The UAE's Regional Ambitions Unravel as Middle Eastern Powers Push Back

Watch the Episode

Video originally published on January 31, 2026.

The United Arab Emirates' extensive network of proxy relationships and grey-zone operations across the Middle East and North Africa is collapsing in dramatic fashion. After years of cultivating influence through non-state actors in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya, Abu Dhabi now faces a coordinated pushback from regional powers determined to curtail its rogue behavior. This sudden reversal marks more than just a setback for Emirati ambitions—it signals a fundamental realignment of Middle Eastern geopolitics, where old alliances are dissolving and new power dynamics are emerging in response to both UAE overreach and Israel's increasingly unpredictable regional conduct.

Key Takeaways

The UAE's carefully constructed network of proxy governments and non-state actors across Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya is experiencing simultaneous collapse due to coordinated pushback from regional powers.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt have formed a core coalition that delivered swift, coordinated, and devastating blows to UAE interests across multiple theaters in a matter of weeks.

The UAE's continued close relationship with Israel, particularly after Israel's controversial airstrike in Doha, Qatar, has isolated Abu Dhabi at a moment when Arab nations are reassessing their tolerance for rogue actors.

Israel's strike on Qatar in June 2025 fundamentally changed Arab perceptions of Israel from a predictable regional actor to a rogue state, catalyzing a broader regional security rethink.

A new security architecture is emerging, with Turkey joining the Saudi-Pakistan collective security agreement, and Egypt potentially following, creating a bloc with a combined population greater than the EU and potentially unified under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella.

A rival coalition has formed around Israel, the UAE, Ethiopia, Morocco, Greece, and India, creating two competing blocs in the Middle East with nuclear-armed partners on each side (Pakistan vs. India).

The Foundation: Israel's Pre-October 7th Normalization Drive

To understand the UAE's current predicament requires examining the regional context that preceded it, specifically Israel's normalization efforts before the October 7, 2023 attacks. Starting in 2020, Israel achieved what had seemed impossible for decades: formal diplomatic relations with several Arab nations that had long shunned Jerusalem primarily over the Palestinian issue. The Abraham Accords brought normalization with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco in 2020, followed by an agreement with Sudan in 2021.

By summer 2023, Israel appeared on the verge of its most significant diplomatic breakthrough: normalization with Saudi Arabia. Such an agreement would have represented a seismic shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics, linking the region's second- and third-largest economies in trade and collaboration. A Saudi endorsement of Israel would have fundamentally altered regional perceptions and paved the way for a US-Saudi security pact, providing the West with a crucial counterweight to Chinese and Russian influence while enabling broad regional security cooperation against insurgent groups and rogue actors.

Perhaps most remarkably, this normalization wave came shortly after Saudi Arabia had normalized relations with Iran. In an alternate timeline, these diplomatic efforts could have created an unbroken chain linking two of the Middle East's most bitter enemies around growing mutual interests, potentially making future conflict far less likely and raising the possibility that Israel and Iran might actually coexist peacefully. The Hamas attacks of October 7 shattered this trajectory, quite possibly motivated at least partially by a desire to prevent Israel from achieving these regional breakthroughs. Israel's overwhelming and continuous retaliatory force created such destruction that Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia simply couldn't pursue the agreements they'd been developing, at least in the short term.

The UAE's Geopolitical Strategy: Building Influence Through Non-State Actors

Prior to October 7, the UAE had already established the fundamentals of its geopolitical strategy, one that would prove both ambitious and ultimately unsustainable. For years, Abu Dhabi had been building connections with several non-state actors across the Middle East and North Africa: the breakaway region of Somaliland in Somalia, the rival government of warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, and the separatist Southern Transitional Council in Yemen.

The UAE's connections with these groups emerged through various pathways. Some relationships developed through participation in regional interventions—the Emirates began working closely with Yemen's Southern Transitional Council during Saudi-led operations against Houthi rebels. Other connections were primarily economic, such as development projects on Somaliland's coast. Regardless of origin, the UAE's objective remained consistent: establish geo-strategic footholds to gather intelligence, station troops, and monitor the world's most volatile regions that needed to remain peaceful for the Emirates' export-centered economy to function.

The UAE's tactics were equally consistent: work with non-state actors that other countries kept at arm's length to maximize loyalty at minimal cost, while trusting its position as an oil-rich and wealthy nation to shield it from diplomatic blowback. This approach represented a calculated gamble that the Emirates could operate in grey zones of international relations without triggering serious consequences. For years, this strategy appeared to work, allowing Abu Dhabi to extend its influence far beyond what its size and population would traditionally permit.

Exploiting Regional Chaos: The UAE's Post-October 7 Expansion

Once the Israel-Hamas War began, the UAE took increasingly brazen steps to advance its goals abroad, operating under the cover of regional distraction. The civil war in Sudan had started just months earlier, and with the wider Middle East focused on Gaza, the Emirates surged support to the Rapid Support Forces and secured control over the Sudanese gold trade. In Somaliland, neighboring Puntland, and later southern Libya, the UAE began construction projects with specific focus on airfields that could facilitate the passage of arms and supplies into Sudan.

In this phase, the Emirates became increasingly willing to engage in what can be described as grey-zone geopolitics—acts that wouldn't necessarily bring the wrath of the international community but would certainly cause frustration. This included funneling hundreds or thousands of Colombian mercenaries into the conflict while looking the other way when the RSF engaged in massacres and even genocide. In Yemen, the UAE broke from Saudi Arabia and began working through the Southern Transitional Council, quietly securing de facto control over the port city of Aden and using STC approval to construct bases and intelligence outposts on nearby islands.

During this period, the Emirates actually grew closer to Israel than before, especially once Iran-backed Houthi rebels began targeting Israel with long-range weapons and launched their campaign against trade vessels in and around the Red Sea. Although they had only properly normalized relations a couple of years prior, Israel and the UAE coordinated a deep intelligence-sharing relationship, using common assets, analyzing common data, and organizing their efforts into a program codenamed Crystal Ball. The two nations began investing in each other's defense industries, including cutting-edge technologies like unmanned naval vessels and advanced sensors.

As the UAE-Israel relationship deepened, other Emirati relationships across the Arab World began to deteriorate. Nations grew distrustful of the Emirates' intentions and weary of Abu Dhabi's willingness to bend rules as it pleased. However, the problem wasn't easy to fix—the UAE never crossed lines that would trigger large-scale regional backlash, and whether the affected nation was Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, or others, those countries had greater priorities to address. The Western world still viewed Iran as the region's primary bad actor, the Emirates maintained investment in other Arab nations, and overall, Abu Dhabi managed to position itself as the sort of nuisance that everyone could grit their teeth and tolerate.

The Doha Strike: Israel's Attack That Changed Everything

Until a few short weeks ago, the UAE seemed ascendant on the regional stage. RSF operations in Sudan were gaining momentum, capturing the Darfur region. Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland were pushing hard against Somali authority. The STC in Yemen was gaining power and nearly ready to launch an all-out offensive against the Saudi-backed Republic of Yemen. But just as sudden external changes had created opportunities for the Emirates in October 2023, another series of unexpected changes would begin shifting momentum against Abu Dhabi's ambitions—and again, it traced back to Israel.

In June 2025, Israel and Iran engaged in the Twelve-Day War, a highly destructive conflict in which Israel clearly gained the upper hand. With Iran seriously diminished and seemingly incapable of supporting its regional proxy forces as before, Israel stepped up pressure on Hamas—but not just in the Gaza Strip. Israel carried out an airstrike in Qatar, in a district of the capital city Doha where Hamas leadership had lived since 2012. At the time of the strike, Hamas leaders were gathered to discuss a ceasefire proposal just sent by the United States. Although most Hamas leadership survived, six people were killed, including five Hamas members and a Qatari security guard.

Israeli politicians and military leaders celebrated the strike, proudly claiming credit and drawing support from three out of four Israelis according to national polling. Ironically, it resulted in a ceasefire contrary to most expert opinions at the time; that ceasefire was agreed in early October and has held, despite strain and intermittent violence, through today. But across the Middle East, the strike in Doha was received very differently, and for good reason. Qatar was a sovereign nation, a wealthy and powerful Gulf state where Israel had formed a technically unofficial but complex diplomatic and trade relationship. The presence of Hamas leadership in Qatar wasn't secret—it was well-known to the entire region, including Israel, and was the critical arrangement ensuring Hamas and Israel could indirectly negotiate even during war.

At the time, and especially in hindsight, it became clear that among powerful Arab nations, perceptions of Israel had fundamentally changed. Before, Arab nations had certainly held Israel at arm's length, condemning its Gaza Strip actions with the knowledge that their populations would accept nothing less. But both among nations that had signed the Abraham Accords and those that hadn't, the Israel-Hamas War was more an inconvenience than anything else, delaying the region-wide normalization that had been close at hand. The fundamental understanding of Israel that made normalization possible—that Israel was ultimately a responsible, predictable actor in regional politics and could be trusted to operate within a shared regional understanding—had now been torn apart.

As Qatar told the world after the strike, Israel was now engaged in "state terrorism." Turkey was forced to immediately raise its guard, since it too hosted a known Hamas delegation on its sovereign soil. Regardless of the message Israel intended to send, the message Arab leaders received was clear: if Israel would attack Qatar for any reason, it was a rogue actor that couldn't be trusted. Unless regional governments acted fast, they risked becoming part of Israel's sphere of influence—a very dangerous place to be.

Regional Security Rethink: The Arab World Reassesses Its Vulnerabilities

Not long after the Doha strike, conversations began bubbling up publicly and privately between Middle Eastern leaders about rethinking regional security. If Israel could conduct such an operation and escape consequences, it was clear that Washington was either less committed to regional security than claimed or, worse, less able to enforce its security expectations against Jerusalem. This realization was particularly problematic for Gulf states that had been forced to rethink self-protection due to Houthi threats but hadn't conceived of a world where Israel could simply launch precision weapons into their territory for any reason and escape punishment.

The conversation around security quickly became messy. Some Middle Eastern nations advocated for a Muslim-world version of NATO, while others made clear they would never entertain such an arrangement. Nations did shore up bilateral defense agreements, most notably when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a comprehensive security partnership with a mutual guarantee of collective defense similar to NATO's Article 5. But even without establishing larger security agreements immediately, the most important shift had already occurred: the Arab world agreed that the old status quo was no longer sufficient, even if they lacked immediate ideas about how to improve it.

In the wake of the Doha strike, the UAE reacted essentially as every other nation had. It issued condemnations of Israel's violation of Qatari sovereignty, its leader visited Qatar in solidarity, it summoned Israeli diplomats, and it banned Israeli defense firms from participating at the Dubai Airshow months later. But not long afterward, it became clear that the UAE's relationship with Israel hadn't actually deteriorated in the way Israel's relationships with other Middle Eastern nations had. By October, the Emirates were working on plans to develop a post-war Gaza Strip. In November, analysts raised alarms about potential Israeli use of an Emirati base in Yemen. By December, the two nations were revealed to have signed a multibillion-dollar defense deal to produce aircraft-mounted laser technology.

The Emirates continued pushing back against Israel publicly, threatening diplomatic action if Israel annexed the West Bank, but behind the scenes, the two appeared to remain very cozy—and other regional nations seemed to know it. By December 2025, the UAE faced significant headwinds in Middle Eastern relationships, even if Abu Dhabi either didn't realize or didn't treat those headwinds with the respect they deserved. Problem one: the Emirates were cooperating with Israel, particularly on security matters, at a moment when the Middle East was growing increasingly wary of Israel and its partners. Problem two: the Emirates were a rogue actor in their own right, just as much in late 2025 as they'd been for years, but now active in a region growing increasingly sensitive about rogue actors in its midst.

The UAE's Overreach: Multiple Offensives Launched Simultaneously

All of the UAE's problems came to a head simultaneously as the Emirates set a series of plans in motion during the final weeks of 2025. First came the offensive by Yemen's Southern Transitional Council, which seemed to defeat the Saudi-backed Republic of Yemen government, pushed its forces back onto Saudi territory, and captured a majority of Yemen's territorial landmass with such effectiveness that the STC seemed poised to declare independence and offer itself to the world as an anti-Houthi fighting force.

Around the same time, using a newly finished airbase and newly secured smuggling routes, the Emirates substantially increased their delivery rate of weaponry to the RSF, fueling a growing RSF offensive in central Sudan. In Libya, growing signs suggested that the Haftar government could be on the verge of launching a new military offensive, and in Somalia, the country's UAE-backed autonomous regions and a wide range of opposition figures gathered in conference, threatening to create a parallel Somali government.

Then came the biggest shock of all, the one most directly tying the Emirates and their international ambitions to Israel. On December 26, Israel became the first nation to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign nation, with rumors spreading that the UAE, Ethiopia, and other nations would soon follow suit. At that moment, and for a few short days that must have felt like a dream in Abu Dhabi, it seemed as if the UAE's long-term efforts abroad were really paying off. Soon, the Emirates would be doing business with the Republic of Somaliland, the State of South Arabia, and possibly even a Sudan and Libya fully under control of Emirates-friendly governments.

The Emirates could trust that volatile regions from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden to the eastern Mediterranean to the dangerous Somali coastline would all be watched over—and Israel appeared already in motion. By that time, Jerusalem was sending intelligence officials and early troop detachments to Emirati bases in the region to continue building their rapidly evolving partnership. But just as soon as the Emirates appeared to have ascended to the status of a true regional power, everything began to blow up in Abu Dhabi's face.

The Coordinated Counteroffensive: Regional Powers Strike Back

The response from regional powers was swift, coordinated, and devastating to UAE interests. After a massive counteroffensive by Saudi-backed tribal units, with the benefit of Saudi air support, the Southern Transitional Council was pushed off the land it had captured, plus the land it had held for years, before ultimately being forced to dissolve. This represented a complete reversal of what had appeared to be an imminent UAE victory in Yemen.

Nations across the Middle East and North Africa, particularly Turkey and Egypt, surged into action to cut off Emirati supply lines to the RSF, refusing control of their airspace. In an unprecedented move, Egypt carried out an airstrike on an RSF supply convoy on Sudanese soil, while calling Khalifa Haftar to Cairo for a meeting that regional sources describe as a verbal bludgeoning from Egyptian leaders. The message was clear: Egypt would not tolerate continued UAE destabilization efforts in its sphere of influence.

The RSF were forced to rely on land smuggling routes across the Chadian border, where their fighters were soon confronted in skirmishes with Chadian soldiers. In Somalia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other nations began wielding their diplomatic authority openly against Somaliland, including by visiting a region that hosts militants who have been effective in fighting Somaliland in the past. The anticipated Emirati and Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland never materialized.

Within weeks, the carefully constructed UAE network had collapsed. The STC had fallen, Somaliland was isolated, Haftar had been reminded of the fragility of his position, and according to the most recent reports from Sudan, the RSF is beginning to suffer battlefield setbacks now that its regional support has waned. The speed and coordination of this regional response demonstrated that Middle Eastern powers had reached a breaking point with UAE behavior and were willing to act decisively to curtail Abu Dhabi's ambitions. What the Emirates had built over years unraveled in a matter of weeks, marking a dramatic reversal of fortune and signaling a new era in Middle Eastern power dynamics where grey-zone operations and proxy relationships would face far greater scrutiny and pushback from established regional powers.

The Significance of Regional Response: A Fundamental Shift in Middle Eastern Dynamics

More important than any individual setback the UAE experienced was the nature of the regional effort that made those setbacks happen. For years, when the Emirates had tested the limits of the Middle East's regional order, other powerful nations had chosen to either ignore Abu Dhabi's provocations or, at worst, deliver mild diplomatic rebukes. The pattern had been consistent: the UAE would engage in grey-zone operations, regional powers would issue perfunctory protests, and the Emirates would continue their activities largely unimpeded.

This time proved fundamentally different. When the Emirates engaged in their December 2025 offensive across multiple theaters—actions they would have reasonably expected to garner the same lukewarm protestations as before—they instead encountered a Middle East that had fundamentally transformed in two critical ways. First, the tremendously destabilizing acts that the Emirates were engaged in were finally recognized as such by regional powers. What had previously been tolerated as minor irritants was now understood as a genuine threat to regional stability and sovereignty. Second, after months of heightened regional coordination on security matters following the Doha strike, the nations of the Middle East were actually prepared to respond with coordinated, decisive action rather than isolated diplomatic complaints.

This shift represented more than just a change in tolerance levels—it marked a recognition among Middle Eastern powers that the old approach of allowing the UAE to operate in grey zones had become untenable. The combination of Israel's increasingly unpredictable behavior and the UAE's expanding proxy network had created a security environment that threatened the interests of multiple regional powers simultaneously, finally providing the catalyst for coordinated action that had been absent during previous Emirati provocations.

The Core Coalition: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt Unite Against UAE Ambitions

The real thrust of the regional response came from three key nations: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. This alignment was particularly remarkable given the historical tensions between these powers. Turkey and Saudi Arabia had been on opposite sides of numerous regional conflicts, Egypt and Turkey had maintained cool relations for years, and the Saudi-Egyptian relationship, while generally positive, had not previously translated into joint military operations against a fellow Gulf state.

Yet very quickly after these three nations collaborated to stop the major Emirati push of December 2025, it became clear they intended to work together in a deeper, more institutionalized way going forward. The speed with which this coordination emerged suggested that behind-the-scenes discussions had been ongoing for some time, likely accelerating after the Doha strike forced regional powers to reassess their security arrangements. The UAE's simultaneous offensives across multiple theaters provided the immediate trigger for action, but the groundwork for cooperation had already been laid.

The effectiveness of this three-nation core demonstrated something crucial about the new Middle Eastern order: when major regional powers actually coordinated their efforts, they possessed overwhelming advantages in resources, diplomatic leverage, and military capability compared to the UAE's network of non-state actors and weak governments. The Emirates had built their strategy on the assumption that no such coordination would materialize—an assumption that proved catastrophically wrong.

Institutionalizing the Alliance: The Emerging Islamic Security Architecture

In January 2025, reports revealed that Turkey was joining the collective security agreement that Saudi Arabia had formed with Pakistan—a development that significantly expanded the scope and capability of the emerging security architecture. This represented a major strategic shift for Turkey, which had historically maintained its security arrangements primarily through NATO and bilateral relationships rather than regional Islamic coalitions.

Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia made new overtures to Qatar to deepen their security relationship, a remarkable development given that just years earlier, Saudi Arabia had led a blockade against Qatar that severed diplomatic and economic ties. The willingness to not only normalize relations but actively pursue security cooperation demonstrated how dramatically regional priorities had shifted. The shared concern about rogue actors and the need for coordinated responses to grey-zone operations had overcome previous animosities.

Rumors have also spread that Egypt could soon join the collective security pact, a move that would bring together a group of four nations—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt—with a combined population greater than the European Union. Perhaps most significantly, this arrangement would potentially unify these nations under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella, providing a deterrent capability that would fundamentally alter regional power calculations. While the details of any nuclear guarantee remain unclear, even the possibility of such an arrangement represents a dramatic shift in Middle Eastern security architecture.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have already sealed a new partnership specifically focused on Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security, the very maritime zones where UAE influence had been expanding through its relationships with the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen and Somaliland. This partnership directly addresses the security concerns that UAE activities had created, establishing a framework for the two nations to jointly monitor and respond to threats in these critical waterways.

Extending Influence: The Coalition Moves to Secure UAE-Contested Territories

The emerging coalition has moved quickly beyond simply countering immediate UAE offensives to establishing long-term presence and influence in the territories where Abu Dhabi had been building its proxy network. Current indications suggest that the two nations intend to jointly offer a defense deal to Somalia, directly countering UAE support for Somaliland and other separatist movements. Such an arrangement would provide Somalia's federal government with the military and diplomatic backing it has long sought to reassert control over breakaway regions.

In Sudan, where the UAE had been supporting the Rapid Support Forces, the coalition appears to be positioning itself to back the internationally recognized military regime instead. Saudi Arabia has offered to facilitate a major deal between Pakistan and the Sudanese Armed Forces, potentially providing the government forces with the military equipment and training needed to definitively defeat the RSF. This represents a direct challenge to what had been one of the UAE's most significant regional investments, where Abu Dhabi had funneled substantial resources into the paramilitary force.

The coalition's approach to Libya has been equally direct. Just over the last month, Pakistan has signed a deal to deliver fighter jets with the explicit purpose of bringing Libya's Khalifa Haftar in line with regional expectations. This represents a significant shift in Haftar's position—rather than operating as a UAE-backed alternative to the internationally recognized government, he now faces pressure to moderate his ambitions and coordinate with the broader regional order. The message is clear: the UAE can no longer provide sufficient support to make defying regional consensus a viable strategy.

In Somalia specifically, Turkish warplanes have purportedly landed as a direct threat to Somaliland, demonstrating Ankara's willingness to back its diplomatic pressure with military presence. This represents a dramatic escalation in regional involvement in the Horn of Africa, transforming what had been a relatively permissive environment for UAE activities into one where major powers are actively contesting Emirati influence with their own military assets.

The Limits and Reality of Islamic Unity: Not Quite NATO, But Something New

Despite these dramatic developments, it's essential to emphasize that the world remains far from witnessing a true Islamic NATO. The nations involved maintain significant differences in political systems, strategic priorities, and regional interests. Turkey's secular democratic system differs fundamentally from Saudi Arabia's absolute monarchy. Pakistan's focus on South Asian security concerns doesn't always align with Arab priorities. Egypt maintains its own distinct interests in North Africa and its relationship with Israel, despite current tensions.

What the Middle East does have, however, is a growing sense of unity between some of the most powerful nations in the Islamic world, specifically as those nations build connections with relatively weak countries where the Emirates have been making plays for dominance. This unity is issue-specific and pragmatic rather than ideological—it's built around the concrete objective of countering rogue actors and grey-zone operations rather than broader visions of Islamic solidarity or anti-Western alignment.

The problem with Abu Dhabi's approach to the region has always been its fragility and the assumption that it could rely on relatively thin connections to support its international proxy forces because the rest of the Middle East wouldn't take notice or wouldn't coordinate a response. The UAE's strategy depended on other regional powers remaining divided, distracted, or indifferent. But now, the Middle East has taken notice, and the results have been devastating for Emirati ambitions.

In the span of just one month, these newly aligned nations have not only delivered what appears to be a mortal blow to the Emirates' proxy network, but they've made long-term changes and positioned assets in ways that suggest it will be practically impossible for the Emirates to reconstitute their previous influence. The infrastructure of relationships, the military presence, the diplomatic commitments—all now favor the coalition rather than Abu Dhabi. The UAE's years of investment in building its network have been effectively neutralized in a matter of weeks.

The Normalization That Wasn't: Saudi-Israeli Relations in the New Order

With Saudi-Israeli normalization now off the table unless Israel's behavior changes radically, the entire regional bloc appears headed in a new diplomatic, strategic, and economic direction that excludes both Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. This represents a dramatic reversal from the trajectory that seemed inevitable just two years earlier, when Saudi normalization with Israel appeared imminent and would have anchored a broader regional realignment.

The collapse of normalization prospects has profound implications beyond just Saudi-Israeli relations. It means that the economic integration that would have followed normalization—the trade relationships, the technology transfers, the joint infrastructure projects—will not materialize in the foreseeable future. It means that the security cooperation against Iran that normalization would have facilitated remains unrealized. Most significantly, it means that Israel and its closest regional partner, the UAE, now find themselves increasingly isolated from the emerging power structure in the Middle East.

This isolation has forced both Israel and the UAE into a position where they must either fundamentally change their approach to regional relations or double down on their partnership with each other and seek alternative allies outside the emerging Saudi-Turkish-Egyptian-Pakistani coalition. The evidence suggests they have chosen the latter course, leading to the formation of a rival bloc that threatens to divide the Middle East into competing camps in ways not seen since the Cold War era.

The Counter-Coalition: Israel, UAE, and Their Unlikely Alliance Network

As the growing regional alignment between Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan has taken shape, the first signs of a rival faction meant to oppose it have emerged. Israel and the Emirates, already aligned on strategic and security matters, have found themselves regarded as increasingly rogue actors by the rest of the region. This shared isolation has forced them to pivot toward each other even further, deepening their intelligence sharing, defense cooperation, and strategic coordination beyond what the Abraham Accords initially envisioned.

This budding coalition appears to include Morocco, which normalized relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords and has maintained those ties despite regional pressure. Morocco's inclusion provides the Israel-UAE axis with a presence in North Africa and access to Atlantic coastlines, though Rabat's commitment to the coalition remains uncertain given its own complex regional relationships.

The coalition also appears to have secured the support of Greece, Turkey's long-time rival. For Israel, Greece represents an ally for its own growing rivalry with the Turkish government, providing potential basing options, intelligence cooperation, and diplomatic support within European forums. The Greece-Israel relationship has strengthened significantly in recent years, built on shared concerns about Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and mutual energy interests related to natural gas deposits.

Perhaps most significantly for regional dynamics, this emerging coalition appears to include Ethiopia, a nation that finds itself generally hostile toward Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudanese Armed Forces—precisely the nations that the Saudi-Turkish-Egyptian coalition is supporting. Ethiopia's inclusion is particularly important given its control over Nile River headwaters, its ongoing tensions with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and its interest in securing Red Sea access through Somaliland. Ethiopia's alignment with Israel and the UAE creates a Horn of Africa dimension to the broader regional split, potentially drawing the entire Red Sea basin into the emerging rivalry.

The Indian Dimension: Expanding the Coalition Beyond the Middle East

In late January, the Emirates signed a major strategic defense pact with India, adding a South Asian dimension to the emerging counter-coalition. This agreement comes after years of growing ties between India and Israel, and follows the establishment of the I2U2 partnership—an economic and technological cooperation framework linking India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States.

India's inclusion is particularly significant because it positions the coalition to challenge Pakistani interests, creating a direct counterweight to Pakistan's role in the Saudi-Turkish-Egyptian alliance. India and Pakistan have fought multiple wars, maintain hostile relations over Kashmir, and view each other as existential security threats. By bringing India into their coalition, Israel and the UAE have effectively ensured that Pakistan's nuclear umbrella—potentially extended to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt—will be balanced by India's own nuclear capabilities.

The India-Israel-UAE triangle also represents substantial economic and technological power. India is the world's most populous nation and fifth-largest economy, Israel is a technology powerhouse, and the UAE serves as a major financial and logistics hub. Together, these nations can offer economic incentives, technological partnerships, and development assistance that provide alternatives to what the Saudi-led coalition can offer to smaller nations.

The strategic logic of this alignment extends beyond the Middle East to encompass Indian Ocean security, energy transit routes, and competition with China's Belt and Road Initiative. All three nations share concerns about Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region, and their cooperation on maritime security could have implications far beyond their immediate neighborhoods.

The American Dilemma: Choosing Between Incompatible Allies

The emergence of two rival coalitions in the Middle East creates an acute dilemma for the United States, which maintains important relationships with nations on both sides of the divide. While it's too early to say definitively whether the US will side with the Israel-UAE-India coalition, especially since doing so would mean opposing historic allies Turkey and Egypt as well as increasingly close partners in Riyadh and Islamabad, it's equally unlikely that the US would ever side against a group that includes Israel.

The United States' relationship with Israel remains a cornerstone of American Middle East policy, backed by domestic political considerations, security cooperation, and shared democratic values. Any coalition that includes Israel automatically commands significant American attention and, likely, support. The US-Israel relationship includes massive military aid, intelligence sharing at the highest levels, and diplomatic backing in international forums that would be difficult to withdraw regardless of other considerations.

Yet the United States also maintains crucial relationships with nations in the opposing coalition. Turkey is a NATO ally, hosting American nuclear weapons and providing critical bases for US operations. Egypt receives substantial American military aid and controls the Suez Canal, a vital waterway for US naval operations. Saudi Arabia remains a major oil producer and has been a key American partner in the Gulf for decades. Pakistan, while a more complicated partner, has been essential for US operations in Afghanistan and represents a nuclear-armed nation that Washington cannot afford to alienate completely.

The I2U2 partnership suggests that the United States may be leaning toward the Israel-UAE-India coalition, at least in economic and technological terms. However, the Biden administration and its successors will face intense pressure to avoid forcing a choice between these incompatible sets of allies. The most likely American approach may be to attempt to maintain relationships with both coalitions while working to prevent the rivalry from escalating into open conflict—a difficult balancing act that may ultimately prove unsustainable as the two blocs consolidate and their interests diverge further.

A New Middle Eastern Order: The Axis Has Shifted

After years of regional meddling by Abu Dhabi, fueled and accelerated by actions from Jerusalem, the entire strategic alignment of the Middle East has now shifted on its axis. The region's power structure no longer revolves primarily around the traditional divides that have defined Middle Eastern geopolitics for decades—Sunni versus Shia, Arab versus Persian, or pro-Western versus anti-Western alignments.

Instead, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt stand on one side, united by their opposition to rogue actors and grey-zone operations that threaten sovereignty and stability. Israel, the Emirates, Ethiopia, and Morocco stand on the other, bound together by their isolation from the emerging regional consensus and their shared interests in challenging the new order. Each side has found a nuclear-armed partner to stand alongside them—Pakistan for the former, India for the latter—raising the stakes of any potential confrontation to unprecedented levels.

This new alignment cuts across traditional regional rivalries in unexpected ways. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, long at odds over political Islam and regional influence, now find themselves cooperating. Egypt and Qatar, whose relations were severed during the Gulf crisis, are rebuilding ties. Meanwhile, the UAE and Israel, whose normalization was supposed to herald a new era of Arab-Israeli cooperation, find themselves increasingly isolated from the broader Arab world.

The implications of this shift extend far beyond the immediate question of UAE proxy networks or Israeli military operations. The new alignment will shape trade relationships, determine which nations can access which technologies, influence the flow of investment capital, and potentially determine the outcomes of conflicts from Libya to Sudan to Yemen to Somalia. Nations throughout the region and beyond will be forced to navigate between these two emerging blocs, choosing alignment or attempting the difficult path of neutrality.

Beyond Israel and Iran: The New Dominant Rivalry

As all signs point to potential military action involving Iran, it has become clear that the Israel-Iran rivalry is no longer the dominant force shaping Middle Eastern affairs. For decades, the conflict between Jerusalem and Tehran served as the organizing principle around which other regional relationships were structured. Nations aligned themselves based largely on their position regarding this central rivalry, and most regional conflicts could be understood, at least partially, through the lens of Israeli-Iranian competition.

That era has now ended. The region has found its way to a new reality where the primary fault line runs not between Israel and Iran, but between two coalitions with fundamentally different visions of regional order. One coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, seeks a Middle East where sovereignty is respected, where grey-zone operations are not tolerated, and where regional powers coordinate to maintain stability. The other coalition, anchored by Israel and the UAE, operates on the principle that security requires proactive operations across borders, that non-state actors can be valuable partners, and that traditional notions of sovereignty must sometimes yield to security imperatives.

Ironically, Iran's diminished position following the Twelve-Day War may have contributed to this shift. With Tehran less capable of supporting its proxy network and less able to threaten its neighbors, the unifying effect of the Iranian threat has diminished. Regional powers no longer need to overlook disagreements and tolerate rogue behavior from putative allies because the existential threat from Iran has receded. This has created space for other concerns—particularly about Israeli and Emirati behavior—to take precedence in shaping regional alignments.

The region has entered uncharted territory, where the relationships and security arrangements that have defined Middle Eastern geopolitics for generations no longer apply. There is no telling where the world will go from here, but the collapse of the UAE's regional ambitions has served as the catalyst for a fundamental reordering of Middle Eastern power that will shape the region for years to come.

Related Coverage

FAQ

What was the UAE's geopolitical strategy in the Middle East and North Africa?

The UAE built connections with non-state actors across the region—Somaliland in Somalia, Khalifa Haftar's rival government in Libya, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen. The goal was to establish geo-strategic footholds for intelligence gathering, troop stationing, and monitoring volatile regions critical to the Emirates' export-centered economy. The UAE worked with groups other countries kept at arm's length to maximize loyalty at minimal cost, relying on its oil wealth to shield it from diplomatic blowback.

How did Israel's strike on Qatar change the regional dynamic?

In June 2025, after the Twelve-Day War with Iran, Israel carried out an airstrike in Doha, Qatar, targeting Hamas leadership. Although most Hamas leaders survived, six people were killed including a Qatari security guard. The strike shattered the perception of Israel as a responsible, predictable regional actor. Qatar called it 'state terrorism,' Turkey raised its guard since it also hosted Hamas delegations, and Arab nations began reassessing their security arrangements. This catalyzed regional coordination that would later be used against the UAE.

What triggered the coordinated regional response against the UAE in late 2025?

In December 2025, the UAE launched simultaneous offensives across multiple theaters: the STC offensive in Yemen, increased weapons deliveries to the RSF in Sudan, signs of a Haftar offensive in Libya, a conference of UAE-backed opposition figures in Somalia, and Israel's recognition of Somaliland. This overreach, combined with months of heightened regional security coordination following the Doha strike, triggered a swift and coordinated response from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and other nations.

How did Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt counter the UAE's proxy network?

Saudi-backed tribal units with Saudi air support pushed the STC off captured territory and forced it to dissolve. Turkey and Egypt cut off Emirati supply lines to the RSF by refusing airspace access. Egypt carried out an airstrike on an RSF supply convoy in Sudan and summoned Haftar to Cairo for a stern warning. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar wielded diplomatic authority against Somaliland. Within weeks, the STC had fallen, Somaliland was isolated, Haftar was chastened, and the RSF began suffering battlefield setbacks.

What new security architecture is emerging in the Middle East?

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a collective security agreement with mutual defense guarantees similar to NATO's Article 5. Turkey has reportedly joined this pact, and Egypt may follow, creating a bloc of four nations with a combined population greater than the EU, potentially unified under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have also sealed a Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security partnership, and the coalition is offering defense deals to Somalia and Sudan while delivering fighter jets to bring Libya's Haftar in line.

What are the two rival coalitions forming in the Middle East?

One coalition includes Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Pakistan, united by opposition to rogue actors and grey-zone operations. The other includes Israel, the UAE, Ethiopia, Morocco, Greece, and India, bound by shared isolation from the emerging regional consensus. Each side has a nuclear-armed partner—Pakistan for the former, India for the latter. This new alignment cuts across traditional Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian divides.

Why is Saudi-Israeli normalization now off the table?

Before October 7, 2023, Saudi-Israeli normalization appeared imminent and would have been a seismic geopolitical shift. The Hamas attacks and Israel's overwhelming retaliation made normalization politically impossible in the short term. Israel's subsequent strike on Qatar further destroyed the perception of Israel as a trustworthy partner. With Saudi Arabia now leading a coalition that opposes Israeli and Emirati behavior, normalization is off the table unless Israel's conduct changes radically.

What role does India play in the emerging counter-coalition?

In late January, the UAE signed a major strategic defense pact with India, adding a South Asian dimension to the Israel-UAE coalition. India's inclusion directly counterbalances Pakistan's role in the Saudi-Turkish-Egyptian alliance, as India and Pakistan are longstanding rivals. India, Israel, and the UAE were already connected through the I2U2 economic and technological partnership with the United States. India's nuclear capabilities balance Pakistan's potential nuclear umbrella over the opposing coalition.

Sources

About the Author

Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

About the Team →