Are the Baltic Republics Ready for War? Analyzing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania's Defense Capabilities

In September 2025, retired British General Richard Shireff, former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, released an interview describing a potential World War 3 scenario beginning with a Russian invasion of Lithuania on November 3, 2025. While such a conflict remains unlikely before Russia resolves its ongoing situation in Ukraine, the three Baltic Republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—represent plausible targets for Russian expansionism. These small nations, with a combined population under 6 million spread across territory roughly 80% the size of Kansas, gained independence with the Soviet Union's collapse and joined NATO in 2004. Despite their modest size, they boast vibrant economies and seven major ice-free commercial ports on the Baltic Sea—a strategic asset Russia, with only one such port, might covet. This analysis examines the combined strengths and weaknesses of all three Baltic Republics to assess whether NATO's northeastern frontier stands ready to withstand a hostile assault.

Key Takeaways

• Lithuania leads Baltic defense spending at 4% of GDP, followed by Latvia at 3.7% and Estonia at 3.4%—all well above NATO's 2% guideline—yet combined military expenditure totals only $5.4 billion.
• None of the three Baltic Republics currently field main battle tanks, their combined artillery numbers only 118 units, and their air forces and navies lack offensive capabilities.
• Estonia maintains the strongest reserve system with 230,000 trained civilians from a population of just 1.3 million, while Lithuania fields the largest active force with 23,000 personnel plus over 100,000 reserves.
• All three nations rely on total defense doctrines requiring immediate citizen mobilization, with constitutional and legal frameworks binding civilians to homeland defense.
• The Baltic Defence Line initiative, launched in January 2024, aims to fortify borders with Russia and Belarus using bunkers, anti-tank ditches, minefields, and sensors, with an estimated completion by 2030.
• A 'Drone Wall' concept approved by the EU in September 2025 will create a network of sensors, jammers, AI software, missiles, and UAVs along the eastern border, targeting completion by 2027.

Easy Pickings for the Behemoth?

The Baltic Republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, with their respective capitals Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius—all gained independence following the Soviet Union's collapse and joined NATO in 2004, acutely aware of their vulnerability to expansionism from Russia and its regional ally Belarus. The independence of these three nations has historically been precarious. They were part of the Russian Empire before breaking away in 1918, only to be incorporated once again into the Soviet Union in August 1940 following the invasion of Eastern Poland.

At first glance, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania appear as easy targets for their neighboring behemoth. Their entire population totals just under 6 million, distributed across a combined surface area of 175,200 square kilometres—approximately 80% the size of Kansas. Despite their small size, these republics maintain lively economies, with GDPs of $80 billion for Lithuania, $42 billion for Latvia, and $41 billion for Estonia.

These countries possess a strategic asset that Russia, despite its immense coastline, cannot match: seven major commercial ports facing the Baltic Sea that remain ice-free throughout the year. By contrast, Russia operates only one such port. This advantage alone makes the Baltics an enticing target for any neighbor, particularly those not aligned with NATO—namely Russia and Belarus.

If invasion were contemplated, multiple scenarios exist. One possibility involves Russia exploiting tensions between Estonia's government and the Russian minority in the border town of Narva. Similar to the playbook applied in Ukraine, Moscow might cite protection of Russian speakers as justification for military action. Much like the 2014 invasion of Crimea, Russian forces could deploy 'little green men'—military personnel in unmarked uniforms operating unmarked vehicles—to quietly and quickly seize towns under a cloak of plausible deniability.

General Shireff outlined another scenario focusing on Lithuania. Russian and Belarusian forces would concentrate efforts by first causing disarray through a planned blackout of the power grid, then invading from two directions. One army group would advance from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad in the west, while Belarusian forces would invade from the east, overrunning the Suwalki Gap along the Polish border and severing the Baltic region from both Poland and the rest of NATO.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, regardless of specific strategy, a Russian attack plan would likely incorporate five elements: shock and awe, decapitation of national leadership, missile strikes against fixed military targets, deep heliborne insertions, and deep attacks by armored columns. The assessment concludes that a Russian attack would be swift, violent, and aimed at rapid and complete victory, leaving little time for defending troops to prepare and position themselves.

Mark Galeotti, Professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London, contends that Russia's objectives in the region may not involve outright territorial expansion. Professor Galeotti quoted a retired Russian General stating that 'The trouble with the Baltic States is that they are full of Balts,' indicating the Russian military may be reluctant to risk a guerrilla-style conflict with the local populations.

Galeotti's interpretation suggests Moscow 'considers the Baltic states a theater in every sense, in which offensive intent can be signaled and offensive capabilities demonstrated without leading to open conflict.' This strategy serves two purposes: First, saber-rattling tests NATO's commitment to defending Baltic allies, potentially forcing the alliance to commit extra resources to an additional theater, straining their coffers and manpower. Second, such posturing might pressure elements within Baltic governments and business communities to seek favorable deals with Moscow.

Dr. Agnia Grigas at Chatham House and The Atlantic Council shared the opinion that Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius might prove pliable to Kremlin influence: 'The Baltic states are susceptible to corruption and external influence as a result both of Russia's efforts and of domestic conditions.'

It bears noting that both Professor Galeotti and Dr. Grigas formulated their analyses before the invasion of Ukraine. While their views may retain validity, the geopolitical landscape has shifted considerably. Moscow may now consider direct military intervention more seriously, while the Baltic Republics will certainly prove less susceptible to foreign influence—especially from their highly aggressive eastern neighbor.

Introducing the Baltic Armed Forces

Evaluating the Baltics' fighting capabilities begins with examining their financial commitments. As of 2025, combined military expenditure for the three countries totals an estimated $5.4 billion. To contextualize this figure: it represents less than one-third of Netflix's investment in producing new original content over the same period—$18 billion. This comparison reveals that Netflix's production budget exceeds the entire military expenditure of three NATO nations.

What truly matters, however, is the percentage of GDP allocated to military spending, as this indicates the Baltics' willingness to develop their fighting capabilities. From this perspective, all three republics have allocated well beyond NATO's 2% guideline. Lithuania leads the regional ranking at 4%, followed by Latvia at 3.7%, and Estonia at 3.4%. By comparison, the United States spends 3.4% of GDP on its military, though the vast size of the American economy means actual expenditures dwarf Baltic spending.

The three nations have also exceeded another NATO guideline recommending member states spend at least 20% of military budgets on equipment. Lithuania again leads with a robust 46%, while Latvia and Estonia allocate 35% and 25% respectively.

Financial resources alone do not constitute a fighting force, necessitating examination of human resources. Lithuania fields by far the largest military, sustained by conscription reintroduced in 2015 after a seven-year hiatus. The Lithuanian Armed Forces comprise 23,000 active personnel, with the vast majority serving in the land army. These forces can be reinforced by a reserve exceeding 100,000 and the 17,000-strong Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (LRU), a voluntary paramilitary organization. If circumstances demand, the Ministry of National Defence may mobilize and train approximately 18,000 additional troops within twelve months—all from a total population of just 2.8 million.

Latvian forces also rely on conscription, introduced in 2023, to maintain adequate numbers. The country fields just over 17,000 troops, supported by a reserve of 38,000. During conflict, approximately 8,000 recruits could be called up within the first year.

Estonia's military may appear minuscule compared to its already lean neighbors. The country fields only 7,700 active personnel, approximately half being fresh conscripts. Notably, Estonia is the only Baltic Republic to have continuously maintained conscription since independence from the Soviet Union.

However, Estonia's small active force belies its true defensive capability. Estonian doctrine emphasizes a strong reserve system, and that reserve totals 230,000 trained civilians, with nearly 40,000 belonging to rapid response units—all from a total population of just 1.3 million, fewer than the population of Prague.

A Lack of Kit

The backbone of all three militaries consists of infantry forces. While the three republics boast respectable performances in international track and field competitions, infantry soldiers require more than athletic ability to wage modern warfare. Ideally, they would charge onto battlefields within the robust hull of main battle tanks—but as of 2025, none of the three republics can field any.

Lithuania has placed an order for 44 Leopard main battle tanks with Germany, but currently Baltic soldiers can only rely on infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Combined fleets total just over 1,100 units, with Estonia operating 447 of them.

A land army's primary firepower typically derives from artillery. In this domain, the combined Baltics are significantly lacking, possessing only 118 self-propelled artillery units, of which 14 are HIMARS systems.

Other military services beyond land armies are similarly under-equipped. Estonia's air force consists of three helicopters, two fixed-wing transports, two training aircraft, plus an unspecified number of drones. The Estonian Air Force acknowledges that combat air power exceeds their resources, stating their focus is 'to maintain control of [our nation's] airspace to preserve our security interests.'

This function is fulfilled by the Air Defence Division, comprising two missile batteries, portable air-defense systems, and mobile medium-range IRIS-T SLMs recently imported from Germany. Latvia and Lithuania maintain similar configurations. Neither country possesses capability or equipment for air attacks, instead prioritizing investment in air defense units.

Regarding naval capabilities, the Baltics lack equipment for large-scale defensive operations at sea, much less offensive operations. The main duties of these naval forces consist of coastal and harbor patrols and, most significantly, mine clearing. This involves not removing recently placed hostile mines, but sweeping old yet highly dangerous explosive relics from World War II.

According to the Estonian navy, approximately 80,000 mines were laid in the Baltic Sea during the conflict, and thirty years of effort removed only 1,200 of them. Their combined fleets number fewer than 40 vessels total. Estonia even donated two patrol boats to Ukraine in 2024, representing 20% of their entire naval force—a demonstration of remarkable generosity.

Intelligence and Doctrine

Despite their relatively small size, Baltic armed forces benefit from disproportionately large intelligence communities. For obvious reasons, personnel numbers in these secret services remain unknown—otherwise they would not be secret. However, each country oversees at least two agencies, demonstrating governmental commitment to intelligence activities.

Lithuania operates the State Security Department and the Second Department of Operational Services. The former is accountable to parliament and the President, tasked with 'conducting intelligence and counterintelligence in the areas of social, political, economic, scientific, technological, and information activities.' The latter is a military intelligence outfit serving the Ministry of National Defence.

Latvia fields separate services under civilian and military authorities. Civilian services—the Constitution Protection Bureau and the State Security Service—share similar mandates. Military intelligence and security are entrusted to the Defence Intelligence and Security Service.

Estonia's state secrets are defended by the Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) and the Internal Security Service (KaPo).

Understanding how the Baltics intend to maximize limited manpower and assets requires examining military doctrine and high-level strategies. Estonia, likely to face attack first from a non-NATO power, is acutely aware that due to its small territorial size, the country might fall within days or even hours. Therefore, Estonian doctrine stresses forward defense actions immediately upon threat detection. The objective is responding instantly to any incursion and taking the fight into Russian territory.

Achieving this objective requires mobilizing the entire country, prioritizing deployment of 40,000 highly-trained rapid-response reservists. Another fundamental principle is the presence of NATO allied troops on Estonian territory—specifically British and French forces. Estonia 'will rely on prepositioned Allied forces prepared to fight alongside its own military in an integrated and coordinated fashion.'

Estonia plans to leverage Sweden's and Finland's recent NATO membership. With support from their navies, Estonian military planners predict maintaining open supply lines in the Baltic Sea during protracted conflict.

Latvian military doctrine, formalized in the State Defence Concept by the Ministry of Defence, presents similar principles. The Ministry's analysis identifies the main security threat as sudden Russian invasion conducted through massed infantry attacks, drones, and artillery barrages. The State Defence Concept states invaders would likely invest disproportionately in manpower and firepower to 'compensate for the lack of quality in Russia's armed forces'—a pointed criticism embedded in an official ministerial document.

The Defence Concept further states that should Russia seize Latvian territory, they would likely maintain control by issuing nuclear deployment threats 'aiming to deter involvement of NATO reinforcements.'

This analysis leads to two fundamental principles of Latvian defensive doctrine. First, strategic use of reserve forces to immediately counter invasion and make it as slow and costly as possible for attackers. This implies not only recalling active reservists but establishing collective responsibility for every citizen to defend their homeland—independently from any chain of command.

The Ministry of Defence states: 'Each resident must acquire and enhance the knowledge and skills to be able to protect not only themselves but also their family, community, and country during times of crisis or war. Residents are responsible for their preparedness and securing the necessary resources for independent action in a crisis during the first 72 hours without the support of the state and local governments.'

Children are not excluded from patriotic duties. While the Latvian military does not intend to recruit or deploy child soldiers, the government recently developed a Cadet Force through which approximately 8,000 Latvian children have 'developed leadership skills during the primary school education stage, while also strengthening patriotism and their physical abilities.' The Cadet Force's main goal ensures children will be 'better prepared for the execution of State Defence Service duties.'

The second fundamental principle requires NATO troops present on Latvian territory and ready to engage immediately, before Russian deterrents prevent allies from joining the fight. Latvia can count on support from a small brigade-size contingent of NATO troops on its territory.

Lithuania's national security strategy similarly integrates reservists and the entire citizenry into a total defense approach. This concept is enshrined in Article 3 of the republic's Constitution, stating 'The nation and every citizen have the right to oppose anyone who forcibly encroaches on the independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of the Lithuanian state.'

This article is complemented by the 2024 Law on the Foundations of National Security, which establishes government responsibility for educating and training all citizens in universal resistance and civil defense. This robust legal framework binds all Lithuanian citizens to actively defend their homeland.

The Baltics' Many Weaknesses

Questions exist regarding how Lithuania's constitutional and legal framework translates into practice. The Military Academy of Lithuania itself expresses doubts about Government and Ministry of National Defence capabilities to actually mobilize the population. A paper by Dovydas Rogulis at the Military Academy identifies 'a long-term gap becomes evident between the declared strategic objectives and the actions implemented, particularly regarding public involvement in national defence.'

Rogulis identified misalignment between the vision of the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) and measures enacted by the Government. Lawmakers wish to involve all sectors of society—including private citizens and businesses—in joint defensive efforts. Meanwhile, the Government and military appear to prioritize developing a professional military.

This does not necessarily mean the Lithuanian population is less prepared for total resistance compared to Baltic neighbors. Rogulis noted that since 2024, both the Defence Ministry and Ministry of the Interior have provided increased funding and infrastructure to the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union paramilitary forces.

The analysis nonetheless highlights one potential weakness of the three Baltic states. In conflict with a neighbor over twenty times their size in population, numerous vulnerabilities exist. The first is over-reliance on civilian defense, paramilitary units, and reservists to supplement professional soldiers and conscripts. While the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would undoubtedly mount fierce resistance and inflict significant casualties on attacking forces, making invasion and occupation extremely costly, questions remain about the sustainability and effectiveness of such defense strategies against overwhelming force.

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FAQ

Why are the Baltic Republics considered potential targets for Russian aggression?

The Baltic Republics are small nations with a combined population under 6 million, sharing 1,545 km of land borders with Russia and Belarus. They possess seven major ice-free commercial ports on the Baltic Sea—a strategic asset Russia lacks—and have historically been subject to Russian and Soviet control. Their flat terrain and lack of strategic depth make them geographically vulnerable.

How much do the Baltic states spend on defense?

As of 2025, the combined military expenditure for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania totals approximately $5.4 billion. Lithuania leads at 4% of GDP, Latvia at 3.7%, and Estonia at 3.4%—all exceeding NATO's 2% guideline. Lithuania also leads in equipment spending at 46% of its military budget.

Do the Baltic Republics have main battle tanks?

As of 2025, none of the three Baltic Republics field main battle tanks. Lithuania has placed an order for 44 Leopard tanks from Germany, but currently Baltic forces rely on infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, with a combined fleet of just over 1,100 units.

What is the total defense doctrine adopted by the Baltic states?

All three Baltic nations employ total defense doctrines that require the mobilization of the entire civilian population in the event of conflict. This includes trained reservists, paramilitary organizations, and ordinary citizens who are expected to defend their homeland independently if necessary. Latvia's doctrine requires residents to be self-sufficient for the first 72 hours of a crisis without government support.

How large are the Baltic military forces?

Lithuania fields the largest force with 23,000 active personnel, over 100,000 reserves, and the 17,000-strong Lithuanian Riflemen's Union. Latvia has 17,000 troops with 38,000 reserves. Estonia has 7,700 active personnel but maintains 230,000 trained reserve civilians, with nearly 40,000 in rapid response units.

What is the Baltic Defence Line?

Launched in January 2024, the Baltic Defence Line is an initiative to fortify the borders with Russia and Belarus using concrete bunkers, anti-tank ditches and obstacles, minefields, motion sensors, and ammunition depots, integrated with pre-existing natural obstacles. Latvia alone plans to invest €303 million over five years, with the line potentially completed by 2030.

What is the Drone Wall?

The Drone Wall is an EU-approved concept from September 2025 involving the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland. It will consist of a network of sensors, jammers, AI software packages, missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles along the eastern border. The three Baltic governments have allocated a combined $29 million, with a target completion date of 2027.

What role do NATO forces play in Baltic defense?

NATO maintains an Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics: 1,350 troops under UK command in Estonia, 2,450 under Canadian command in Latvia, and 1,800 under German command in Lithuania, plus approximately 2,200 US troops. These forces serve as a 'tripwire' to ensure an Article 5 response. Plans call for scaling up to 18,400 troops by 2027.

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