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United Arab Emirates troops train at Fort Irwin

The UAE Is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East

Geopolitics & Strategy

The UAE’s proxy network collapses as Saudi, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Pakistan form a security bloc, while Israel, Ethiopia, Morocco, Greece and India coale

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Video originally published on January 31, 2026.

Abu Dhabi’s long‑term strategy of backing non‑state actors across the Middle East and North Africa has unraveled in early 2026. A coordinated push by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Pakistan has cut off Emirati supply lines, forced proxy defeats and halted the UAE’s bid to gain diplomatic recognition for Somaliland. The fallout is reshaping regional alliances and creating two opposing security blocs.

Key Takeaways

  • The UAE built a network of proxies – RSF in Sudan, STC in Yemen, Haftar’s forces in Libya and Somaliland – to secure intelligence and protect trade routes.
  • Israel’s 2025 war with Iran and its December 2025 strike on a Hamas meeting in Doha triggered Arab mistrust of Israel and heightened scrutiny of the UAE’s covert ties.
  • Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Pakistan coordinated a regional backlash that cut off Emirati supply lines, collapsed the STC and weakened the RSF.
  • The Saudi‑Pakistan mutual‑defence pact and Turkey’s entry created a new security bloc (Saudi‑Turkey‑Egypt‑Qatar‑Pakistan) that now conducts joint patrols and arms transfers.
  • Israel, the UAE, Ethiopia, Morocco, Greece and India formed a rival coalition, each anchored by a nuclear‑armed partner, reshaping the Middle‑East balance.

UAE’s Proxy‑Centred Playbook

For years the United Arab Emirates cultivated relationships with groups that other states kept at arm’s length – the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen, Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya and Somaliland’s breakaway administration. The goal, as outlined in the source script, was to secure intelligence outposts, protect trade routes and safeguard the UAE’s export‑driven economy while keeping direct diplomatic costs low. This “grey‑zone” approach allowed Abu Dhabi to influence volatile regions without overt military occupation.

Intelligence Ties with Israel and the “Crystal Ball” Program

After the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE deepened security cooperation with Israel. The source script describes a joint intelligence‑sharing initiative dubbed “Crystal Ball,” through which the two states exchanged data and coordinated on advanced defence projects. This partnership continued even as the UAE publicly condemned Israeli actions, creating tension with other Arab capitals.

Catalysts for Regional Backlash

Two events triggered a shift in Arab perceptions of Israel and, by extension, the UAE’s covert alignment with it. First, Israel’s twelve‑day war with Iran in June 2025 dramatically reduced Iranian support for regional proxies. Second, Israel’s December 2025 airstrike on a Hamas meeting in Doha, which killed six people including a Qatari security guard, was labeled “state terrorism” by Qatar and sparked outrage across the Gulf. The source script notes that these incidents forced Gulf states to reassess collective security arrangements.

Coordinated Counter‑Measures (Late 2025‑Early 2026)

In response, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Pakistan launched a synchronized campaign to choke the UAE’s proxy network. Saudi‑backed tribal forces repelled the STC’s advance in Yemen; Egypt conducted an airstrike on an RSF supply convoy in Sudan; Turkey and Saudi Arabia denied Emirati use of their airspace, disrupting arms flows to the RSF; and diplomatic pressure from Qatar, Turkey and Egypt isolated Somaliland’s bid for recognition. Within weeks the STC collapsed, RSF momentum waned, and Haftar’s position was weakened.

Emerging Security Bloc: Saudi‑Turkey‑Egypt‑Qatar‑Pakistan

The coordinated response coalesced into a formal security framework. The source script reports that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a comprehensive mutual‑defence pact in 2025, and by January 2026 Turkey had joined this arrangement, creating a trilateral structure that blends Saudi financial resources, Turkish operational expertise and Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. Qatar deepened its security ties with Riyadh, and Egypt is reported to be moving toward participation, forming a bloc that now conducts joint air patrols and coordinated arms transfers across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Counter‑Balancing Coalition: Israel‑UAE‑Ethiopia‑Morocco‑Greece‑India

Facing the new bloc, Israel and the UAE have drawn closer, while seeking additional partners. The source script identifies Ethiopia, Morocco and Greece as willing allies, and notes a strategic defence pact signed in January 2026 between the UAE and India. This coalition mirrors the bloc’s structure, with Israel and the UAE providing advanced technology and the other members offering geographic footholds in the Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean.

Strategic Implications

The emergence of two opposing blocs, each anchored by a nuclear‑armed partner (Pakistan on one side, Israel on the other), raises the stakes of any miscalculation. Saudi‑Israeli normalization, once touted as imminent, is now off‑table unless Israel alters its regional conduct, as the source script explains. Moreover, the Saudi‑Pakistan pact introduces a formal collective‑defence mechanism that could shape future Gulf security architecture.

Outlook

Abu Dhabi must decide whether to adapt to the new security environment by integrating into the emerging bloc or to double down on covert operations at the risk of further isolation. The trajectories of the RSF, the STC and Somaliland’s diplomatic status will serve as barometers for the durability of the new regional order.

Related Coverage

FAQ

What was the UAE’s main strategy for influence in the Middle East?

Abu Dhabi cultivated relationships with non‑state actors such as the RSF, STC, Haftar’s forces and Somaliland to secure intelligence outposts, protect trade routes and keep volatile regions under Emirati watch while avoiding direct diplomatic costs.

How did the “Crystal Ball” program affect UAE‑Israel relations?

The program was a joint intelligence‑sharing initiative that allowed the UAE and Israel to exchange data and coordinate on defence projects, deepening their security partnership despite public criticism from other Arab states.

Which events prompted the Gulf states to act against the UAE’s proxy network?

Israel’s twelve‑day war with Iran in June 2025 and its December 2025 airstrike on a Hamas meeting in Doha, which killed six people including a Qatari security guard, sparked Arab mistrust of Israel and forced Gulf states to reassess collective security.

What are the main components of the emerging Saudi‑Turkey‑Egypt‑Qatar‑Pakistan bloc?

The bloc is built on the Saudi‑Pakistan mutual‑defence pact, Turkey’s accession to that framework, Qatar’s deepened security ties with Saudi Arabia, and Egypt’s moves toward participation, resulting in joint air patrols, coordinated arms transfers and a shared nuclear umbrella from Pakistan.

Who are the members of the rival coalition opposing the new bloc?

The opposing coalition includes Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Morocco, Greece and India, each providing strategic depth and technology while being anchored by Israel’s nuclear capability.

Why is Saudi‑Israeli normalization now unlikely?

The Qatar strike on Hamas and Israel’s broader regional actions have eroded Arab trust in Israel, and the new security bloc led by Saudi Arabia views Israel as a destabilising actor, putting normalization on hold unless Israel changes its conduct.

Sources

  1. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/saudi-israeli-normalization-is-still-possible-if-the-united-states-plays-it-smart/
  2. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-884560
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  4. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/security-dimensions-of-the-saudi-iranian-detente/
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Jackson Reed
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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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