Strategic Autonomy: Can Europe Ever Defend Itself Without America?

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Video originally published on September 5, 2023.

For decades, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have shared a common dream: a Europe capable of defending itself without relying on American military power. For Washington, this vision promises freedom to focus on the Indo-Pacific and the challenge of China. For European capitals, it offers insurance against American isolationism and the possibility of a future president withdrawing from NATO. Yet despite years of rhetoric about strategic autonomy, the war in Ukraine has exposed a harsh reality—Europe remains hopelessly dependent on the United States for its security. While some nations like Poland are dramatically increasing defense spending, the continent lacks coordination, suffers from wasteful duplication across 28 different militaries, and cannot agree on fundamental strategic priorities. The question is no longer whether Europe should pursue strategic autonomy, but whether it actually can.

Key Takeaways

Europe remains deeply dependent on the United States for its security despite decades of rhetoric about strategic autonomy, with American military aid to Ukraine far exceeding combined EU and UK contributions.

Europe operates 178 different weapons systems compared to just 30 for the United States, creating massive inefficiencies through duplication, wastage, and lack of interoperability.

Only 18 percent of European procurement budgets are spent cooperatively, reflecting a fundamental failure to coordinate defense spending across 28 different militaries.

Deep strategic divisions exist between eastern European nations focused on the Russian threat and western countries like France and Germany that have been slower to abandon engagement with Moscow, making unified defense policy nearly impossible.

America's strategic pivot toward the Indo-Pacific and China means Europe can no longer assume Washington will prioritize European security as it did during the Cold War.

Europe possesses significant latent advantages including a world-class defense industrial base (Rheinmetall, Thales, BAE Systems, MBDA, etc.), an economy seven times larger than Russia's, and demonstrated ability to act decisively when forced—as seen in the rapid transition away from Russian gas.

Divided Loyalties: Europe's Failed Wake-Up Call

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many defense analysts believed it could serve as the catalyst Europe needed to finally translate economic power into military capability. For years, European leaders had discussed strategic autonomy. In 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told campaign crowds that the times when Europe could completely rely on others were, to an extent, over. The year before, the EU Global Strategy document had addressed the topic at length. As President Donald Trump repeatedly threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO, French President Emmanuel Macron made strategic autonomy practically his catchphrase.

Yet the invasion did not produce the European transformation many anticipated. Instead of Brussels leading a coordinated continental response, it was Washington that took the lead in assisting Ukraine. American military aid to Kyiv has far outstripped that of the EU and UK combined. Where Europe did provide crucial support to the Ukrainians, it came initially in piecemeal fashion—the result of individual politicians in capitals like London or Warsaw stepping up, rather than a unified effort.

The same pattern emerged in defense spending. While some nations, notably Poland, are now spending substantial amounts to boost their military capabilities, it remains distinctly not a joint project. If anything, many European nations now feel more reliant on America than ever before. Guntram Wolff, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, explained to the New York Times how the EU's traditional model had Germany providing economic muscle while France supplied military prowess. But the Ukraine war proved a game-changer for European security, and Central and Eastern Europeans immediately understood they needed the United States for their security. Germany quickly reached the same conclusion.

In many ways, this represented a default return to the comforting logic of the Cold War—an era when Uncle Sam's number one security priority was ensuring the Soviet Union stayed out of Western Europe. The fundamental problem is that this is no longer the Cold War, and priorities have changed dramatically for both America and Europe.

America's Pivot and Europe's Dilemma

On the American side, the primary strategic challenge in 2023 is not Moscow but Beijing—an adversary far closer in might to America than the USSR ever was. As Breaking Defense summarized, the demands of ensuring European security while maintaining Indo-Pacific deterrence will strain America's defense and military capacity, making avoidance of strategic overreach a core priority for Washington. Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge Colby stated the position even more bluntly on Twitter: if America has to leave Europe more exposed, so be it, because Asia is more important than Europe.

European priorities have also shifted since the fall of the Berlin Wall, creating additional reasons why the current dynamic proves unhealthy for the continent. The main concern is that European leaders can read what figures like Colby are saying, and it terrifies them. Emmanuel Macron recently declared that no one can guarantee the American administration will always remain the same, and Europe cannot delegate its collective security and stability to the choices of American voters.

Simultaneously, parts of Europe's security establishment worry about what happens if Brussels does remain wedded to Washington—namely, that Europeans will be pulled into a conflict with China. To be clear, large parts of Europe, especially in the east, sympathize with Washington's position on Beijing. But that sentiment is not universal across the continent's west. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz attracted criticism in November for traveling to China to drum up investment. In April, Macron was pilloried for seeming to suggest that strategic autonomy for Europe might mean staying neutral in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Perhaps the most pertinent question is not what European autonomy would mean, but why this is even a question in the first place. As a recent article in War on the Rocks posed: these are wealthy, advanced nations with acknowledged security problems and a growing awareness that continuing to rely on the United States entails long-term risks. So why do they remain so incapable of formulating their own response to crises in their neighborhood?

Unable to Act: The Long History of Failed European Defense Integration

One of the most striking aspects of the drive for European autonomy is just how long it has been ongoing. As far back as 1998, the French and British governments heralded the Saint-Malo Declaration as the dawn of a new era for the continent—one in which the EU would have the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, backed up by credible military forces. Yet even as the American troop presence dwindled from a Cold War high of hundreds of thousands to a mere 60,000 in 2013, that new era never materialized. Instead, Europe seemed to become ever more dependent on the United States.

Partially, the issues have been financial. While pre-Financial Crisis Europe had an economy roughly the same size as America's, it now has one approximately a third smaller. That figure only includes the UK—looking solely at the EU, its economy is barely half the size of the United States. This means America has naturally become more dominant in the relationship and has been able to spend far more on its military. Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations note that between 2008 and 2021, U.S. military expenditure increased from $656 billion to $801 billion. The figure for the EU and UK combined, by contrast, rose from $303 billion to a paltry $325 billion.

Clearly, money is part of the problem, but it is not the only one. After all, while Europe's economy may pale beside those of America and China, it remains the third-largest in the world. Add in non-EU member Britain—which collaborates with countries like France and Italy on defense—and there should be enough money available to fund a strong military policy. Here we reach what may be the real core problem with European defense: rather than one military investing in and procuring standardized parts, there are 28 different militaries all working wildly out of sync with one another.

A 2017 review highlighted that Europe's forces were operating 178 different types of weapons systems, compared to just 30 for the United States. While having more platforms might sound advantageous, in reality it creates disaster—characterized by duplication, wastage, and a lack of interoperability. Speaking to Politico, former French Europe Minister Nathalie Loiseau lamented that European efforts are fragmented, with tremendous wastage because the continent operates so many different models of tanks, vessels, and fighter jets.

The Fundamental Question: One Europe or Many?

In many ways, this represents a fresh twist on the core problem the EU has wrestled with over the last decade: is the continent a single, unified entity like the United States, or a collection of individual nations loosely tied together in economic union? In military procurement, at least, it is currently the latter.

For years, France, Germany, and Spain have been working together to develop their Future Combat Air System. But disagreements between Paris and Berlin have dragged the entire project into a quagmire from which it likely will not emerge before 2040. Another example highlighted in the Economist illustrates the problem: France shuns the German-led Sky Shield project to develop air defenses because it relies on non-European suppliers. German officials retort that France treats strategic autonomy as a way to use German money to support French firms.

This lack of collaboration damages Europe far more than any loss of spending power. When confronted with a limited budget, most militaries would opt for streamlining. Europe, by contrast, opts for wastage and duplication. According to Shapiro and Puglierin's paper, only 18 percent of European procurement budgets are spent in cooperation with one another. As Britain's comically inept former Prime Minister Liz Truss might say: that is a disgrace.

Fortunately, it is a disgrace that European leaders are increasingly aware of. At the Vilnius NATO summit this year, for example, the official communique specifically highlighted the need for greater defense industrial cooperation within Europe. Some nations are already pursuing this path, potentially providing a roadmap for the wider continent. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland recently signed a joint declaration of intent to create a unified Nordic Air Force, a declaration that should help streamline all four nations' procurement processes.

Yet it is not wastage alone that has made Europe such a mess in defense, nor even inter-EU rivalries. Rather, it may come down to a single, depressing issue: a lack of any unified vision about what Europe really wants to do.

Friends, Enemies, Frenemies: Europe's Strategic Schizophrenia

Given that Europe currently has a genocidal autocrat fighting a brutal war on its borders, one might expect the continent's leaders to be unified in their strategic thinking. But that is not the impression they are giving. While countries near or bordering Russia and Belarus have become extremely hawkish, some of their western neighbors act as though they still want to return to signing cheap gas deals over fine wines in Moscow.

Emmanuel Macron has particularly outraged leaders in places like Poland and the Baltic states by saying things about Putin needing an off-ramp, or how Moscow deserves security guarantees. Olaf Scholz likewise infuriated not just the eastern countries but also Britain by dithering over whether to send Ukraine Leopard II tanks last winter—dithering which helped give Russian forces time to dig in and construct robust defensive lines.

To be fair to both leaders, they seem to be changing their positions. France now officially supports Ukraine joining NATO. Germany may finally be getting its act together with rearming. Still, the damage has already been done. In places like Warsaw, Tallinn, Vilnius, and Riga, there is real anger that Paris and Berlin did not listen to them on the issue of Russia.

This makes European strategic autonomy harder to implement than ever. As long as Uncle Sam is around, Poland and others feel like someone has their back. Relying solely on Brussels, there is a sneaking suspicion that the French and Germans might greet further Russian land grabs with a resigned acceptance. As War on the Rocks put it, always skeptical about the idea of strategic autonomy, eastern states now think this would amount to strategic suicide.

This chasm of distrust between east and west means it is impossible to have real European leadership in a crisis. But it also means Europeans remain divided on their most pressing foreign policy goals. To illustrate what this would feel like for an American audience, consider Russia aside for a moment and focus on China. In Washington, there is broad, bipartisan consensus that Beijing is a strategic adversary. Even if some lawmakers are more hawkish than others, the terms of the debate have been set. Were war to break out over Taiwan, it is clear that Democrats and Republicans alike would back Taipei.

Now imagine that instead of consensus, a whole bunch of states returned lawmakers who would respond to a Taiwan war by talking about providing Xi Jinping with off-ramps. Who, prior to the war, had become dangerously hooked on Chinese investment. Who had even—as Italy's current deputy PM did with Vladimir Putin—worn t-shirts bearing Xi Jinping's face. Or who—like Viktor Orban in Hungary—seemed to be rooting for Beijing to win its war of conquest.

Obviously, the analogy is not perfect. China is across the Pacific rather than on America's doorstep, and no U.S. states were occupied by Beijing for most of the 20th century. Still, it hopefully illustrates why many eastern European countries do not trust the west to do the right thing in a crisis. The knock-on effect of this distrust is that Europe cannot formulate a common foreign policy. Without Washington to paper over the cracks and provide reassurance, things would likely be even more dysfunctional than they are now.

Strong Enough: Europe's Hidden Advantages

Hopeless as all this might sound, there are some small signs that Europe might be able to increase its autonomy. Maybe not enough for Uncle Sam to ever seriously quit NATO, but perhaps enough so Washington can at least start turning its focus to the Indo-Pacific without worrying. Signs that Europe may one day be capable of translating its economic power into military might.

Although most discourse around strategic autonomy focuses on defense, going it alone militarily is not Europe's only goal. Far less remarked upon has been the economic aspect of autonomy—an aspect that includes both Europe's successful transition off Russian gas, as well as an ongoing attempt to distance itself from China. According to the Economist, as for the economic dimension of autonomy, the EU has made marked progress.

This is because, after decades of hesitation, the bloc is finally starting to pool economic policymaking. Not just building on the massive issuance of common debt seen during the pandemic, but utilizing a host of instruments to reduce exposure to China and implementing new subsidies to speed up the green transition. This is important because it demonstrates that Europe is capable of moving quickly and making dramatic decisions when it wants to.

Consider the Russian gas cut-off the bloc endured last winter. It was painful, certainly, but also supercharged by an insane building spree. In Germany, for example, the build time for liquefied natural gas terminals was reduced from three years to just ten months. When forced to act, in other words, Europe does not simply delay with indecision. The hope is that this sort of energy—and money—could also be harnessed in the military sphere.

If it does happen, that will be extremely bad news for Russia. Because even without the UK, the EU's economy absolutely dwarfs Moscow's. Putin is overseeing a GDP seven times smaller than that of the European Union. Start spending that money wisely, and you should get a Europe strong enough to permanently deter Russian imperialism.

The Strategic Compass and Europe's Defense Industrial Base

Fortunately, spending that money wisely is something that Europe—both via the EU and via NATO—has recently pledged to do. Published the month after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Strategic Compass is an ongoing attempt to reorganize Europe's various defense industries into something more coherent. Over a timeframe of five to ten years, it envisages investment in new capabilities and technologies, increased interoperability among militaries, and a marked increase in joint deployments.

Admittedly, when the document first landed in March 2022, it was something of a dud. The European Council on Foreign Relations declared it brand new and already obsolete, noting that the Strategic Compass underlines the collective action problem at the heart of European attempts to pool defense efforts and resources: everyone agrees that closer integration is essential, but everyone wants someone else to go first.

Still, its core points have since come to be reflected in NATO communiques and national strategy documents. And there is a growing awareness that defense production and procurement needs to be better coordinated. Here we reach the potential ace up Europe's sleeve: the continent's world-class defense industrial base.

Rheinmetall, Thales, Safran, Leonardo, SAAB, BAE Systems, MBDA—the list of top-tier weapons manufacturers in Europe is enormous. The know-how and ability to build missiles, warships, tanks, fighter jets and more is deeply rooted in the continent. Now, so far, many of these makers have been unable to scale up production even as the Ukraine War grinds on—a side effect of governments refusing to guarantee purchases of equipment if the war ends before delivery. The point, however, is that the ability to do so is there. It is just a lack of political willpower that stops Europe from deploying all its massive advantages.

Of course, even if every leader on the continent suddenly saw the light tomorrow, Europe still would not be able to completely divorce itself from the United States. As the Economist notes, there are some vital capacities Europeans simply do not have in sufficient numbers—like heavy-lift, or air transport and refueling, or ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance).

But in a way, this might not really matter. Very few Europeans are advocating for a Europe that is militarily on a par with the United States. Likewise, very few Americans want to cut Europe off to the point of just sitting back and doing nothing if Putin invaded Poland. What reasonable people do want to see is a Europe that is strong enough to make Russia too scared to try anything. To make sure the Kremlin knows it will face immediate and total defeat if Putin tries to move his borders even an inch west.

Given Europe dominates Russia in terms of population, wealth, industry, and almost every other conceivable metric, this should be eminently doable. Not quite the full strategic autonomy Macron dreams of, but a gigantic step in the right direction. Not that a massive arms buildup will happen just on its own.

The New Normal: Regional Clusters as a Path Forward

A couple of sections ago, the plan to create a combined Nordic Air Force was mentioned. What works in Europe's north might work in other regions too. At least, that is what a paper from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently proposed as a way of solving Europe's defense problems.

The basic idea goes like this: although there might be too much mistrust between European states as a whole, that does not hold true at a smaller level. Across the EU and the wider continent, there are clusters of countries with shared outlooks and histories that very much do trust one another. That might be the Nordic countries, or the Benelux nations of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It might be the Baltic states, or France and Germany, or the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The point is that several of these clusters exist. So, the CSIS's argument goes, rather than try and integrate the entirety of European defense, why not just integrate these clusters? By working in small groups, European militaries can cut away a lot of wastage. Not as much as a completely unified continent could, but far more than is the case today. As CSIS notes, collective action problems are less prevalent in small groups where free riders cannot hide, members are more inclined to trust each other, identification and enforcement are easier, and group identity or solidarity may be stronger.

With that trust in place, members within each small group could divide up labor and specialization, playing to each nation's strengths. The result would be a Europe that no longer fields 178 weapons platforms and dozens of different armies, but one in which a small number of core groupings form the backbone of defense. Groupings which, crucially, trust the other members not to abandon them.

As to how to make this all work, CSIS suggests putting in place incentives and penalties designed to make cooperation the default setting within a group. Their full paper contains extensive ideas on how to accomplish this, offering a potential roadmap for European defense that acknowledges political realities while still pursuing meaningful integration and increased capability.

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FAQ

What is European strategic autonomy?

European strategic autonomy refers to the goal of Europe being able to defend itself and handle regional security crises with minimal reliance on American military power. It encompasses both military capability and economic independence, including reducing dependence on external powers like Russia and China.

Why hasn't the war in Ukraine led to a unified European defense transformation?

Instead of Brussels leading a coordinated continental response, Washington took the lead in assisting Ukraine. European support came piecemeal from individual capitals rather than as a unified effort. Many European nations, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, concluded they needed the United States more than ever, defaulting back to Cold War-era reliance on American security guarantees.

Why does America want Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense?

America's primary strategic challenge has shifted from Moscow to Beijing, an adversary far closer in might to the US than the USSR ever was. The demands of ensuring both European security and Indo-Pacific deterrence strain America's defense capacity, making it a core priority for Washington to avoid strategic overreach and free up resources for the Asia-Pacific region.

What is the core problem with European defense spending?

Rather than one military investing in standardized equipment, Europe has 28 different militaries working out of sync. This results in 178 different weapons systems (versus 30 for the US), massive duplication and wastage, and only 18 percent of procurement budgets spent cooperatively. The lack of coordination damages Europe far more than any shortfall in total spending.

Why are eastern and western European countries divided on defense strategy?

Eastern European countries near Russia—such as Poland and the Baltic states—are extremely hawkish and prioritize the Russian threat. Western leaders like France's Macron and Germany's Scholz have been criticized for suggesting Putin needs an off-ramp or dithering on military aid to Ukraine. This creates deep distrust, with eastern states viewing strategic autonomy without American backing as 'strategic suicide.'

What advantages does Europe have for building stronger defense capabilities?

Europe has the world's third-largest economy (seven times larger than Russia's), a world-class defense industrial base including companies like Rheinmetall, Thales, BAE Systems, SAAB, Leonardo, and MBDA, and has demonstrated the ability to act decisively under pressure—such as reducing German LNG terminal build times from three years to ten months during the Russian gas crisis.

What is the Strategic Compass?

Published in March 2022, the month after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Strategic Compass is an EU initiative to reorganize Europe's defense industries into something more coherent over five to ten years. It envisions investment in new capabilities and technologies, increased interoperability among militaries, and more joint deployments, though it initially faced criticism for not going far enough.

What are regional defense clusters and why might they work?

Regional defense clusters are small groups of neighboring countries with shared outlooks and histories—such as the Nordic countries, Benelux nations, or Baltic states—that integrate their defense efforts. A CSIS paper proposed this approach because collective action problems are less prevalent in small groups where free riders cannot hide, trust is higher, and group solidarity is stronger. The Nordic Air Force initiative is an early example.

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Jackson Reed

Jackson Reed creates and presents analysis focused on military doctrine, strategic competition, and conflict dynamics.

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