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From Serbian Streets to Syrian Sanctions: A Wave of Regional Transformations

Geopolitics & Strategy

Across the Balkans, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, a series of unprecedented developments are reshaping the political landscape. In Serbia, a six‑mont

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Video originally published on May 19, 2025.

Across the Balkans, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, a series of unprecedented developments are reshaping the political landscape. In Serbia, a six‑month wave of protests has tested the limits of an increasingly autocratic regime. In Syria, the United States has lifted all sanctions, opening a narrow corridor for reconstruction after years of isolation. In Ukraine, intelligence services have exposed a Hungarian spy ring operating in the country’s western frontier. And after four decades of armed struggle, the PKK has announced a complete disarmament. Together, these events signal a moment of both hope and uncertainty for the security architecture of Europe and its neighboring regions.

Key Takeaways

  • Serbia’s nationwide protests, sparked by the Novi Sad train station collapse, have become the largest in modern Serbian history, threatening the autocratic regime and potentially prompting snap elections.
  • The United States lifted all sanctions on Syria, opening a path for reconstruction and requiring Syria to join the Abraham Accords, marking a major shift in U.S.-Syria relations.
  • Ukraine’s Security Service uncovered a Hungarian spy ring in Zakarpattia probing Ukraine’s defenses, indicating covert Hungarian intelligence activity and raising tensions between Ukraine and Hungary.
  • Turkey’s PKK announced unilateral disarmament and dissolution, ending 40+ years of conflict and potentially reshaping Kurdish‑Turkish relations, though reintegration challenges remain.
  • The four case studies illustrate a broader pattern of regional transformation: protests, sanctions relief, intelligence threats, and insurgency resolution reshaping governance and security across Europe and the Middle East.

Serbia’s Autocratic Crackdown Meets a Resilient Nationwide Protest Movement

The collapse of the newly built Novi Sad train station in April, which killed sixteen people, ignited a protest movement that quickly grew beyond a single tragedy. The station, inaugurated in 2022 as part of China’s Belt and Road initiative and touted as meeting “European” safety standards, fell apart, exposing what many Serbians perceive as endemic corruption. Under President Aleksandar Vučić, former prime minister and former propaganda chief for Slobodan Milošević, graft has become a defining feature of governance, according to the Center for European Policy Analysis. Students seized state universities and formed citizens’ assemblies, while by December 2022 more than 102,000 demonstrators had taken to the streets of Belgrade. The movement’s momentum accelerated as farmers, taxi drivers, military veterans and, in March, the nation’s five largest unions—representing half a million workers—joined the protests. France 24 reported daily student‑led actions, and a mid‑March rally drew an estimated 325,000 participants, a figure that eclipses the turnout during the 2000 overthrow of Slobodan Milošević. Polling suggests up to 80 percent of Serbians back the demonstrators, and the protests have taken on a symbolic dimension: Muslim students from Novi Pazar handed over barricades to Christian protesters during Easter, while a Bosnian‑War veteran declared, “There are no more ‘ours’ and ‘yours.’ They are all our children now.” Such gestures indicate a cross‑ethnic solidarity that challenges the regime’s traditional divide‑and‑rule tactics. Vučić’s response has been a mixture of repression and concession. He removed the education minister in 2023, offered young people loans of up to $100,000 for property, and in 2025 booted out the prime minister before offering the loans. Yet the government’s core apparatus—state‑controlled media, co‑opted business elites and a legal system that files lawsuits against dissenters—remains intact. The European Union’s response has been muted; the Associated Press notes that many pro‑democracy Serbs view EU support as “lukewarm.” While the European Parliament is beginning to link future accession to democratic reforms, the EU still prioritizes the Serbia‑Kosovo normalization process and Serbia’s lithium reserves, limiting its willingness to confront Vučić directly. The protest movement’s leaderless, horizontal structure is both a strength and a vulnerability. Foreign Policy observes that such organization makes it harder for the regime to target individuals, yet history shows that leaderless movements can fracture under internal infighting. Universities that hosted protests now face threats of privatization and salary cuts of up to 90 percent for faculty. Despite these pressures, the protests have continued to expand, suggesting that the regime’s legitimacy is eroding faster than it can be restored.

The End of U.S. Sanctions on Syria: Pathways to Reconstruction and Regional Realignment

During a high‑profile visit to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump announced the complete cessation of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The declaration, made at a joint investment forum, framed the move as a chance for “greatness” and a step toward stabilizing a country that has endured “so much misery and death.” In exchange, Trump called on Syria to join the Abraham Accords, and he pledged a personal meeting with Syria’s transitional president, former rebel commander Ahmed al‑Sharaa. The sanctions lift is poised to address a critical bottleneck in Syria’s post‑Assad reconstruction. International sanctions have hampered the government’s ability to pay and reorganize the myriad militias that now form its security apparatus. Without sufficient financing, the state could not vet, retrain or reassign former rebel groups, leaving them free to act autonomously—as illustrated by the March Alawite massacres, which were carried out by a mix of government forces, aligned militias and opportunistic civilians. Lifting sanctions would enable the government to pay security forces, attract foreign humanitarian aid, and rebuild hospitals, schools and infrastructure that have been devastated by more than a decade of war. Trump’s announcement also signals a broader geopolitical shift. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan participated in the discussion via video call, underscoring Turkey’s growing influence in Syrian affairs. The United States’ willingness to normalize relations with Damascus, coupled with a potential Syrian accession to the Abraham Accords, could recalibrate the balance of power among Iran, Russia and regional actors. While the United Kingdom and the European Union have already eased some sanctions, a full U.S. lift may prompt other Western capitals to follow suit, opening the door for Chinese investment and renewed Saudi financial flows. Nevertheless, the script warns against uncritical optimism. Al‑Sharaa’s past affiliations with al‑Qaeda and recent accusations of massacres against Alawites and Druze communities raise questions about the durability of any peace. The narrative stresses that even with sanctions removed, the transitional government must avoid becoming the next authoritarian regime, echoing the cautionary note that “today’s freedom fighters can quickly become tomorrow’s dictators.” The success of reconstruction will hinge on the ability to channel international funds into a coherent state structure while preventing splinter factions from reigniting violence.

Ukrainian Intelligence Uncovers a Potential Coup Plot: Evaluating Kyiv’s Internal Security Threats

On May 9, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) announced the detention of two Ukrainian military veterans accused of operating within a spy network organized by Hungarian military intelligence. The alleged operatives had been gathering intelligence on Ukraine’s ground and air defenses in Zakarpattia Oblast, a western region that borders Poland, Slovakia, Romania and, crucially, Hungary. Zakarpattia, home to roughly 1.2 million people and a sizable Hungarian minority of about 75,000, has long been a focal point of Budapest’s foreign policy. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has repeatedly accused Ukraine of “Hungarophobia” and has blocked Ukraine’s EU accession bids. The SBU’s report details that the Hungarian officers sought to assess how locals would react to a potential Hungarian incursion, whether they would resist or comply, and also probed the availability of weapons on the black market and the strength of local law‑enforcement units. According to the SBU, the espionage activities began in 2021, with recruitment of the two veterans occurring in 2024. Their mission included mapping the deployment of Ukrainian air‑defence systems, aircraft, helicopters and ground combat vehicles. The report suggests that, should conditions permit, Hungary might consider a covert operation—perhaps deploying non‑uniformed personnel or supporting a local insurgency—mirroring Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Hungary has dismissed the allegations as “completely unfounded anti‑Hungarian propaganda,” expelled two Ukrainian diplomats and suspended negotiations with Kyiv. In retaliation, Ukraine expelled two Hungarian diplomats. An anonymous analyst cited by the Financial Times remarked that the SBU’s dossier appears “too well documented for the Ukrainians to be bluffing,” implying that the claims carry significant weight. If substantiated, the espionage case could trigger a decisive response from the European Union. The EU’s decision‑making process requires unanimity, and Hungary’s alleged actions could prompt member states to consider stripping Hungary of its voting rights—a step already discussed before the SBU’s announcement. The outcome of this diplomatic standoff will shape whether Ukraine must prepare for a potential two‑front conflict and will test the EU’s resolve in confronting a member state that appears to be pursuing hostile intelligence operations against a neighboring ally.

Turkey’s Historic PKK Disarmament: From Four Decades of Conflict to Political Integration

On May 12, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced a unilateral decision to dismantle its organization, terminate all armed operations and begin a full disarmament process. The declaration was confirmed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who hailed the move as a step toward a “terror‑free Turkey.” The PKK’s insurgency, which began in 1984 under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, has claimed over forty thousand lives in more than four decades of low‑intensity warfare, with the majority of casualties being Kurdish civilians. Despite Ocalan’s capture in 1999, the group persisted, drawing support from Kurdish diaspora communities across Syria, Iraq and Iran. Recent years saw the PKK on the defensive, suffering losses to Turkish drone strikes and losing strategic momentum. The path to disarmament began with covert talks reported in October of the previous year. In February, Ocalan, from prison, called for a PKK congress to consider a ceasefire. Although some factions were skeptical, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire on March 1, in exchange for Turkey’s agreement to a legal framework for negotiations. By mid‑May, less than three months later, the organization declared it would lay down its arms. Erdogan’s support for the disarmament aligns with his own political calculus. Facing a possible end of his term in 2028, he seeks constitutional changes that could extend his presidency. The PKK’s decision may help him secure the backing of the pro‑Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party, potentially paving the way for a longer tenure. However, the peace process faces unresolved issues: the status of Ocalan, the reintegration of former fighters, the fate of imprisoned Kurdish politicians, and the dismantling of Kurdish‑led local administrations in PKK‑stronghold areas. The announcement also raises concerns about splinter groups. Historical precedents, such as the Real IRA’s continuation after the Provisional IRA’s ceasefire, illustrate that a majority disarmament does not guarantee total cessation of violence. Erdogan has warned that Turkish intelligence will monitor the process closely to prevent “road accidents” and ensure promises are kept. The durability of the peace will depend on whether the Turkish state distinguishes the PKK from other Kurdish militias—a practice it has historically avoided—and on the willingness of any remaining hard‑line factions to respect the ceasefire.

Comparative Geopolitical Shifts: Governance, Sanctions, Intelligence and Insurgency Redefine Regional Security

The four case studies reveal a converging pattern of transformation across Europe and the Middle East. In Serbia, an entrenched autocratic regime is being challenged by a decentralized, cross‑societal protest movement that has outlasted traditional state repression. The protests’ ability to mobilize hundreds of thousands, attract union backing and achieve near‑parity with historic uprisings demonstrates how citizen‑driven pressure can erode the legitimacy of a regime that has relied on media control, patronage networks and a veneer of European alignment. In Syria, the United States’ unprecedented removal of all sanctions creates a financial opening that could enable the transitional government to pay and reorganize its fragmented security forces, attract humanitarian aid and begin reconstruction. Yet the same relief carries the risk of empowering a government whose leaders have questionable pasts, underscoring the delicate balance between economic integration and political accountability. Ukraine’s exposure of a Hungarian spy ring illustrates how intelligence operations can surface latent territorial ambitions within the EU framework. The alleged espionage targeting Zakarpattia’s defenses and local sentiment highlights the fragility of border regions where ethnic minorities intersect with historic claims. The episode forces the EU to confront the paradox of a member state potentially undermining the security of a neighboring ally, testing the Union’s mechanisms for collective defense and internal cohesion. Finally, the PKK’s disarmament marks a rare instance where a long‑standing insurgency has voluntarily ceased hostilities, opening a pathway for political integration. The process, however, is contingent on broader political reforms in Turkey and the management of splinter factions, illustrating that the end of armed conflict does not automatically translate into lasting peace. Together, these developments suggest a regional shift from overt coercion toward more nuanced contests of legitimacy, economic leverage and intelligence maneuvering. Authoritarian resilience is being tested not only by street protests but also by external economic tools and covert operations. The outcomes will shape whether Europe and its neighboring regions move toward a more stable, cooperative order or revert to cycles of repression, sanction‑driven isolation and fragmented insurgency.

Related Coverage

FAQ

What is the central development in From Serbian Streets to Syrian Sanctions: A Wave of Regional Transformations?

Across the Balkans, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, a series of unprecedented developments are reshaping the political landscape. Precise details on when sanctions relief will arrive, and how that relief will be structured in practice, have yet to be revealed, But even without understanding the specifics of America’s new arrangement, the lifting of US sanctions would be a desperately needed reprieve for the Syrian people.

What remains uncertain right now?

During a high‑profile visit to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump announced the complete cessation of U.S. sanctions on Syria. But another point we’ve made before, and will probably make again in the future, is that there isn’t an objectively right option to lead Syria right now.

Why does this matter strategically?

On May 9, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) announced the detention of two Ukrainian military veterans accused of operating within a spy network organized by Hungarian military intelligence.

What indicators should observers monitor next?

On May 12, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced a unilateral decision to dismantle its organization, terminate all armed operations and begin a full disarmament process.

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Jackson Reed
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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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