Could Europe Get its Own Nuclear Deterrent? The Debate Over a 'Eurobomb'

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Video originally published on April 13, 2024.

Nearly 80 years after the United States tested the world's first nuclear weapon, only eight countries have officially announced successful nuclear tests, with Israel widely known as an unofficial ninth nuclear power. Now, recent comments by European politicians have sparked intense debate about the possibility of a tenth nuclear power emerging: the European Union itself. Coming from political leaders in countries like Germany and Poland, the concept of a 'Eurobomb' remains extremely contentious and, if it happens at all, would be years away from realization. Yet the debate surrounding Europe and nuclear weapons has become increasingly urgent, driven by concerns about American isolationism, Russian aggression, and the fundamental question of how Europe can guarantee its own security in an unstable world.

Key Takeaways

European politicians, including leaders from Germany and Poland, are increasingly discussing the possibility of developing an independent nuclear deterrent ('Eurobomb'), driven by fears of American withdrawal from NATO and growing Russian aggression.

France and the UK already possess nuclear arsenals totaling approximately 525 warheads combined, with France operating independently while Britain's system relies heavily on American cooperation.

The debate centers on whether existing European nuclear powers can extend their deterrence across the continent, or whether new nuclear capabilities need to be developed.

Germany, despite historical taboos against nuclear weapons, has seen some politicians float the idea of leading a nuclear initiative, though public opposition remains strong and costs would be prohibitive.

Poland has expressed interest in hosting American nuclear weapons through NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement, and some analysts envision Warsaw leading a regional nuclear program with Baltic and Nordic partners.

Emmanuel Macron has offered to extend France's nuclear umbrella to have a 'European dimension,' but France would retain sole decision-making authority, raising credibility questions about whether Paris would risk its cities to defend other European capitals.

Nuclear Nations and the European Drumbeat

A steady pulse of comments from European politicians has created what resembles a drumbeat, attempting to march Europeans towards a future involving nuclear weapons. German politician Manfred Weber, leader of the European parliament's largest grouping, the EPP, recently told Politico that 'Europe must build deterrence, we must be able to deter and defend ourselves. We all know that when push comes to shove, the nuclear option is the really decisive one.' Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski likewise put the option on the table when describing what Europe might do if America pulled out of NATO, stating that 'Allies will look for other ways to guarantee their safety. They'll start hedging. Some of them will aim for the ultimate weapon, starting off a new nuclear race.'

These high-profile examples represent a lively strand of debate in Europe, one that examines America's growing isolationism and Russia's growing belligerence and questions whether the only rational response is to start stockpiling hydrogen bombs. Europeans need only look east to understand what can happen to a nation that chooses to live without nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine was home to the world's third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, totaling some 3,000 warheads. While these bombs were under Moscow's operational control, and independent Ukraine was never going to be able to stand up to pressure from America, Europe, and Russia to give up its stockpile, Kyiv's surrender of its nukes in the 1990s is now seen as a defining moment that paved the way for Russia's full-scale invasion a quarter of a century later.

This fear lies at the heart of the European debate, variously referred to as 'Eurobomb' or 'Euronuke': the fear that in this unstable new world, the only way to guarantee safety is to have a superweapon that makes your enemy think twice, to follow Teddy Roosevelt's advice of 'speak softly and carry a big stick,' only ensuring that stick is big enough to wipe out Moscow. Most of Europe is already defended by such a stick through the American nuclear arsenal. Article Five of the NATO treaty obliges members to treat an attack on one as an attack on all, and while it doesn't explicitly state that America will rain nuclear hellfire down on anyone who invades NATO territory, it's certainly implied, creating what people often call NATO's 'nuclear umbrella.'

This umbrella extends over most of the continent. Of the European countries that directly border Russia and aren't in alliance with it, only Ukraine and Georgia are outside in the rain. Everyone else, from the Baltics to Finland to Poland and Norway, are in NATO. This raises the obvious question: if that's the case, why all this talk about European nukes? The answer can be traced to one man: Donald Trump.

The Trump Factor and European Security Fears

While Trump's supporters would point out that he only berates NATO allies who don't pay their fair share, European politicians worry that Trump's antipathy goes deeper. They fear it doesn't matter that a majority of NATO states are now hitting the two percent spending target, and that a second Trump presidency would see the United States effectively abandon Europe at a time when Putin is looking to expand his empire. Estonian intelligence has estimated that Russia will attack a NATO country in the next decade, while Denmark's defense ministry thinks three to five years is a more likely timeframe.

Although Congress recently passed a law that would stop Trump from unilaterally pulling America out of NATO, that may not provide any real help. Article Five doesn't stipulate a military response if an ally is attacked. Were Putin to invade Europe, a Trump White House could claim to be fulfilling its NATO commitments even if it only sent a sympathetic card reading 'Sorry you got invaded!' For the continent's politicians, this is a troubling idea, especially since it's near-impossible to imagine Europe winning a serious war without America's backing. As the Economist points out, Europe's armed forces are less than the sum of their parts, and the continent is years away from being able to defend itself from attack by a reconstituted Russian force.

Nor might it even need a Trump victory to threaten Washington's solidarity with the old continent. Even if Biden wins, everyone knows that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would take up so much American bandwidth that Europe would have to fend for itself. This is why EU politicians are now thinking the impossible, trying to imagine a world in which, for the first time since NATO's founding in 1949, Washington is not the continent's security guarantee—a world in which the only real defense is a nuclear one. The only odd thing about this discussion is that, as many are aware, Europe already has nukes.

Europe's Existing Nuclear Stockpiles

Of the roughly 9,500 operational nuclear warheads in the world, the vast majority—up to ninety percent—are held by the United States and Russia. The rest are split across the remaining nuclear nations: China and North Korea in east Asia, Pakistan and India in south Asia, and Israel in the Middle East. But that still leaves two nuclear powers that are very much a geographic part of Europe: France and the United Kingdom.

Overall, the UK is thought to have somewhere in the region of 225 warheads, while France has closer to 300. Nor are these the only nukes on European soil. Alongside London and Paris's arsenals, there are roughly 100 American tactical nuclear weapons held in bases in Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as in the part-European nation of Turkey. Unlike the high-yield missile-mounted warheads defending the homeland, these American nukes are B61 gravity bombs, designed to be carried and dropped by European air forces.

Importantly, though, these bombs are not under European control. Even in a situation where Germany is facing an imminent existential threat, Berlin alone cannot give the command to use these weapons. The initial decision to go nuclear rests solely with Washington. The French and British arsenals, however, are two nuclear stockpiles purely under the control of Europeans. While Britain is no longer politically part of the EU, plenty still see a role for London in a future European nuclear umbrella.

As the Wall Street Journal writes, in recent weeks German officials have called on France and the UK—Europe's two nuclear powers—to work with Berlin to develop a fallback plan for nuclear deterrence for NATO, should the U.S. no longer be willing to fulfill that role. German finance minister Christian Lindner went even further, suggesting that rather than acquiring a separate Eurobomb, EU countries could instead contribute financially to the two nations' nuclear programs in exchange for protection.

The British Nuclear Deterrent: Capabilities and Limitations

Unlike most nuclear states, the UK operates a single deterrent system, what the House of Commons Library describes as 'continuous at-sea deterrence (CASD).' This means there are no bombs that can be loaded onto planes like the American B-61s, nor are there land-based sites for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead, the British system consists of four Vanguard-class submarines, carrying Trident II D5 missiles topped with Mk4/A nuclear warheads. Every single second of every single day, at least one of those submarines is out at sea, capable of launching a volley of destruction should the British state be threatened.

The threshold for nuclear use remains deliberately ambiguous. The UK government maintains a policy of ambiguity as to its nuclear red lines, stating: 'We are deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how, and at what scale we would use our weapons.' Broadly, though, the threshold is understood to also include an existential threat to other NATO states. Unlike France, Britain assigns its nukes to NATO, although the ultimate decision to fire rests with the Prime Minister.

This attachment to NATO is a major reason why some European politicians think Britain could step up if America withdraws. While France will only deploy its nukes to defend French interests, British doctrine would theoretically place everywhere from Estonia to Germany under its nuclear umbrella. Unfortunately, there are a couple of significant catches.

One is that Britain has been having troubles with its Trident system in recent years. Tests in both 2016 and 2024 saw the missile crash into the ocean shortly after firing. According to the Ministry of Defence, these failures have not affected the UK's nuclear credibility, since the US also carries out Trident tests. But this brings us to the second problem: Britain's nuclear deterrent is heavily reliant on America. The Economist points out that America designs Britain's warheads and holds the jointly-owned stockpile of missiles on which to mount them. In their assessment, if America were to sever all cooperation, British nuclear forces 'would probably have a life expectancy measured in months rather than years,' according to an assessment published ten years ago.

While it's probably unlikely that a reelected President Trump would go so far as to block even technical cooperation with Britain, a NATO country that consistently spends over two percent of its GDP on defense, the uncertainty remains. This may be why some are hoping to look to Europe's other nuclear power: France.

The French Deterrent: Independence and Capability

For fans of Charles de Gaulle, recent European fears of abandonment by America are Exhibit A for why his nuclear legacy was correct. Way back in 1961, the general point-blank asked JFK if he would be willing to 'trade New York for Paris.' By that, de Gaulle meant would America really be willing to lose its own citizens to protect those of France. Unlike the British, the general clearly thought the answer was a firm 'non.'

De Gaulle wasn't the only soldier among America's allies to feel this way. Much closer to our own time, the former leader of South Korea's special forces memorably told the Financial Times: 'I have never doubted an American soldier. But I would be foolish to place my nation's security in the hands of an American politician.' The difference is that South Korea to this day hasn't acquired its own nukes, while France not only has its own nuclear weapons but has never relied on America or NATO for any part of the technology.

Britain's House of Commons Library summed it up in a briefing paper: 'France has sought to independently build and maintain all the necessary components of its nuclear arsenal. The aircraft and submarine platforms for the French nuclear deterrent are all designed and built by French companies. France also has its own facilities for maintenance and support.' The trade-off has been that France's program has always been far more expensive than Britain's. But were a future US president to suspend all nuclear cooperation, that would start to look like a pretty good deal, not just for Paris but potentially for Europe as a whole.

Unlike the UK, France operates two levels of deterrence: one based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and one based on air-launched missiles carried by Rafale MF3 aircraft. This gives Paris both strategic and tactical nuclear options, the latter potentially plugging a hole in European defense if America suddenly makes its B-61 gravity bombs unavailable. However, French deterrence is still weighted heavily towards submarines. Roughly eighty percent of France's nukes are held by the Navy, with most of them carried onboard four Triomphant class subs, each equipped with 16 M-51 ballistic missiles.

The remainder still held by the Navy come in the form of nuclear-armed ASMP-A cruise missiles, designed to be carried by the squadron of Rafale MF3 onboard the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. After that, the French Airforce has an additional 40 Rafale MF3s set aside, equipped with 54 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Compared to the American or Russian arsenals, this is not a huge nuclear force. France's total warhead count comes in at slightly under 300, compared to Russia's 6,000.

Still, it's enough to fulfill France's nuclear doctrine of 'unacceptable damage.' Berlin's SWP think tank explains that this means France's nuclear weapons are directed not against a potential adversary's nuclear forces but against its 'political, economic and military nerve centers.' To put that in lay speak, Paris's explicit policy in a war with Russia would be to respond to an existential threat by annihilating major Russian ports and military bases, as well as cities like Moscow and St Petersburg, threatening such unacceptable damage that Putin would have to be crazy to cross France's red lines.

Of course, the flipside is that Moscow has 6,000 nukes under its control. The Economist explains why that might be a problem for Paris: French strategists think a few hundred warheads, more than enough to wipe out Moscow and other cities, will dissuade Putin from any reckless adventure. Analysts of a more macabre bent think such lopsided megatonnage, and the disproportionate damage which France would suffer, give Putin an advantage. In other words, Russia might lose all its ports and military bases as well as its biggest cities in an exchange, but France could be utterly destroyed. Still, the French nuclear arsenal is likely the best Europe can rely on right now, which may be why it features in so many plans for continent-wide deterrence.

The European Umbrella: Macron's Offer and Its Limitations

One main reason why major German politicians have hinted at a European deterrent backed by France is Emmanuel Macron's track record of offering one. In both 2020 and 2022, Macron suggested that France could redefine its nuclear doctrine to emphasize that France's vital interests have 'a European dimension.' Both times, he likewise made noises about 'Europeanizing' France's nuclear umbrella.

To be clear, the proposal is more limited in nature than these remarks might suggest. SWP reports that Paris is willing to extend its deterrent across NATO, but not to give up or share any of the decision-making power. The choice to launch would belong to France alone. For many, that would be an acceptable trade in the event that America completely pulled out of Europe. For others, it simply replicates the same issues, only at a European level.

Just as de Gaulle wondered if America would sacrifice New York for Paris, doubters are now wondering if Macron would risk Toulouse for Tallinn. The SWP makes the same point in a less flippant way, noting that because its nuclear arsenal is rather small and not very flexible, Paris would have to respond to a Russian conventional attack against, say, the Baltic states by threatening the use of strategic nuclear weapons against Russian cities.

This is key because the current setup allows NATO to go nuclear without potentially leading to global destruction. American B-61 bombs can be as powerful as the one that flattened Hiroshima, but they can also work on much smaller yields—enough to cause damage to Russian forces and send a brutal message, but hopefully not large enough for Putin to flip the switch and send hydrogen bombs hurtling towards US cities. A purely French deterrent wouldn't have much scope for tactical strikes, at least not as things currently stand. Given enough time and, potentially, enough investment from partners, Paris could grow out its lower-yield arsenal.

Still, the lack of options for low-level escalation is just one reason why some are skeptical about a French-led European deterrent. Germany's leadership, including Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, have been vocal about trying to retain the American-led NATO structure, saying additional money shouldn't go into lower-yield nukes but improved air defense for European cities. But even if relying on America isn't an option in the long term, there are also worries that France won't be any more reliable.

After all, the last presidential election saw over 41% of voters back Marine Le Pen, a politician who has been repeatedly accused of having ties to Putin. While Le Pen denies the charges, those in Europe's east worry she could easily win the next election and immediately withdraw France's nuclear protection. As such, some figures are looking outside existing nuclear arsenals for protection against the future, and they already have a couple of nations in mind to lead the way.

The German Factor: Breaking Historical Taboos

As the biggest, most populous, and most economically powerful nation in Europe, Germany should be the natural choice for building a continent-wide nuclear defense system. That it isn't is rooted in Germany's history. Even as Britain and France acquired nukes in the 20th Century, no sane German politician tried floating the idea. Today, though, that taboo is slowly cracking. Not by much—there's little to indicate that the German public is raring for their government to invest in hydrogen bombs. But at least some senior politicians in Berlin are questioning whether their nation shouldn't lead Europe's new nuclear charge.

Among these are the leader of Angela Merkel's old CDU party, Friedrich Merz, and Katarina Barley, from the same party as Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The Wall Street Journal reports that both recently floated the idea of a German-led nuclear initiative. To be clear, such an opinion is unbelievably controversial in Germany. Nor do many think it's practical. Even without the historical baggage, conservative opposition lawmaker Norbert Röttgen pointed out that it would be prohibitively expensive, stating: 'Building our own nuclear deterrent would take 15 years and cost untold billions of euros.'

That may be why, outside the corridors of power, others have suggested a cheaper version that would transform Germany into a nuclear power for a fraction of the cost. The idea comes from political scientist Maximilian Terhalle. If a future Trump administration pulls out of NATO, Terhalle's plan is that Berlin could simply offer to buy all the warheads the US doesn't need. That could include the B61 gravity bombs already in Europe, but it could also include the 1,000 nonactive strategic warheads the US currently has locked away. Given Trump loves to do business deals, Germany might be able to buy up to 1,100 nukes from the US—for a huge sum, yes, but still for less than the cost of Berlin developing its own weapons.

By Terhalle's count, combining these with the French arsenal would give Europe about 1,550 warheads. He envisages them being deployed together across the continent as a true European deterrent against Russian aggression. However, the German public is likely to be somewhere between mega unimpressed and outraged with any government that tries to make this a reality. As a result, many think there's another country that could be a more natural fit for developing a Eurobomb: Poland.

Poland's Nuclear Ambitions and the Risks of Nuclear Sharing

Although Warsaw has not given any indication it might seek nukes, they're clearly on the government's mind. Back in 2023, Poland asked to become part of NATO's nuclear sharing, indicating Warsaw would feel comfortable having B61 bombs positioned on its territory. Ironically, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has pointed out that placing American nukes within its borders might make Poland less safe.

Since the prelude to any use of NATO nukes would include dispersing the B61 bombs to stop Russia destroying them, Moscow might be incentivized to hit any country sheltering them with a massive preemptive strike to take them off the table. This is why Britain and France both operate continuous-at-sea deterrence. While the logic of escalation might incentivize Russia to attack first, the presence of nuclear-armed subs hiding at sea means the Kremlin knows it can't bomb London or Paris without inviting the destruction of Moscow in return.

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FAQ

Why are European politicians suddenly talking about nuclear weapons?

European politicians are increasingly concerned about American isolationism under leaders like Donald Trump, growing Russian aggression (with Estonian intelligence estimating Russia could attack a NATO country within a decade), and the possibility that the US might not fulfill its NATO commitments. These fears have prompted discussions about Europe developing its own independent nuclear deterrent.

Doesn't Europe already have nuclear weapons?

Yes. France has approximately 300 warheads and the UK has around 225 warheads. Additionally, roughly 100 American B61 tactical nuclear weapons are stationed in Italy, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey. However, the American weapons are under US control, and Britain's deterrent is heavily reliant on American technology and cooperation.

What is NATO's nuclear umbrella?

NATO's nuclear umbrella refers to the implied protection provided by the American nuclear arsenal under Article Five of the NATO treaty, which obliges members to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. While Article Five doesn't explicitly promise a nuclear response, the implication of nuclear retaliation deters attacks on NATO member states.

Why can't France simply extend its nuclear protection to all of Europe?

While Macron has offered to give France's nuclear doctrine a 'European dimension,' there are several challenges: France's arsenal is relatively small (~300 warheads vs. Russia's ~6,000), it lacks flexibility for low-level tactical strikes, France would retain sole decision-making power, and there are doubts about whether any French president would risk French cities to defend other European capitals. Additionally, political risks like Marine Le Pen potentially winning the presidency raise concerns about reliability.

Why is Britain's nuclear deterrent considered unreliable for European defense?

Britain's nuclear deterrent is heavily reliant on American cooperation—the US designs Britain's warheads and holds the jointly-owned stockpile of missiles. According to one assessment, if America severed all cooperation, British nuclear forces 'would probably have a life expectancy measured in months rather than years.' Additionally, Trident missile tests in 2016 and 2024 both failed, with missiles crashing into the ocean.

Could Germany develop its own nuclear weapons?

While some German politicians like Friedrich Merz and Katarina Barley have floated the idea, it faces enormous obstacles: Germany's historical taboos against nuclear weapons, strong public opposition, prohibitive costs, and an estimated 15-year development timeline. One alternative proposal by political scientist Maximilian Terhalle suggests Germany could buy up to 1,100 surplus American warheads, though this remains highly controversial domestically.

What role could Poland play in a European nuclear deterrent?

Poland asked in 2023 to join NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement. Some analysts envision Poland partnering with Baltic and Nordic states to develop nuclear weapons, potentially with South Korean technological assistance. However, hosting nuclear weapons could make Poland a target for Russian preemptive strikes, and Poland lacks the submarine-based deterrence that protects France and the UK.

How likely is a 'Eurobomb' to actually happen?

A Eurobomb remains unlikely in the near term. It would require a complete and permanent US withdrawal from European security, which is uncertain given that most NATO countries are meeting the two percent spending target. The US also has strategic reasons to maintain European alliances, particularly regarding potential conflict with China. However, the debate reflects genuine anxieties about Europe's long-term security.

Sources

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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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