Why Is China Firing Its Top Generals? Inside Xi Jinping's Military Purge

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Video originally published on November 27, 2025.

In October, China shocked observers by expelling nine of its top generals from the military and the Chinese Communist Party for what officials termed 'serious violations of discipline and law'—typically code for corruption. Among those ousted was He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and one of the most powerful men in China. His removal marked the first time a sitting general was expelled from the CMC since the Cultural Revolution nearly 50 years ago, underscoring the unprecedented nature of this purge. The dismissals have raised fundamental questions about the state of the People's Liberation Army: if corruption was this widespread at the highest levels, what does it mean for China's military effectiveness and its ability to project power abroad at a time when tensions with the United States continue to escalate?

Key Takeaways

Nine top Chinese generals were expelled in October for corruption, including CMC vice chairman He Weidong—the first sitting general removed from the CMC in nearly 50 years.

The purged officials were primarily members of the Fujian clique, once considered Xi Jinping's most trusted military allies, suggesting they formed improper personnel networks that undermined anti-corruption efforts.

The purges are likely to slow weapons modernization programs, disrupt command structures, weaken morale, and strip the PLA of experienced leadership at a critical time.

The timing is particularly significant as Xi has set 2027 as the target year for the PLA to complete modernization and be ready to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan.

In the short term, the internal turmoil may force Beijing to exercise greater caution before pursuing large-scale military operations, creating a window of opportunity for the West to strengthen its Indo-Pacific presence.

The Unprecedented Purge

On Friday, October 17th, the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced that nine of the country's top generals were expelled from both the military and the Chinese Communist Party for 'serious violations of discipline and law.' In China's political lexicon, this phrase typically serves as code for corruption. The scale and seniority of those dismissed sent shockwaves through China-watching circles worldwide.

The most significant removal was that of He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, the body that leads the Chinese Communist Party and is widely considered one of the most powerful institutions in China. He's dismissal represents a historic moment—the first time a sitting general has been removed from the CMC since the Cultural Revolution, close to 50 years ago. This historical parallel underscores just how significant and unusual this move was within the context of Chinese military and political norms.

Neil Thomas, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told the Financial Times that the purge demonstrates Xi Jinping's seriousness about stamping out corruption in the military. According to Thomas, Xi wants to transform the PLA into an effective fighting force capable of operating beyond China's borders, while also ensuring it remains a complete servant to his domestic agenda. This dual objective—military effectiveness and political loyalty—lies at the heart of Xi's approach to military reform.

Beyond the official corruption narrative, some analysts have viewed the purge as a way for Xi to consolidate his power and potentially stave off a coup, rumors of which have persisted in certain circles for some time. However, the reality appears more complex than either a simple anti-corruption drive or a preemptive strike against potential challengers.

Factionalism and Coup Speculations

While nine generals were removed in the October purge, He Weidong's case deserves particular attention for two reasons: the unprecedented nature of his removal given his rank, and his close personal ties to Xi Jinping. Dr. Zi Yang, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, wrote in the Diplomat that the relationship between the two men stretches back decades to when they both served in Fujian province, a coastal region in southeastern China that sits directly across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. Yang asserts that He's rise to the top was primarily the result of Xi's patronage, making his fall all the more remarkable.

The mention of Fujian is crucial to understanding the factional dynamics at play. According to Bloomberg, several of the other ousted officials also served in the province, including Miao Hua, former director of the CMC's political work department, and Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the Eastern Theater Command. These officials formed what became known as the Fujian clique, which, alongside the Shaanxi Gang and the New Zhijiang Army, formed the Xi Jinping faction. These groups were the primary beneficiaries of Xi's earlier anti-corruption purges when he first consolidated power.

When Xi came to power in 2012, he specifically called out corruption in his inaugural address as one of the most pressing challenges facing the Chinese Communist Party. His earliest targets included Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, two former CMC vice chairmen implicated in a cash-for-ranks scheme. By early May 2016, Xi's anti-corruption campaign had reportedly resulted in the arrest of at least 60 military officers, though some analysts believe the actual numbers could be significantly higher. Most of the ousted officials were thought to be members of the Shanghai clique, a faction that had risen to power during the rule of former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin.

The fall of the Shanghai faction allowed Xi Jinping to appoint members of his own faction to influential positions throughout the military and party apparatus. However, by 2023, Xi had begun turning on his own allies, starting with the Shaanxi Gang—military leaders who shared connections to Xi through his family's home province of Shaanxi. After this purge, Xi promoted members of the Fujian Clique into positions previously held by Shaanxi Gang affiliates. According to Nicolas Zarbin, editor-in-chief of the Lafayette Global Review, this indicated that Xi trusted the clique's members at that time.

This history illustrates several crucial points about Chinese elite politics. First, in order to thrive—and to a large extent survive—within Chinese politics, officials need to be part of the right faction and maintain the president's support. Second, it's remarkably easy to lose that support, even after decades of loyalty. And third, once that support is lost, officials are usually on their way out, regardless of their previous service or connections.

This raises the critical question: what did He Weidong and the rest of the Fujian clique do to lose Xi's trust? According to Deng Yuwen, an independent scholar and columnist writing for Think China, we can immediately rule out the idea of the Fujian faction plotting a coup against Xi. Yuwen offers several reasons for this assessment. First, from the standpoint of Chinese political orthodoxy, rebellion has always been considered a heinous crime punishable by death and collective extermination. Second, He was regarded as one of Xi's most trusted military confidants, elevated to a position 'second only to one man,' giving him no apparent motive for rebellion. Moreover, senior military officers today operate under constant surveillance, leaving virtually no chance of success for any coup attempt.

Michael Cunningham, a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for China Studies at National Taiwan University, takes this analysis further. Writing for the Lowy Institute, he argues that despite the expulsions, no military officer would risk attempting a coup because of how extensive Xi's control over the army has become. Cunningham acknowledges that something strange is happening in Beijing, noting that since Xi began his third term in 2022, several of his hand-picked appointees have been removed, prompting speculation about a power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party. Most of this activity has occurred in the military, leading some to conclude that Xi is losing control of the armed forces. However, Cunningham points out that despite all the speculation, no one has credibly explained how a leader who dominates every significant CCP organization could actually be toppled.

If a coup isn't the explanation, what is? According to Yuwen, the most likely reason is that He, Miao, and the others went behind Xi's back and formed a clique to control personnel selection and promotion. This would directly undermine all the work Xi has done to root out corruption from the army and transform it into a modernized force. Tristan Tang, an Associate Fellow at the Research Project on China's Defense Affairs, agrees with this assessment. Writing for the think tank Jamestown, Tang argues that the nine ousted generals appeared to have formed an improper personnel network centered around Miao Hua and He Weidong, echoing the crimes of Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong from the earlier generation.

On the surface, this might appear to be just another routine corruption scandal involving high-ranking officials. However, the implications run much deeper. If corruption was this widespread at the highest levels of the Chinese military, what does that mean for the PLA's actual combat readiness and effectiveness?

The Impact on Military Readiness

One of the most underreported aspects of these expulsions is their timing. According to Taylor Fravel, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, writing in Foreign Affairs magazine, the timing is critically important because in 2027, the PLA will be celebrating 100 years since its formation. By that point, Xi Jinping expects China to have made significant strides in its modernization efforts. Additionally, according to former CIA Director Bill Burns, Xi has instructed the PLA to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan.

This timeline is, in a word, ambitious, and relies on numerous factors aligning favorably. However, given the scale of this purge and past purges, it's increasingly likely that the PLA won't hit these targets. As Fravel notes in his Foreign Affairs piece, the purges themselves are likely to slow some weapons modernization programs, disrupt command structures and decision-making, and weaken morale throughout the force.

The Center for Naval Analyses, an independent, nonprofit research and analysis organization, was considerably more pointed in its assessment, laying out four major concerns. First, if officers reached their positions through bribes instead of merit, their ability to actually command effectively becomes highly questionable. These are individuals who may have purchased their ranks rather than earning them through demonstrated competence, raising serious doubts about their leadership capabilities in actual combat situations.

Second, if weapons contracts went to companies offering the biggest kickbacks rather than the best equipment, then the military's critical systems might not work as advertised when they're actually needed. This concern extends beyond individual weapons to entire systems and platforms that the PLA would rely on in any major military operation. If procurement decisions were driven by corruption rather than capability, the entire modernization effort could be built on a foundation of substandard equipment.

Third, morale among regular soldiers and junior officers is likely to take a significant hit when they see so many top brass getting fired for corruption. This creates a crisis of confidence throughout the ranks, as personnel question whether their leaders achieved their positions through merit or through connections and bribes. The psychological impact of such revelations on military culture and cohesion cannot be underestimated.

Fourth, the purges are stripping the PLA of experienced leaders, creating operational chaos as their replacements try to figure out what they're supposed to be doing. Institutional knowledge is being lost, command relationships are being disrupted, and new leaders are being thrust into positions without adequate preparation or transition periods. This creates vulnerabilities throughout the command structure at a time when China is attempting to project power more assertively.

These issues are likely to compound in the coming months. As a CCP official told reporters, 'China's fight against corruption is a protracted battle with no finish line,' signaling that more military firings could be on the way. This suggests that the instability and disruption caused by the current purge may not be a one-time event but rather the beginning of an extended period of upheaval within the PLA's leadership.

In the short term, at least, this suggests that Beijing will be forced to exercise greater caution before pursuing large-scale military operations, such as an amphibious assault on Taiwan, even as it continues to exert pressure on Taiwan with aerial activities and naval patrols around the island. The gap between China's rhetoric and its actual military readiness may be wider than previously assumed.

In the South China Sea, where Beijing has been pushing its territorial claims aggressively, the purges might actually lead to a reduction in Chinese aggression for now. The Chinese coast guard has maintained an almost daily presence at reefs that China deems strategically or symbolically important within the exclusive economic zones of other Southeast Asian countries. The coast guard uses two of these reefs, Luconia Shoals and Vanguard Bank, as staging grounds to harass nearby oil and gas drilling by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. China has particularly targeted the Philippines in these operations, with dangerous collisions and water cannon attacks on Philippine resupply missions becoming more frequent, while Chinese vessels venture deeper into Philippine waters.

According to Admiral Steve Koehler, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, while the attacks have ramped up, they haven't achieved the desired outcome. As he put it, 'China's pressure is not working well. It has failed to intimidate Southeast Asian claimants and make them surrender their sovereign rights.' Given the internal struggles within the PLA and the limited success that Beijing's pressure campaign has achieved, it's possible that President Xi decides the risks of a major confrontation outweigh the potential gains, at least until he's certain that the PLA is ready for such an engagement.

However, none of this should be interpreted to mean that the Chinese army is weak or not a threat. As Pete Hegseth, U.S. Secretary of Defense, stated during this year's Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, 'We're not going to sugar-coat it. The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent.' Despite the challenges revealed by these purges, China retains significant advantages that most nations don't possess.

First, China benefits from centralized political control. Xi doesn't have to worry about public opinion, congressional approval, or election cycles when making military decisions. This means he can play the long game without having to deal with the same constraints that democracies face. He can fire numerous generals without worrying that the public will turn on him or that political opponents will use the situation against him. This allows for decisive action that might be politically impossible in democratic systems.

Second, China possesses remarkable industrial speed. China's shipyards are producing warships faster than anyone else on the planet, and its defense industry can scale up production in ways that would take Western countries years to match. Even if current equipment has been compromised by corrupt procurement practices, China's industrial base gives it the capacity to correct these problems relatively quickly once they're identified. This industrial advantage provides a cushion that allows China to absorb setbacks that might be crippling to nations with smaller defense industrial bases.

What's Next For China?

To properly answer the question of where China goes from here, the analysis needs to be broken down into three timeframes: the short term, accounting for the next year or so; the medium term, about two to three years out; and the long term, meaning the back half of this decade and beyond.

In the short term, Xi's primary concern is replacing the generals he purged without destabilizing the military further. He has already tapped Zhang Shengmin to replace He Weidong, and this appointment gives China observers a clear indication of what Xi's priorities are right now. Zhang is from Shaanxi province, and since 2017, he has served as the Chinese military's top anti-corruption officer, heading up disciplinary inspections for the CMC. Zhang spent most of his career in the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, the branch of the Chinese military responsible for long-range missiles.

Zhang's elevation indicates that Xi wants someone who is both close to him personally and understands the factional politics of the CCP, while also having a proven track record of rooting out corruption. The choice of someone from the Rocket Force is also significant, given that force's critical role in any potential conflict over Taiwan or in the broader Indo-Pacific region. While the identities of other appointees remain unknown, if they follow the same pattern as Zhang Shengmin, they're likely to be other members of Xi's faction with similar anti-corruption backgrounds and demonstrated loyalty.

This personnel strategy will be critically important for the medium term, where Xi's primary objective appears to be rooting out corruption from the PLA and transforming it into a modern fighting force capable of standing toe-to-toe with any modern army. This will require fundamentally restructuring how the PLA operates, from procurement processes to promotion systems to command relationships. If necessary, Xi appears prepared to conduct further purges, which will inevitably cause more instability and disruption. However, according to William Matthews, former Senior Research Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, this is a risk that Xi seems willing to take.

As Matthews explains, 'In Xi's mind, a politically compliant and minimally corrupt PLA equals a combat-ready PLA. To Xi, any short- to medium-term instability at the highest levels of the PLA command structure—and the reputational costs that incurs—is a price worth paying to achieve his goal.' This perspective reveals Xi's calculation that temporary weakness and disruption are acceptable costs if they lead to a more effective and loyal military in the future. It's a long-term strategic bet that prioritizes future capability over current readiness.

In the long term, the goal is straightforward: for China to resume pursuing its original geostrategic objectives in places like Taiwan and the South China Sea, but this time with a competent army free of the corruption scandals that have riddled the PLA. Xi envisions a military that can not only threaten force but actually employ it effectively if necessary, projecting Chinese power throughout the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. This vision includes the capability to conduct complex operations like an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, enforce China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, and deter or defeat U.S. intervention in what China considers its sphere of influence.

Getting there will take considerable time, which creates a window of opportunity for the West. As Beijing works to fill vacancies, restore morale, and root out corruption, Washington and its allies need to take advantage of this period of relative Chinese vulnerability. This means strengthening the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific through forward deployments, enhanced exercises, and improved infrastructure. It means strengthening allies' abilities to defend themselves through arms sales, training programs, and intelligence sharing. And it means making it as difficult as possible for China to attack once their restructuring is complete, by ensuring that any potential aggression would face formidable opposition.

The stakes are clear, and the clock is ticking. What happens in the next few years will determine whether China controls the Indo-Pacific outright, or whether the nations of the region have a genuine chance to determine their own destinies. The current purges have revealed vulnerabilities in the Chinese military system that were previously hidden or underestimated. How China addresses these vulnerabilities, and how the West responds to this window of opportunity, will shape the strategic balance in the world's most important region for decades to come. The outcome of this competition will affect not just regional security but the global balance of power and the future of the international order itself.

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FAQ

Why were nine Chinese generals expelled in October?

The nine generals were expelled from both the military and the Chinese Communist Party for 'serious violations of discipline and law,' which in China's political lexicon is typically code for corruption. According to analysts, the ousted generals—primarily members of the Fujian clique—appeared to have formed an improper personnel network to control personnel selection and promotion, echoing earlier cash-for-ranks schemes that Xi Jinping had previously targeted.

Who was the most significant general removed and why was his case unprecedented?

The most significant removal was He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). His dismissal was historic because it marked the first time a sitting general had been removed from the CMC since the Cultural Revolution, nearly 50 years ago. He was also notable for his close personal ties to Xi Jinping, dating back decades to their shared service in Fujian province.

What is the Fujian clique and how does it relate to Xi Jinping's factional politics?

The Fujian clique was a group of military officials who served in Fujian province alongside Xi Jinping. They formed one of three sub-factions within the broader Xi Jinping faction, alongside the Shaanxi Gang and the New Zhijiang Army. After Xi purged the Shanghai clique upon coming to power and later turned on the Shaanxi Gang, he promoted Fujian clique members into key positions—only to purge them as well when they allegedly formed improper personnel networks.

Is there any credibility to rumors of a coup attempt against Xi Jinping?

Analysts broadly dismiss coup speculation. According to Deng Yuwen, rebellion is considered a heinous crime in Chinese political orthodoxy, He Weidong had no apparent motive given his elevated position, and senior military officers operate under constant surveillance. Michael Cunningham of National Taiwan University further argues that no one has credibly explained how a leader who dominates every significant CCP organization could actually be toppled.

How do the purges affect China's military readiness and modernization timeline?

According to Taylor Fravel of MIT and the Center for Naval Analyses, the purges are likely to slow weapons modernization programs, disrupt command structures and decision-making, weaken morale, and strip the PLA of experienced leaders. This is particularly significant because Xi has set 2027 as the target year for the PLA to complete modernization and be ready to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan—a timeline that now appears increasingly difficult to meet.

What are the implications for Taiwan and the South China Sea?

In the short term, the purges may force Beijing to exercise greater caution before pursuing large-scale military operations like an amphibious assault on Taiwan. In the South China Sea, the internal turmoil could lead to a temporary reduction in Chinese aggression. However, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has warned that the threat China poses remains real and could be imminent, and China retains advantages in centralized political control and industrial speed.

Who replaced He Weidong and what does the appointment signal?

Xi tapped Zhang Shengmin to replace He Weidong. Zhang is from Shaanxi province, has served since 2017 as the Chinese military's top anti-corruption officer heading disciplinary inspections for the CMC, and spent most of his career in the PLA Rocket Force. His appointment signals that Xi prioritizes personal loyalty, understanding of CCP factional politics, and a proven track record in rooting out corruption.

What is Xi Jinping's long-term strategy despite the short-term disruption?

According to William Matthews of Chatham House, Xi views short- to medium-term instability as a price worth paying. His calculation is that a politically compliant and minimally corrupt PLA equals a combat-ready PLA. The long-term goal is for China to resume pursuing its geostrategic objectives in Taiwan and the South China Sea with a competent, corruption-free military capable of projecting power throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Sources

About the Author

Wilfred M. Waimiri

Wilfred M. Waimiri creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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