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Video originally published on November 27, 2025.
Why Is China Firing Its Top Generals? Author: Wilfred M. Waimiri On Friday, the 17th of October, the Chinese Ministry of Defense put out a statement announcing that nine of the country’s top generals were expelled from the military and the Chinese Communist Party for, and we’ll quote them here, “serious violations of discipline and law”, which in China is usually code for corruption.
Key Takeaways
- Why Is China Firing Its Top Generals? . Waimiri On Friday, the 17th of October, the Chinese Ministry of Defense put out a statement announcing that nine of the country’s top generals were expelled from.
- Among the ousted generals was He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the body that leads the Chinese Communist Party, and widely considered one of the most powerful men in China.
- Can an army riddled with internal problems truly project power abroad, as China sought to do?
- Dr. Zi Yang, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), wrote in the Diplomat, that the relationship between the two men goes back decades, to the time they served in.
- In his inaugural address when he first came to power in 2012, Xi specifically called out corruption as one of the most pressing challenges that the Chinese Communist Party had to address.
Key Developments
Among the ousted generals was He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the body that leads the Chinese Communist Party, and widely considered one of the most powerful men in China. His removal marks the first time that a sitting general is removed from the CMC since the cultural revolution, close to 50 years ago, underscoring just how significant a move this was. Neil Thomas, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told the Financial Times, and we’ll quote him here, “The fact that Xi Jinping can purge a CMC vice-chair shows how serious he is about stamping out corruption in the military. Xi wants to turn the PLA into an effective fighting force beyond China’s borders but also into a complete servant to his domestic agenda.” Beyond corruption, there are those who viewed the purge as a way for Xi to consolidate his power, and stave off a potential coup, rumours of which have persisted for a while now. The purge has also raised troubling questions about the state of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). If corruption was indeed as widespread as these dismissals seem to suggest, then what does it say about the military's effectiveness?
Strategic Implications
Can an army riddled with internal problems truly project power abroad, as China sought to do? And does this upheaval strengthen or weaken the PLA, at a time when tensions with the U.S. continue to escalate? [TITLE]: Factionalism And Coup Speculations As we mentioned in our introduction, nine generals were removed in the October purge. We chose to focus on He Weidong for two reasons. One, how unprecedented his removal was given his rank and two, his close ties to Xi Jinping. To Xi, any short- to medium-term instability at the highest levels of the PLA command structure – and the reputational costs that incurs – is a price worth paying to achieve his goal.” In the long term, the goal is simple, for China to resume pursuing its original geostrategic goals in places like Taiwan and the South China Sea, with a competent army free of the corruption scandals that have so far riddled the PLA.
Risk and Uncertainty
Dr. Zi Yang, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), wrote in the Diplomat, that the relationship between the two men goes back decades, to the time they served in Fujian province, a coastal region in southeastern China that sits directly across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. Yang further asserts that He’s rise to the top was primarily the result of Xi’s patronage. The mention of Fujian is important here because, according to Bloomberg, several of the other ousted officials, including Miao Hua, former director of the CMC's political work department, and Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the Eastern Theater Command, also served in the province. These officials formed the Fujian clique, which, alongside the Shaanxi Gang, and the New Zhijiang Army formed the Xi Jinping faction, and they were the primary beneficiaries of Xi’s earlier anti-corruption purges.
Outlook
In his inaugural address when he first came to power in 2012, Xi specifically called out corruption as one of the most pressing challenges that the Chinese Communist Party had to address. Some of Xi’s earliest targets included Xu Caihou amd Guo Boxiong, two former CMC vice chairmen who were implicated in a cash for ranks scheme. By early May 2016, Xi's anti-corruption campaign had reportedly resulted in the arrest of at least 60 military officers, although some analysts believe that the actual numbers could be higher. Most of the ousted officials were thought to be members of a faction within the Chinese government called the Shanghai clique, which had risen to power during the rule of former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin. The fall of the Shanghai faction allowed Xi Jinping to appoint members of his faction to influential positions. However by 2023, Xi had begun turning on them, starting with the Shaanxi Gang, military leaders who shared connections to Xi through his family's home province of, you guessed it, Shaanxi.
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FAQ
What is the central development in Why Is China Purging Its Top Generals??
Why Is China Firing Its Top Generals? Author: Wilfred M. Waimiri On Friday, the 17th of October, the Chinese Ministry of Defense put out a statement announcing that nine of the country’s top generals were expelled from.
What remains uncertain right now?
Dr. Zi Yang, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), wrote in the Diplomat, that the relationship between the two men goes back decades, to the time they served in.
Why does this matter strategically?
Can an army riddled with internal problems truly project power abroad, as China sought to do? The Chinese coastguard has maintained an almost daily presence at reefs that China deems strategically or symbolically important within the exclusive economic zones of other Southeast Asian countries.
What indicators should observers monitor next?
In his inaugural address when he first came to power in 2012, Xi specifically called out corruption as one of the most pressing challenges that the Chinese Communist Party had to address.
Sources
- https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/purges-and-power-is-china-quietly-rebalancing-its-command-structure/
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/chinese-anti-corruption-crackdown-former-top-general
- https://jamestown.org/cronyism-and-failed-promotions-xis-pla-purge/
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/xi-jinpings-inner-circle-the-shaanxi-gang/
- https://orcasia.org/article/140/faction-politics-in-china-and-its-implications-for-the-20th-party-congress
- https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-future-of-factional-politics-in-china-under-xi-jinping/
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-powerful-factions-among-chinas-rulers/
- https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/he-weidong-general-who-tested-xi-jinpings-ultimate-taboo
- https://jamestown.org/the-four-main-groups-challenging-xi-jinping/
- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/thoughts-on-the-political-demise-of-miao-hua/
- https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-coup-rumours-xi-jinping-s-decline-are-premature
- https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/30/xi-purges-china-military-pla-ccp-power-control/
- https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/do-military-coup-plots-or-fears-explain-largest-ever-pla-purge/
- https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/12/world/asia/xi-trump-military-purges.html
- https://www.thecipherbrief.com/inside-xi-jinpings-military-purge-loyalty-power-and-taiwan
- https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/chinas-upgraded-lawfare-in-the-south-china-sea/
- https://breakingdefense.com/2025/11/as-china-pushes-out-from-the-first-island-chain-us-allies-like-japan-and-the-philippines-surveil-from-nearby/
- https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/03/11/chinas-shipbuilding-dominance-a-national-security-risk-for-us-report/
- https://geopoliticalfutures.com/rethinking-china/
- https://www.reuters.com/world/china/veteran-military-leader-zhang-shengmin-promoted-chinas-number-two-general-2025-10-23/
Wilfred M. Waimiri
Wilfred M. Waimiri creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.
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