systematically gathering power.

After first taking office and gaining a supermajority in the Legislative Assembly, Bukele immediately set to work packing the country's Supreme Court with loyal justices. In 2021, these hand-picked justices did away with a long-standing prohibition on presidents seeking consecutive terms. Under the old constitutional rules, Bukele would have been able to run for president again only after someone else had served in the role following his first term. The Supreme Court's decision removed this barrier entirely.

In 2024, Bukele ran successfully for re-election and consolidated his control over the nation. His New Ideas party won in all but one of El Salvador's forty-four municipalities—a near-total electoral sweep. Bukele himself won with nearly 85 percent of the national vote. This electoral process also saw him strip funding for the nation's traditional multi-party political system permanently, further weakening any potential opposition.

In January of this year, the Legislative Assembly rewrote the rules to make amending the constitution easier, essentially giving Bukele direct control over the constitutional reform process since his New Ideas party holds a supermajority and follows his instructions. This procedural change set the stage for the rapid passage of the July 31st reforms.

Over the last few months, Bukele's government has extended its crackdowns to include some of the last opposition leaders who could have posed a threat to him in the future. Prominent anti-corruption leaders, journalists, and the leaders of El Salvador's biggest human rights organization have been targeted. Cristosal, the leading human rights group, spent years investigating prison deaths and the use of torture under Bukele's administration. Following sustained pressure and threats, Cristosal shut down its Salvadoran offices, and its leaders and employees fled the country. They followed in the footsteps of several journalists from the investigative outlet El Faro, who had recently done the same.

While it is technically possible that Bukele has simply watched his political allies deliver him a victory that he never actually requested, the far more likely explanation is that Bukele has quietly orchestrated the entire process that would make him President for Life. The pattern is too consistent, the timing too convenient, and the beneficiary too obvious for this to be anything other than a carefully planned consolidation of power.

Justifying the Transformation

Following the passage of the constitutional reforms, Bukele himself led the public charge in praising the Legislative Assembly's actions, despite his earlier claims of disinterest in seeking additional terms. His defense of the changes was framed in terms of sovereignty and international double standards. Online, Bukele drew a comparison to European leaders, stating: "90% of developed countries allow the indefinite reelection of their head of government, and no one bats an eye. But when a small, poor country like El Salvador tries to do the same, suddenly it's the end of democracy. […] The problem isn't the system, it's the fact that a poor country dares to act like a sovereign one."

This framing—positioning El Salvador's constitutional changes as an assertion of sovereignty against international interference—resonated with nationalist sentiment and deflected criticism by portraying opponents as tools of foreign powers. From across his party infrastructure, leaders chimed in with supporting statements, all essentially echoing the same message.

Xavier Zablah, Bukele's cousin and the president of the New Ideas Party, was blunt in his assessment: "I'll say it bluntly: President Nayib Bukele is the only one who can take El Salvador to where our people want to go." The vice president of the Legislative Assembly framed the reforms in populist terms: "Power has returned to the only place that it truly belongs … to the Salvadoran people." Ana Figueroa, the lawmaker who introduced the legislation, emphasized democratic choice: "It will be the people who decide, as many times as they wish, whether to continue supporting the path of transformation that our nation is experiencing."

On the streets of El Salvador, the reaction was largely muted—neither enthusiastic celebration nor mass protest. One Salvadoran citizen, a business owner, expressed the pragmatic acceptance that characterized much of the public response: "Maybe I'll feel differently if you ask me in 10 years, I don't know. But for today, I have no problem with him being re-elected."

This tepid response reflects either genuine satisfaction with Bukele's governance, exhaustion with political conflict, fear of expressing opposition, or some combination of all three. The absence of significant protest is particularly notable given that the news was plastered across the front page of just about every Salvadoran newspaper. It's not that the people of El Salvador didn't know about the seismic shift that had just taken place; they simply didn't mind, or at least didn't feel empowered to object.

The Marginalized Opposition

There were Salvadoran voices opposed to the constitutional reforms, but in a practical sense, they were entirely inconsequential. When prominent opposition legislator Marcela Villatoro declared that "Democracy in El Salvador has died!", she did so as one of just three dissenting votes on the constitutional reform—a tiny minority in a legislature dominated by Bukele's New Ideas party.

Other opposition voices were similarly marginalized. One civilian speaking to the New York Times explained that the reforms meant "that now he'll never give up the presidency," but she spoke as a person whose son and two nephews have been incarcerated by the government—a personal situation that diminishes her social standing in the new national order that Bukele has created. In contemporary El Salvador, having family members imprisoned in the anti-gang crackdown carries social stigma, as it implies criminal connections regardless of whether evidence supports such connections.

When El Salvador's surviving opposition leaders issued condemnations of the constitutional reforms, they did so mostly from exile, with little hope of seeing their commentary gain traction on Salvadoran social media networks. The systematic targeting of journalists, human rights activists, and opposition politicians has created an environment where dissent is dangerous and exile is often the only safe option for those who persist in criticizing the government.

Despite the fundamental nature of the changes, there was no protest in the streets. The absence of public demonstrations is particularly striking given the visibility of the news. The Salvadoran public was informed—the constitutional reforms were front-page news across the country's media outlets—but they remained passive. Whether this passivity reflects genuine support, political exhaustion, fear of repression, or a combination of factors, the result is the same: Bukele faced no meaningful domestic resistance to his transformation into a potentially lifelong leader.

The Path Forward and Potential Vulnerabilities

Barring an incredible change in Salvadoran society between now and 2027, El Salvador has entered the second chapter of its Bukele saga. The question is no longer whether Bukele can become President for Life—the legal and constitutional path is now clear. The only questions remaining are whether he will pursue this path, and whether anyone in El Salvador will be able to stop him by other means.

Bukele's hold on power is strong, but it is not absolute. He has made an incredible number of enemies, even if most are now exiled or imprisoned. He has positioned himself at the head of an emerging new oligarchy, where Salvadoran leaders and business magnates join him in a cycle of self-enrichment. Like any other leader of an oligarchy, Bukele will have to carefully navigate his situation to avoid a scenario in which his partners no longer find him profitable and consider moving against him.

El Salvador has a long history of military coups and military regimes, and if Bukele fails to appease the armed forces, he may find himself in jeopardy. For now, both the oligarchy and the military appear to be pacified. Bukele has provided his generals with immense resources and protected them from scrutiny, while his close friends and allies are visibly prospering. The real challenge will be maintaining the public support that Bukele has commanded thus far, or at least preventing any precipitous drop in his popularity.

Bukele appears to understand that the tides will eventually turn against him, as they turn against virtually every leader who attempts to seize power indefinitely. Last week's constitutional reform included one final stipulation: moving the date of the next presidential election from 2029 to 2027. Officially, this change places presidential elections on the same schedule as the rest of the country's elections in a bid to save money. But in practical terms, it ensures two things simultaneously.

First, it ensures that Bukele will stand for re-election to a third term and secure six years in power before public opinion is likely to turn against him. Second, it ensures that the country's shattered opposition will have very little time to organize and mount a coherent challenge. This process has been made even easier for Bukele by his government's recent rounds of arrests, which have added to the ever-growing list of potential opposition leaders who are now behind bars.

Bukele demonstrates undeniable political savvy and is keenly aware of the power dynamics at play both in his own country and across Latin America. While his inner thoughts cannot be known with certainty, it would be a mistake to believe that Bukele thinks his incredible popularity will last forever. Instead, he has given himself the best possible opportunity for re-election to a third term—at which time he will have six years to work, plus a likely continuation of his legislative supermajority and the continued protection of the Trump administration, at least through early 2029.

In that time, Bukele will be able to undertake the work of further consolidating power and building an architecture of state repression that follows in the footsteps of modern Latin American authoritarians from Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua to Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. With that much time to work, El Salvador in 2033 could be practically unrecognizable—a place where an opposition candidate simply stands no chance of success even after the public inevitably turns on Bukele.

Bukele was able to resist the urge to act too obviously or too early in consolidating power. But his actions just below the surface reveal that this has been the plan all along. Now, the seal has finally broken, at a time and in a manner of Bukele's own choosing. As opposition legislator Marcela Villatoro warned in her dissenting statement: "You don't realize what indefinite reelection brings; It brings an accumulation of power and weakens democracy … there's corruption and clientelism because nepotism grows, and halts democracy." Whether her warnings will prove prophetic or whether Bukele will defy the historical pattern of authoritarian decline remains to be seen, but the constitutional framework for indefinite rule is now firmly in place.

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FAQ

What specific constitutional changes were approved in El Salvador on July 31st?

Three key changes were approved: presidential terms were extended from five to six years, runoff elections were abolished in favor of single-round voting, and all limits on presidential re-election were removed, allowing a president to run indefinitely. Additionally, the next presidential election was moved from 2029 to 2027.

How popular is Nayib Bukele among Salvadorans?

Bukele's approval rating hovers around 85 percent, sometimes spiking into the nineties and never dropping below 75 percent. These figures are confirmed by credible outside pollsters and do not appear to be the result of poll manipulation. In one recent poll, less than two percent of Salvadoran respondents expressed concern about how much power Bukele has concentrated.

How did Bukele consolidate power before the constitutional reforms?

After gaining a supermajority in the Legislative Assembly, Bukele packed the Supreme Court with loyal justices who in 2021 removed the prohibition on consecutive presidential terms. In 2024, he won re-election with nearly 85 percent of the vote, his party won all but one of 44 municipalities, and he stripped funding from the traditional multi-party system. In January 2025, the assembly rewrote rules to make constitutional amendments easier.

Why was there no significant public opposition to the reforms?

Several factors contributed: Bukele's genuinely high popularity due to reduced homicide rates and anti-corruption efforts, the systematic marginalization of opposition voices through exile and imprisonment, the timing during the San Salvador celebration week, and the social stigma attached to dissent in a country where critics are framed as corrupt agitators. The news was widely reported but generated no street protests.

What role has the United States played in Bukele's consolidation of power?

The Trump administration has developed a friendly relationship with Bukele, sending hundreds of migrant detainees to Salvadoran prisons while Bukele has offered to build dedicated detention centers for the US. This mutually beneficial relationship has insulated Bukele from American criticism, removing what was historically a key external check on Central American leaders.

What happened to El Salvador's human rights organizations and independent media?

Cristosal, El Salvador's leading human rights group, shut down its Salvadoran offices after years of investigating prison deaths and torture under Bukele, with its leaders and employees fleeing the country. Journalists from the investigative outlet El Faro similarly went into exile. Opposition leaders, anti-corruption figures, and journalists have been systematically targeted, arrested, or forced out.

Why was the next presidential election moved from 2029 to 2027?

Officially, the change aligns presidential elections with other national elections to save money. In practical terms, it ensures Bukele can secure a third term and six more years in power before public opinion is likely to turn against him, while giving the shattered opposition very little time to organize a coherent challenge.

What are the potential vulnerabilities in Bukele's hold on power?

Bukele has made many enemies, even if most are exiled or imprisoned. He leads an emerging oligarchy where partners could turn against him if they no longer find the arrangement profitable. El Salvador has a history of military coups, and Bukele must continue to appease the armed forces. The biggest long-term challenge is maintaining public support, as popularity eventually turns against leaders who seize power indefinitely.

Sources

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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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